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Why Johnny Still Can't Encrypt: Evaluating the Usability of a Modern PGP Client
- dorfsmay 11y agoI personally have started to use enigmail in Thunderbird a lot more since it has its newer, much more intuitive interface.
- stuaxo 11y agoThis is something that the UX people of gnome could actually be useful for..
- dredmorbius 11y agoI'm yet to be convinced they'd be useful for anything. Other than, perhaps, signing on to a competing project to bring it down as well.
- lmm 11y agoBut they've made gnome worse, not better.
- bruo 11y agoWorse for some people and better for other. My mother (58) and my grand mother (82) love how easily is to do what they usually do contrasted to the windows 8 experience. I don't know if that is a common case or not, but at least it's not a definitive "worse" or "good". And for me, it's great as I never got a call to ask me where is something anymore.
- kuschku 11y agoWell, my little sister (12) and my dad (56) love KDE Plasma, as it’s "simpler than windows".
- snassar 11y agoThis paper should be titled: Why Johnny Still, Still Can't Use Mailvelope: Evaluating the Usability of Mailvelope.
- bluegate010 11y agoYes, we probably would have gotten better usability scores if we developed our own PGP client with a better UX and tutorials. We selected Mailvelope because it was rated highly on the EFF's secure messaging scorecard [1] and we were exploring how the state-of-the-art in PGP software actually performed with end users. [1] https://www.eff.org/secure-messaging-scorecard https://www.eff.org/secure-messaging-scorecard
- tptacek 11y agoThere is a lot wrong with that scorecard, and it's dispiriting to hear that it is actually influencing research.
- rakoo 11y agoWhere can we read more about what's wrong with this scorecard ?
- bluegate010 11y agoInteresting; I'd really like to hear what issues you have with that scorecard.
- tptacek 11y agoMatthew Green and I had a bet for the last year, which just ended, over libotr's security; I bet him that nobody would find a sev:hi flaw in it all year, and, of course, won, because at this point all the low-hanging fruit in libotr has been shaken out. That bet was a reaction to the release of the EFF scorecard, which at the time gave Cryptocat(†) a perfect score but dinged ChatSecure, which is a libotr client, for not having an audit done. I told Matthew Green I'd write up something about the bet, and what did get reported to me about libotr; I'll probably spend a few thousand words critiquing the scorecard there. A brief outline, though: * There are places where the scorecard is factually misleading. For instance: there seems to be no coherence to what "source code available for inspection" means; it still lists Telegram as being open source! * It's oversimplified in misleading ways as well. Systems which technically have the capability of verifying peers are given big green checkmarks even when that feature is so broken as to be useless. And, of course, there's the "been audited recently" checkmark, which, as anyone familiar with software security auditing will tell you, means absolutely fuck-all (again: ponder the fact that libotr, which has been a high-profile target for something like a decade and is more or less frozen stable, was counted as "not audited", while projects that got a 1-week drive-by from a firm specializing in web security got a big green checkmark). * What does "security design properly documented" even mean? Where's the methodology behind the chart? A few paragraphs of text aimed at laypeople isn't a documented methodology! The one place they eventually did add documentation --- "what's a good security audit" --- tries to explain a bunch of stuff that has almost nothing to do with the quality of software security inspection, and then throws up its hands and says "we didn't try to judge whether projects got good audits". Why? Why didn't they consult any named outside experts? They could have gotten the help if they needed it; instead, they developed this program in secret and launched it all at once. * The project gives equal time to systems that nobody uses (at one point, Cryptocat was near the top of the list, and ChatSecure was actually hidden behind a link!), and is ranked alphabetically, so that TextSecure, perhaps the only trustworthy cryptosystem on this list (with the possible exception of the OTR clients) is buried at the bottom. * If the point of this chart is to educate laypeople on which cryptosystem to use, how is anyone supposed to actually evaluate it? They don't really say. Is it ok to use Jitsi's ZRTP, despite missing the "recent audit" checkbox? What about Mailvelope, which is missing the forward-secrecy checkbox? Can anyone seriously believe it's a better idea to use Telegram or Cryptocat, both flawed ad-hoc designs, than TextSecure or ChatSecure? I guess I can't be brief about this after all. Grrr. This scorecard drives me nuts. I am not saying that these flaws in any way impacted your particular research project. PS: an old thread on this: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8557654* https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8557654* † 31580544b27c10736ebe1bdd05a56d96c486823d563d4493c317548976c3d8db
- pen2l 11y agoShould be considered with moxie's piece: http://www.thoughtcrime.org/blog/gpg-and-me/ http://www.thoughtcrime.org/blog/gpg-and-me/
- jokoon 11y agoIsn't there a firefox extension that can just do some PGP stuff with some right click in gmail ?
