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Updated Firefox Security Indicators
- owenwil 11y agoNovember 2015 these rolled out, not sure why they're republishing them now
- jonathonf 11y agoYeah: "The above changes will be rolled out in Firefox 42." I assume it's somehow related to the 44 having just been released?
- robin_reala 11y agoOh yeah, weird. I tend to run Nightlies so I just assumed they were hitting release now.
- lorenzhs 11y agoThe post is from November 3, 2015. I'm not sure why this was resubmitted now.
- leeoniya 11y agowhat i really want is an indicator of how many 3rd party https domains have dumped active content onto the page. better yet, disallow this behavior entirely. the fact that banks and other critical portals can dump third party scripts like optimizely and stuff from https cdns is truly disturbing. it's such an obvious oversight to me that i dont understand how a green anything can be shown on mixed https domain sites. am i not understanding something?
- pdkl95 11y agoTry noscript? Douglas Crockford warned[1] us about years ago about the dangers of mixing 3rd party Javascript. Unfortunately, very few listened to that warning. [1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V13wmj88Zx8 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V13wmj88Zx8
- leeoniya 11y agomy argument is that there should be no need for the average user to install noscript to prevent injection from third party "secure" domains. the default should be to deny loading them in the first place. there should be a "yesscript" for those who want to assume the risk.
- pdkl95 11y agoI completely agree - Javascript is cool, but it's also a security risk that needs to be limited. For the moment, unfortunately, we're stuck running noscript (or similar).
- Silhouette 11y agoBut how do you know which resources from a separate domain are third party ones, and which are from (for example) a dedicated CDN run by the same people who operate the site you're visiting and fundamental to its normal operation? For now, there are still performance-related reasons you might want to do this, and many high volume sites do.
- pdkl95 11y agoYou don't know - which is why javascript needs to be whitelist-only, no exceptions. > performance-related reasons Security is always more important than performance. It's irresponsible to sacrifice security simply to make page loads faster. Some of these problems can be worked around in the future with authenticated hrefs (such as with a hash-check aka subresource integrity).
- Silhouette 11y agoSecurity is always more important than performance. It's irresponsible to sacrifice security simply to make page loads faster. And where does functionality fit in, in your black and white world? It's easy to make a lot of things perfectly secure, but if in doing so you give up the essential functionality that made those things useful in the first place, what have you really achieved? If you make JS whitelist-only, no exceptions, then you will break the web for huge numbers of people on huge numbers of sites they value, because JS is useful. Those people aren't going to thank you for keeping them safe, they're going to say your browser doesn't work, and then they're going to use someone else's browser that does work instead. In reality, security is nearly always a sliding scale, and the best results are nearly always achieved by balancing security against other factors like performance and functionality to keep the user as safe as possible while still providing whatever it is they actually want.
- icebraining 11y agoMixed content means HTTP+HTTPS resources, not HTTPS-only resources from multiple domains. And it's not always clear what's "third-party", as a common optimization technique is to serve static assets form a second domain, to increase the number of parallel connections.
- pdkl95 11y ago> what's "third-party" That's already defined by the same-origin policy. > a common optimization technique Optimization should never happen at the expense of security. (and yes, 3rd party scripts are a security risk) > increase the number of parallel connections. I believe that trick is to save bandwidth by not sending the (large) cookies that would normally be sent to the normal domain.
- richardwhiuk 11y ago>> increase the number of parallel connections. > I believe that trick is to save bandwidth by not sending the (large) cookies that would normally be sent to the normal domain. No, Internet Explorer (and other browsers) used to only allow a small number of connections per domain. Long running COMET requests ate up these connections, so if you wanted to simultaneously download multiple resources from a single domain, and reduce time to page ready, then you had to use multiple domains.
- extra88 11y agoThe limit is per host, not per domain. Before using CDNs became commonplace, it was not unusual for a site to use multiple hostnames of their own to spread out their content and have more parallel connections for a single page load; example.com img1.example.com, img2.example.com, etc.
- richardwhiuk 11y agoIt's per FQDN, not per host. Host refers to either an individual machine, or an IP address, and the restriction is to neither of these.
