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No Matter What the FBI Says, Compromising Encryption Is a Technical Issue
- api 11y ago"It turns out that somehow, Comey believes that the question of whether to ban encryption without backdoors is “not a technical issue.” He told the senators that “plenty of companies” provide services online while still maintaining the ability to read their users' data, and that “plenty” of smartphone manufacturers can unlock encrypted phones. Thus, he concluded, “it’s a business model question.”" If you read between the lines a bit, it's clear that what they want is encryption to/from cloud hubs where data is stored using escrowed keys (a.k.a. server-side "encryption"). Many services already more or less do this, so the goal would be to push the entire market in this direction and then eventually to outlaw or otherwise restrict systems that do not work in this way. This fits in with the dumb terminal / mainframe model of the Internet being pushed to varying degrees by most of the tech giants these days and with Amazon's vision for IoT. It's stupid and naive to claim that there is some technical barrier to what the FBI wants. It's actually quite easy if we apply a bit of government pressure to push the Internet even further toward the "put everything in the cloud" direction it's already going. Anything in the cloud is almost by definition backdoored.
- lmitchell 11y agoThe article does label key escrow as 'technical means that badly compromise their users’ security'. Now I'll be the first to admit that I'm not an expert, but saying 'well, you can use key escrow' ignores the fact that the authors label key escrow as one of the ways not to do it.
- Zigurd 11y ago> Many services already more or less do this... Those services can't be trusted now where part of the threat model is corrupt, hostile, and/or authoritarian state actors. Unless you think America is the only place you'll conduct business that needs secure communication, that's not a viable "solution."
- mindslight 11y agoHonestly the EFF should pivot their marketing directly to this, rather than staying abstract and getting lost in the noise - "FBI Director James Comey wants to help authoritarian regimes spy on Americans simply to make his agency's job easier"
- lazaroclapp 11y ago"Unless you think America is the only place you'll conduct business that needs secure communication", and you trust the US government in the general, and you trust each individual government agent or employee with that kind of access not be corrupt, and you trust each such agent or employee to be super-competent as to not be hacked by an hostile third party, and you trust the cloud company in the general, and you trust each employee of that company with access to not be corrupt and to be super-competent... and so on and so forth. The fact that we currently mostly use systems where we need to trust a large number of people with our data only to communicate with one another doesn't mean that those systems are the right ones to build, even at a relatively apolitical technical level. The early internet, before HTTPS was common, added a large number of interconnected ISPs to that list of 'fully trusted by design' parties. That was, as we have recognized for decades, a design bug. One which we are only now starting to fix adequately. Trusting the cloud providers with full access to all data stored or even processed by them is a similar design mistake. (Not saying that there isn't ever a use case to send data to a company so that they offer a service by processing it, but simply storing and transmitting private messages between two users shouldn't count as giving that data to the cloud provider anymore than it counts as giving that data to the ISP)
- mindslight 11y ago> Anything in the butt is almost by definition backdoored Pretty much. The TLAs are whining because they got used to wholesale vacuuming of butt data, and now the pendulum is poised to swing the other way. IMHO Apple is merely poking a hornet's nest, because it will be quite easy for USG to force them to modify their centrally-distributed software. The only truly defensible position we have is Free software. Whether there's enough interest/money to support its wide scale adoption is one of the major questions of our time.
- hueving 11y agoGreatest instance of the 'cloud-to-butt' translator I've seen.
- yuhong 11y agoNot so easy when there is no law requiring them to do so. In iMessage, Apple still has the keys but the forward secrecy is enough to exclude it from CALEA because of the way the "encryption" exception was designed. This of course caused FBI to complain, which among other example of encryption made encryption backdoors a political issue again in the first place.
- mindslight 11y agoIt's USG. Creating new authoritarian laws, especially indirectly applied through companies, is basically what it does.
- yuhong 11y agoWhich reminds me that CALEA, DMCA and the like was passed in the 1990s, when not as many people was using the Internet as today. SOPA/PIPA was passed in a time when everyone for example is using Google, which is why the protests was so effective. In this case, such a law requiring backdoors would be likely unconstitutional (it was tried in the 1990s too), which is why FBI is resorting to other methods.