- diafygi 11y agoYep! https://www.mailvelope.com/ https://www.mailvelope.com/
- sirclueless 11y agoDid you guys read the paper, or even the abstract? This whole paper is about Mailvelope and the difficulty people had using it.
- slipstream- 11y agoMaybe that's the joke.
- longlivegnu 11y agoI mean using (Keybase) https://keybase.io/ https://keybase.io/ is pretty easy
- jmsdnns 11y agothis is specifically the problem they are trying to solve, too
- enginnr 11y agoOne click encryption is one click too many
- patrickaljord 11y agoI created an account there and never used it ever again, same for most people I know. Even the rock stars featured there don't seem to be using it. Also, in what world is a cli tool with a git-like interface "pretty easy" outside of the tiny world of computer programmers?
- mike-cardwell 11y agoSame here. I set up a Keybase account and never used it. And I'm somebody who actually uses PGP every day.
- aidos 11y agoI have a keybase account that I used it the other day to have a few secrets sent to me from various sources. I have to say, even as a complete geek, I wasn't that thrilled with the experience. I have a new machine so I had to go through the setup process. First I had to install node/npm, and then their stuff, and then some other PGP apps. The whole thing felt really clumsy. I'm a bit of encryption novice, but for what I get, it feels like the openssl tools on my mac should be able to do everything without having to jump through all the hoops. Then there's the user experience on the other side. I had to send people to the keybase page to get them to generate the message and then email / send that to me. That's annoying and probably verges on terrifying for non-geeks. Afterwards I thought to myself, why can't I sent up an html / js page with my public key in? It would have a single box called "Send something to me" and it could do the encryption client side and then fire me an email, or stick it in firebase, or whatever. I know this doesn't solve all of the issues (trust etc) but when I'm just trying to give customers a way of getting me a password or something without them sending it via email it goes a long way and removes a lot of the friction.
- squidlogic 11y agoI think of it like this: usability can be a security feature. If you build a "perfectly secure" piece of software, but it takes a very high level of skill to use it, your users will use something else that is easier to use, but less secure. And then how has your ideologically perfect piece of software helped improve their security? If you make tradeoffs for usability, you will raise the bar because people will actually use what you make.
- x5n1 11y agoFork Thunderbird or some such client, also make a web client available. Make a new service which offers only encrypted e-mail by default (with a new e-mail address that includes e-mail hosting for your own domain) and provides the key server and everything else. Advertise it as something different from e-mail like encrypted e-mail. Set a new precedent, create a new industry.
- munin 11y agoso like hushmail?
- x5n1 11y agoNo you need to provide a desktop client, open source, by default with everything configured in addition to the service. I guess you should also let users use other IMAP servers but the client should always encrypt all mails it sends out. Hushmail was always open to court order attack, a desktop client, an open source one, is much less so. It should always put the name of the client in the subject line or send some unencrypted text along with each message on where they can get a client to view the message. And the client should be able to configure itself with minimal input, sort of like Thunderbird does right now with most e-mail services. And generate, transmit, and store your public key to anyone upon request.
- munin 11y agooh ok. this is actually harder to solve than just 'here have thunderbird'. how do you replicate keys across computers? how do you send e-mail from a new computer when you don't have access to your old computer (it turns out the answer is you don't). how do you back up your keys? where do you store them? there are some high security answers like "ship our users HSMs" but those are very brittle to common failure modes like "i lost it". I think you'll discover that if you try to create something that is both resilient to average negligent use but still encrypted, you'll wind up with something that is basically hushmail.
- bluegate010 11y agoHey HN, I'm one of the authors on this paper. I'd be happy to answer any questions.