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- Freak_NL 11y agoPrivacy Badger can answer some of those questions: https://www.eff.org/privacybadger https://www.eff.org/privacybadger
- nly 11y agoI agree generally, although Subresource Integrity[0] and Content Security Policy[1] somewhat solve the problem. Not that any of this will ever be deployed[2], because they're two of the most invasive defence measures and fragile wrt updates. [0] https://www.w3.org/TR/SRI/ https://www.w3.org/TR/SRI/ [1] https://scotthelme.co.uk/content-security-policy-an-introduction/ https://scotthelme.co.uk/content-security-policy-an-introduc... [2] https://scotthelme.co.uk/how-widely-used-are-security-based-http-response-headers/ https://scotthelme.co.uk/how-widely-used-are-security-based-...
- phlo 11y ago> Not that any of this will ever be deployed[2], because they're two of the most invasive defence measures [...] SRI is going to be a tough sell. CSP, not so much. Case in point: within two years, HSTS use by Swiss Banks has gone from 0% to 40%. I managed to get the first deployment up and running, and at this point we made it into the preload lists. If just one company gets any of this stuff up and running (and whomever did it keeps pestering their colleagues at some others about it), adoption is possible. Right now I'm working on getting some traction with HPKP and CSP. HPKP is going to be challenging as doesn't offer protection against user-installed (or malware-installed) root certificates, but seeing how the cost of adoption is low, it shouldn't be impossible. CSP should be easier. Being the responsible bank we are, we aren't dropping any javascript files from CDNs into our pages. Anything running in our domain originates from there, so it's basically down to starting with -Report-Only, unsafe-eval and unsafe-inline options and gradually moving towards *-src 'self'. And it provides valuable protection against all sorts of Adware and Malware. Ping me in a year. I'm confident we'll get there by then.
- nailer 11y ago> HSTS use by Swiss Banks has gone from 0% to 40%. That's awesome. Do you have a reference? Not doubting you, just want to read more.
- phlo 11y agoSorry, I don't have a public reference. The first number came from my (unpublished) 2013 bachelor's thesis, where I surveyed the 20 biggest banks (by balance sheet) in each of CH, DE, AT, IT and FR. HSTS was very new back then, so the 0% was no big surprise. The full thesis is in German. I can send you the PDF if you're interested. For the second number, I had a look at 15 banks represented at Vontobel, Credit Suisse, J. Safra Sarasin, PostFinance, Raiffeisen, Swissquote, UBS, Valiant and the State Banks from Basel, Geneva, Grisons, Schaffhausen, Thurgovia, Zug and Zurich. Of these 15 banks, six were using HSTS: CS, PostFinance, Raiffeisen as well as Basel, Thurgovia, Zug and Zurich. Switzerland has over 200 banks in total, but many of these are small private shops, only a couple dozen actually offer e-banking. The majority of people is banking with one of the top 5 (PF/CS/Raiffeisen already are, and I'm hoping for UBS and Valiant to adopt HSTS soon-ish). The 15 I had a look at in December 2015 are responsible for the vast majority (90+%) of online banking done in Switzerland.
- angry-hacker 11y agoThen you need to detect CDN's that actually serve your content. Images and such. They can also come from your subdomain(s) of course. Maybe you could whitelist the subdomains only.
- nailer 11y ago> Maybe you could whitelist the subdomains only. https://www.npmjs.com/package/csp-by-api https://www.npmjs.com/package/csp-by-api can help with that: it contains CSPs for popular APIs so you can just add the the APIs you're using to your own CSP: var policy = cspByAPI(basePolicy, ['twitter', 'mixpanel', 'googleFonts', 'stripe', 'typekit', 'ractive'])
- anc84 11y agoanyone similarly disturbed, check out the amazing https://github.com/Synzvato/decentraleyes https://github.com/Synzvato/decentraleyes add-on which will serve those common scripts from a local cache!
- tombrossman 11y agoYou are presumably willing to trust the first-party website for content and it is not a big stretch to trust the third-party content they chose to include as well. Not much difference between trusting them to serve jQuery themselves (which they must source from a third-party initially) or link to it directly at the third-party site, for example.