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- Ar-Curunir 11y agoOutsourcing your computation to the cloud doesn't have to be insecure, if you trust the code you're running (perhaps it's your own code). Cryptographers call this delegated computation, and while modern techniques are still VERY slow, there has been a lot of progress in the past few years, and I think the landscape of these techniques will look much better. Of course, we still have to contend with the case where the software you use is NOT owned or trusted completely by you. That's a different problem that IMO can only be solved by open source software.
- topspin 11y ago"Comey believes..." Comey is the emptiest suit I've ever seen testify before Congress. Comey is told by his handlers what he should claim to believe and otherwise he carefully avoids believing anything. At one point today he really showed his ass. After tacitly agreeing with Leahy about "an Internet sale" of a gun which implied anyone could order a gun online without a background check, Graham asked Comey if such a purchase would be "delivered to my home." When asked this question, the Director of the FBI, an organization that, along with the ATF, orchestrated the Fast and Furious gun-walking scheme and therefore should have absolutely zero confusion about the exclusive role of FFL holders in the transfer of firearms in the United States and the harsh federal penalties for anyone that fails to obey the relevant laws, answered in public, complete with a genuinely quizzical look; "... I assumed it's shipped to you, but I don't know for sure actually ..." Full stop. Not one shred of a clue. Un. Freaking. Believable. There is nothing there. Comey is literally propping up a suit for the cameras.
- mrsteveman1 11y agoIf we're going to have an argument over who needs to change their "business model" so the FBI's anti-terrorism mission is easier, gun manufacturers and sellers should be at the top of the list, not software companies.
- fein 11y agoHow exactly? If anything this outlines the failure of NICS; not gun manufacturers and FFL's.
- 67726e 11y agoHow is it a failure of NICS?
- fein 11y agoWe have plenty of gun laws and methods of checking criminal history already; additional restrictions and laws don't change the fact that criminals are willing to be criminals. Unless you just want to take guns away from all civilians forever, and in that case I don't think we can have an actual rational dialogue. edit: I don't mean "you" specifically, I mean the general "you". I can see how that could read wrong.
- satori99 11y ago> Unless you just want to take guns away from all civilians forever, and in that case I don't think we can have an actual rational dialogue. Can I ask why not? I mean, why is it irrational to suggest that civilians not be allowed to own powerful weapons designed to kill humans?
- aianus 11y ago> I mean, why is it irrational to suggest that civilians not be allowed to own powerful weapons designed to kill humans? Because criminals don't care about laws and then they would become the only ones with guns. A law abiding citizen should be allowed the necessary means to protect himself, his family, and his possessions. Besides that, they're not necessarily designed to kill humans; plenty of people need guns to defend against animals (like anyone working in bear country, farmers protecting chickens against coyotes, etc.)
- Briel 11y agoFederal agencies didn't flag the San Bernardino killers despite the fact they apparently considered an earlier attack, had connections with known radicalized persons, was radicalized for many years and other serious warning signs. Having access to encrypted communications is just going add a lot more information to monitor and thus more noise to filter out for federal agencies, who are already bad at catching the red flags. The answer here isn't MORE surveillance, it's more TARGETED surveillance ie devising much more precise warning patterns to look out for. For example, the San Bernardino killers apparently took out a massive loan and emptied their bank accounts prior the attack.
- hueving 11y ago>For example, the San Bernardino killers apparently took out a massive loan and emptied their bank accounts prior the attack. This happens quite frequently when people are going to make a big purchase or pay off another loan with worse terms. It's not as much of a red flag as you would think.
- 91bananas 11y agoBut coupled with the stated other red flags, this one is bright red with big red arrows pointing to it.
- vlunkr 11y agoSure, but taking out a massive loan in coordination with other signs, like buying guns, would start to paint a better picture.
- compactmani 11y agoI believe the word is "context."