- diafygi 11y ago> While our results are disheartening, we also discuss several ways that participant experiences and responses indicate how PGP could be improved. Have you approached the developers of both Mailvelope and Gmail to discuss these improvements? How did they respond? Also, have you participated in usability discussion with the OpenPGP developer community at large? Any insights? I ask because it seems like everyone who isn't very active in the OpenPGP developer community thinks that usability is a high priority. But, in my experience, when you start to bring up the topic of user-friendliness in the mailing lists, you get resistance or apathy. It seems like this is a problem of culture and incentives. How can those issues be addressed?
- bluegate010 11y agoWe haven't reached out to Mailvelope/Gmail developers, nor have we opened a usability dialogue with the OpenPGP community. We're still in the process of getting these results published. Your experience with that community is interesting though.
- Natanael_L 11y agoPlease talk to the OpenKeychain developers. That's the best PGP implementation I know of. Also keybase.io.
- bhickey 11y agoGiven the usability and technical problems with PGP, do you think it's worth saving?
- nickpsecurity 11y agoIt's one of only 2 or 3 techs mentioned in Snowden leaks as capable of blocking NSA. GPG specifically. That's enough reason to build on and around it until we have a usable solution just as strong.
- jabo 11y agoI think GPGTools for OSX does a great job of a client.
- patrickmay 11y agoSeconded. Unfortunately the webmail services don't have the same simple interface.
- Perceptes 11y agoI've been pretty happy with it, but I'm also a programmer with interest in and knowledge of why it's important and how it's useful. I can see non-technically-inclined family and friends being very confused by it.
- tolle 11y agoTo bad theres no GPGTools for iOS. And the chances of Apple opening up the mail client for it is slim. Also, the licenses could be a problem?
- makmanalp 11y agoI think it's easy to pick on a weak example, but much progress has been made since the original "Why Johnny Can't Encrypt". A recent example: Textsecure / Signal has been very, very smooth for me and I doubt it'd be much more difficult for laypeople either: https://whispersystems.org/ https://whispersystems.org/
- bburshteyn 11y agoAgreed, Whisper is doing this right.
- Perceptes 11y agoAlthough, like mentioned in above comments, Signal does not hide metadata, which can be as valuable to attackers as the contents of the messages themselves. Also, in terms of adoption, it's still hard when everyone has phones that use iMessage or SMS by default. iMessage is end-to-end encrypted, but not compatible with Signal, and Android has no equivalent baked in. Using Signal requires two extra steps for the user 1) downloading/installing Signal 2) knowing about it and caring enough to use it in the first place.
- patrickaljord 11y agoReal secure encryption is and always will be not user friendly because it means only you can know the private key. This means no "Forgot my password" functionalities, no fancy powerful cloud AI analyzing your data and suggesting cool stuff, no free hosted full text search of your data, no open directory of friends to search on etc. So basically, no gmail, icloud, facebook, dropbox etc. It would require a complete new paradigm, sure there are interesting techs such as ethereum and bitcoin but they are not user friendly, and don't scale much to the regular user (downloading the whole blockchain is a no-no to most people for example) but most importantly, current solutions are too convenient and work really well (bar privacy and security issues most don't care about). So you'd need a tech that not only is way better, more efficient and smarter than current ones (gmail, google, facebook, icloud etc) but also secure and decentralized. Not happening any time soon but hopefully not impossible either.
- iak8god 11y agoBecause I have no interest in memorizing keys, I store them on disk protected by a passphrase. I don't know if this counts as "Real secure encryption" but it's sure a lot more secure than more typical use of email.
- patrickaljord 11y agoYou can store it on disk protected by a passphrase but that's still not user friendly as way too few people would be willing to or capable of doing so which was my main point. My point is that secure encryption is by definition impractical, inconvenient and not user friendly which makes its adoption by mainstream users very unlikely at least in the foreseeable future.
- bburshteyn 11y agoOur approach here is to make security usable to developers via a programmatic interface/API, so users' data is better protected without them having to do anything at all. https://www.trycryptomove.com https://www.trycryptomove.com Eventually if/when we think about making consumer-facing wrappers to CryptoMove, the key is going to be usability. Security will need to be as easy/fun as consumer applications. Easier said than done though.