- bsilvereagle 11y agoThe code they source from the third-party initially can be audited and then self hosted. If the code is not self hosted, the third party can change the script to be malicious (or be compromised) without the first party ever knowing.
- Phemist 11y agoI think this is why integrity hashes should be included anytime a CDN is used to load a third-party library. Bootstrap does this, for example: http://getbootstrap.com/getting-started/ http://getbootstrap.com/getting-started/ I'd like to see more lib providers, and even CDNs themselves, follow suit.
- Too 11y agoThank you, i always thought about this but didn't know it already existed. This should definitely be used for any content included on a page, especially third party CDN, it could also allow caching if the address changes but the content is the same.
- castell 11y agoWhy not a red "open lock" icon?
- marcosdumay 11y agoPeople look for a lock - that's the only thing everybody knows about web encryption. An open lock is still a lock, thus plenty of people will understand it as secure. On what case do you want the open lock? If this is about the active mixed content warning, I do think it's worse than the previous version. But well, it can only happen by manual intervention, so nobody will ever see it.
- K0nserv 11y agoEven more interesting: In the current Firefox nightly inputs with `type="password"` on insecure origins are being marked explicitly as insecure. This also includes common anti patterns such as loading an iframe from a secure origin on an insecure page. There's a screenshot of this on my latest blog post[1] and another article[2] on this topic. I am very happy to see browser vendors pushing for HTTPS adoption and forcing the hands of developers. Further highlighting poor security like this also means that users are made aware and can opt out of using websites with poor security practices. 1: https://hugotunius.se/2016/01/24/how-browser-vendors-are-pushing-for-https-adoption.html https://hugotunius.se/2016/01/24/how-browser-vendors-are-pus... 2: https://www.fxsitecompat.com/en-CA/docs/2015/non-https-sites-containing-login-form-will-be-marked-insecure/ https://www.fxsitecompat.com/en-CA/docs/2015/non-https-sites...
- mikegerwitz 11y agoThis is a good, important feature. Do you know what the plans are for enabling this in all editions of Firefox?
- dao- 11y agoAFAIK and contrary to what others have said, there's no plan to enable this in a release version of Firefox anytime soon. There are too many affected sites and most average users would probably just start ignoring the crossed out lock or get scared and use some other browser.
- K0nserv 11y agoHmm I was under the impression that since it's currently in Aurora it's likely to be in the end release? Do you have a source on this?
- dao- 11y agoIt's in dev edition / aurora because those aren't "release" builds, and the security.insecure_password.ui.enabled default value depends on a RELEASE_BUILD ifdef. So no, it won't automatically be enabled when current aurora moves to beta.
- phlo 11y agoI disagree with their rationale in changing the padlock used to indicate a DV certificate from grey to green (and thus mirroring EV certs) to a point: Yes, the connection is secure, but given the numerous free and automated options to obtain DV certificates, phishing sites are going to increasingly use TLS, and mostly do so using DV certificates. I guess this boils down to me actually favouring a clear divide between EV and DV. My EV connection to bankofamerica.com should be as visually different from the DV connection to the phishing site bank0famer1ca.com as possible. As it is, the Firefox UI improves visibility of encryption while I think it might be more appropriate to improve the differentiation between encryption and authentication. As for all the other states: good work. The new iconography seems more streamlined and clear to me.
- nailer 11y agoEdge has done a really nice job here: DV is a hollow grey lock, EV is a solid green lock, plus the validated company name & jurisdiction. There's way less clutter in the address bar too, so the difference is more striking: http://imgur.com/7W4YmuZ http://imgur.com/7W4YmuZ
- _nedR 11y agoFor me the presence of the organisations name in green letters emphasizes the difference. (Besides the green/grey lock difference alone is small enough to miss) The UI choice i don't like is having a hazard sign for secure websites with mixed active content blocked . Hazard sign implies some hazard exists - but in this case the hazard has been averted, so why show a hazard sign still?
- facepalm 11y agoToo complicated...