- marcosdumay 11y agoThat done by somebody that the police should be monitoring closely should raise some flags. Problem is, the police seems to be spending the resources that should be monitoring those people on monitoring everybody.
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- austenallred 11y agoCan someone explain to me how a proposed government backdoor into encryption would work? Is every creator of encryption software supposed to build in a master key and hand that over to the FBI? I ask this in all seriousness, as I cannot fathom how such a system would be implemented, even disregarding the Constitution and the willingness of those creating the software.
- jrcii 11y agohttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_escrow https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_escrow https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secret_sharing https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secret_sharing It's a terrible idea. The only proposed methods with theoretically possible security would suffer insurmountable side channel issues. Edit: more https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/97690/MIT-CSAIL-TR-2015-026.pdf https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/97690/MIT-CSA...
- austenallred 11y agoThat makes sense (technologically). Still a terrible idea but I understand how it would be done now, thanks.
- Arainach 11y agoSteven Levy wrote an excellent book about the first big battle over encryption standards in the 90s, "Crypto". One of the more heavily pushed "solutions" was the Clipper Chip, which was essentially key escrow.
- newman314 11y agoSee also TSA Master keys for a physical implementation and how well that works (or not). [1] [1] https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/09/tsa_master_keys.html https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/09/tsa_master_ke...
- coderdude 11y agoLike most insane directives I'd imagine this one isn't intended for the masses. Only for the ones you want to compel. This isn't as technical an issue as we'd want to believe. They want to be able to light a fire under your ass. Once they light that fire, the technical issues are moot.
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- dcw303 11y ago> the FBI will rely on backroom pressure to make companies compromise encryption, or even eliminate business models it doesn’t like. What does this imply for FOSS? I can't really see the feds organizing a sit down with the maintainers of the hot new crypto algo repo hosted on Github.
- alextgordon 11y agoIn the US, publication of source code is free speech protected by the first amendment. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bernstein_v._United_States https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bernstein_v._United_States
- theandrewbailey 11y agoSite note: publication/distribution of runnable binary code isn't necessarily 1st amendment protected. There aren't any laws[0] about it, and there haven't been any federal court decisions[0] over it. [0]that I know of. IANAL.
- sobinator 11y agoI watched Comey's entire hearing today. The article here is accurate, but I think that it takes an strongly opinionated view of Comey's guarded and yet honest responses. Comey knows that the solution to this problem won't be solved with legislation, which is why he isn't going to expend his energy trying to accomplish what the EFF suggests as a solution. One good thing to consider is that the EFF and the FBI both recognize that encryption can be an evil thing and that actions need to be taken to protect the citizens and the government that serves them. With respect to the debate I'm seeing here in the comments, it seems like, to me, that there is a considerable amount of misunderstanding. What was discussed today wasn't the issue of mass surveillance, but of how or even IF these companies that offer secure communication services could aid in FBI investigations. That is both a technical and a non-technical issue. Comey calls it a non-technical issue simply because he thinks the solution ought to be left to the technical people at each company, and that in principle, regardless of encryption strength, these companies should offer a way to help the FBI in these exceptional instances. I think people here are seeing one or the other side and not realizing that Comey is aware of both.
- sillysaurus3 11y agoOne good thing to consider is that the EFF and the FBI both recognize that encryption can be an evil thing and that actions need to be taken to protect the citizens and the government that serves them. It's not a useful classification. Encryption can be used for evil, just as everything else in the world can. Comey calls it a non-technical issue simply because he thinks the solution ought to be left to the technical people at each company, and that in principle, regardless of encryption strength, these companies should offer a way to help the FBI in these exceptional instances. There's a difference between leaving it to technical people to help, and forcing technical people to help. Legislation is the route to the latter. There is no way for technical people to help against a good cryptosystem unless that cryptosystem has been subverted from the start. This is the new world we live in, and it's up to law enforcement to either recognize that fact, or weaken American encryption relative to the rest of the world, with predictable consequences. EDIT: "The Horror of a 'Secure Golden Key'" https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8428632 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8428632