- mbrock 11y agoI think we should start with an EXTREMELY simple app that does not attempt to do any fancy e-mail client integration, but is aimed at making it possible for non-nerds to send one-off secure mails and files in a way that is at least SLIGHTLY fun. Keybase, GPGTools, and all of these things have different features and menus and all kinds of stuff which makes them EXTREMELY intimidating. My mom is a teacher of computers, she is an expert at Excel and basic Windows things and Twitter and mail and she's even somewhat into Bitcoin, but crypto makes her instantly freeze into "oh my god what is happening I am terrified and confused" mode. Today she needed to send some encrypted JPGs to verify her identity for some Bitcoin wallet thing. The support asked her to please encrypt her stuff with our public key. When she opened that public key it came up in Notepad++ as a huge intimidating block of random characters. That was probably enough to put her in a bad mood. After that she wasn't very receptive and I guarantee that every single guide or tutorial or program would be WAY too nerdy, boring, and complicated for her to follow step one. Anyway I just did it for her on my Mac and I explained my thoughts as I did it and she said "see I understand the concepts but it's just too much stuff to know about to actually do it myself." I said "yeah, that's what Snowden keeps saying, these things are just too difficult for normal people. Even Glenn Greenwald, that journalist you know, apparently he sucks at computers and it took him months to even install the crypto app." So I wish I could have said "just go to crypto.express" (random made up available memorable domain) and follow the easy steps and you can encrypt your zip file pretty easily with just drag and drop and it's totally made for newbies but still Snowden-level secure. I don't really think people in general relate to the paranoid wish to encrypt all your mail. They probably think more in terms of specific secrets that they care about protecting. So you could get them started on use cases like sending passport photos, passwords, codes, credit card numbers, or dick pics or whatever it may be. Once they have some tiny bit of successful experience with using private/public keys that one time, and it wasn't super impossible like they thought, they might be more open to learning more sophisticated ways of using crypto, such as automatically encrypting and signing mail.
- lisper 11y agoWhat do you think of this? https://github.com/Spark-Innovations/SC4 https://github.com/Spark-Innovations/SC4
- calebm 11y agoThis doesn't solve the problem of email encryption, but I made a (web-based) file encryption app with the goal of usability: https://hypervault.github.io/ https://hypervault.github.io/
- Decade 11y agoBackwards compatibility is the killer. The whole design of PGP is to be the envelope to make email private, versus the plaintext postcard that everybody can read. It works with existing servers and existing mail clients. The biggest Snowden revelation is the importance of metadata. Just knowing whom you talk to, when, is frequently enough to compromise the parties involved. You might be doing something legal now, but you can’t tell when some despot takes over and makes your activity illegal. When data can potentially last your lifetime, you need to consider this sort of thing. Illustration: Using Metadata to find Paul Revere. [1] So, we need a new mail transmission protocol that limits the amount of metadata that can be seen. Something like Dark Mail [2]. I don’t think Open Whisper Signal hides the metadata. The problem is that Dark Mail needs to be developed and its security reviewed, and people need to adopt it. It needs new servers and clients, and the prevalence of Windows shows just how difficult that problem is. Also, any new messaging program these days needs a story about web and mobile. In practice, I heard someone say that the biggest improvement in people’s privacy has been use of Gmail. The clients connect to it with SSL certificates controlled by Google; Google promotes 2-factor authentication and access tokens; and Google’s legal team challenges subpoenas. As long as you are not leaking national security secrets, I think this is adequate until a better system is deployed. [1] http://kieranhealy.org/blog/archives/2013/06/09/using-metadata-to-find-paul-revere/ http://kieranhealy.org/blog/archives/2013/06/09/using-metada... [2] https://darkmail.info https://darkmail.info
- baudehlo 11y agoSMTP with TLS doesn't leak any metadata except the connecting IP address. And with DMARC you can mandate it. Calls for whole new protocols for email are usually made by people who don't understand the email ecosystem as it currently stands.
- function_seven 11y agoCan the TLS be enforced by the sender all the way through the chain to the destination mailbox?
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- moonbug 11y agoPGP's UX is so dismal I could almost believe the whole project operates under an NSA false flag.