- angry-hacker 11y agoI think it's safe to assume HTTPS when it comes to browser indications is broken. In a sense that majority of user don't care or understand. I once had a client who wanted an EV cert, so the company name gets "shown nicely in the address bar". After explaining about encryption for half an hour, the only question was why should I care. It was a simple website for a company. Contacts and about us mainly. I often ask regular users, and they don't know what difference does it make, the click everything and as far as they care, the lock can even be purple. Which doesn't mean we shouldn't keep pushing https mainstream of course. Correct me if I'm wrong.
- kevhito 11y agoWhy would you do that? Did you also try to explain the beauty of diffie hellman key exchange and the details of TCP selective acknowledgement before helping your client get an EV cert?
- Flimm 11y agoGet a Wifi Pineapple device and show them how easy it is to do a MITM attack. A demonstration might make them care.
- seanwilson 11y ago> I think it's safe to assume HTTPS when it comes to browser indications is broken. In a sense that majority of user don't care or understand. I'd agree with this as well. I find summarising it as "if you enter secret details when the green lock isn't there, a hacker could steal them" isn't concrete enough to sink in for most non-technical users. To really understand what the HTTPS lock icon means let alone what mixed content warnings means requires a lot of background knowledge most of us take for granted (web servers, networking, hacking, how a web page loads scripts/images/css). Given many people still use simple passwords and the same passwords everywhere because of lack of understanding of what hackers can do, I think it's a lost cause. People do pay attention to e.g. Chrome's big red "this site is not secure" screen that you have to bypass when there's something wrong with the SSL certificate though. Showing something like this as standard would help.
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- perlgeek 11y agoThe real truble with Firefox UX regarding security is that a HTTPS connection with an untrusted certificate is more hassle than an unencrypted connection. But from a security concern, HTTPS with an untrusted certificate is better, it prevents passive eavesdropping at least. It's certainly not worse than unencrypted traffic. And yet firefox continues to make it hard to accept untrusted certificates.
- anc84 11y agoI understand their motivation as sending traffic that is expected to be secure to the wrong person is worse than knowing ones traffic is visible to all hops.
- dchest 11y agoIt is worse, and this has been discussed to death: when you go to www.facebook.com, what UX will help people distinguish between trusted certificate (all good) and untrusted (active attack)?
- marcosdumay 11y agoWhat does help you distinguish between the correct site and an HTTP attack?
- rockdoe 11y agoAn untrusted certificate is a clearer sign of an ongoing attack (or server admin incompetence).
- CaptSpify 11y agoEveryone always defends this, and I can't understand why. Here's the way I see it: unsecure-cert= me + some unknown entity can read it. no-cert = me + anyone can read it. I'd rather have some shady unknown entity read it, than everyone read it. Of course, a warning for both should exist, but IMO, the 2nd is much worse. Am I mis-understanding how this works?
- agwa 11y ago
- wooptoo 11y agoSomewhat off-topic: I feel that Firefox has improved significantly lately, even though it ceased to be the "star" browser a while ago. Its usability is much better than other browsers. On Linux for example, it integrates with GTK and the rest of the OS seamlessly. Also websites tend to display and function more accurately than in Chrome. This is subjective, it might be just me who experienced more broken websites lately.
- _asummers 11y agoI have noticed that Firefox on Android seems to keep up much better on bigger pages. I regularly browse SBNation sites and Chrome locks up to the point that I have to kill the entire browser. Firefox handles it much better, also in my anecdotal experience. That it allows you to install plug-ins like uBlock is simply a bonus. That being said, the performance on OSX at my last check seemed to be inferior to Chrome unfortunately. The development tools are still inferior, too. I want to move away from Chrome on OSX but still can't justify it.
- marcosdumay 11y agoStill no warning on HTTP sites.
- hackuser 11y agoHas Mozilla studied how end users acutally understand and respond to those icons? I have no idea what they mean, other than the plain grey lock and plain green EV lock and name.
- Too 11y agoOk, so how do i explain in two sentences to my mom if she is actually on her bank or not? Can the company name text inside the green bar for EV certificates be spoofed and used for phising?