- mschuster91 11y agoThe problem is a lack of funds. It was concieved for nerds by nerds and never got enough funding for UX. A common state in the FOSS universe.
- Asbostos 11y agoThat's not funding. That's boredom or perhaps ideology. Most FOSS developers don't bother thinking about UX or even implementing a UI because it's boring. They're interested in the high-tech stuff that their software can do and hope somebody else will put a front end on it. But usually nobody does - at least not an open source front end - because all other FOSS developers are also more interested in the specific technical thing their software does. I make money developing a front end for a popular but absolutely unusable piece of FOSS software. Other companies do too. It sometimes feels a bit wrong that the open source guys have done the biggest and hardest job for free, while I profit just slapping some windows and dialog boxes over the top of it. But they really don't want to do that part of it and have openly said they think their UI is fine and that people would benefit from learning to use a command driven interface.
- iza 11y agoWhat ever happened to Google's "End-To-End" Chrome extension? https://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2014/06/making-end-to-end-encryption-easier-to.html https://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2014/06/making-end...
- dguido 11y agoIt's still being worked on. Turns out, getting these things right from a crypto and a UX perspective is hard.
- enginnr 11y agoA lot of baseline configs can be implemented to setup opportunistic crypto, for what Ben Brookes calls 'starbucks hacker bob' https://brooksreview.net/2013/06/encrypting-stuff-against-starbucks-hacker-bob/ https://brooksreview.net/2013/06/encrypting-stuff-against-st...
- jordanpg 11y agoI see two major barriers to mass adoption of any crypto system that requires a UI. 1. Abstraction. For the non-expert, the only metaphor that works for PKI is that of physical security. The concept of a "key" as a series of characters or a file that must be protected must be replaced by an abstraction that allows users to protect it in the same way they understand how to protect a key or a wallet. So long as the "key" continues to appear to be an enormous password, people will continue to treat it that way, along with all the crazy worst-practices in the world. Not to mention the huge host of problems that accompanies key security for the layman. I don't know what the answer is, but I do think that a physical token of some sort is the right start. 2. At the end of the day, the vast majority of people are not interested in the trade off between better security and convenience. There is a learning curve, however shallow it can be made, and those that genuinely want or need better security are motivated enough to do the learning. For everyone else, it's like optional homework. I would add to this that most everyone I know who cares about security is quite comfortable with a large array of APIs and software to do all sorts of cryptographic gymnastics. The bar is quite low already -- it has been for some time, IMO.
- jakejake 11y agoI agree that some terminology could make it easier. I think "key" is an ok choice for the private key, but for the public key I think there could be a better analogy. Calling them the same thing is a bit confusing and people don't understand that one of them you give away, while the other is confidential. When I explain it to people I tell them that their public key is like an unlocked lockbox that you give people into which they can put a private message. They can close the box to lock it, but once they shut the box only you have the key to open it. It's not a great analogy but it seems to me that the public key does not make sense as a "key" to the average person.
- maxerickson 11y agoI think if it can be made to work, a better framing is in terms of establishing a secure channel and then communicating/sharing something over that channel. Don't make the user think about the underlying mechanism at all. The hardest part is probably getting the public key distributed, but that can just be "Check if Bill can receive over a secure channel."
- jnpatel 11y agoIt's worth mentioning, the original paper [0] recently won the USENIX Security 2015 Test of Time Award [1], which highlights papers at least 10 years old, that have made a lasting impact on their field. [0]: http://www.gaudior.net/alma/johnny.pdf http://www.gaudior.net/alma/johnny.pdf [1]: https://www.usenix.org/conferences/test-of-time-awards https://www.usenix.org/conferences/test-of-time-awards
- rogeryu 11y agoGiven the fact that https://protonmail.com https://protonmail.com is still offline after several days of attacks, will secure mail ever get a chance?
- fonosip 11y agoFor occasional pgp use, a webapp is as easy as it goes. https://ssl.ba.net/util/pgp/ https://ssl.ba.net/util/pgp/ No need to store or remember keys, just create a new key for your conversation. All encyption / decryption is done client-side with open source code.
- lordofmoria 11y agoPGP does have a legitimate use case, namely Edward Snowden: he's technical, the NSA is his main threat vector, and it makes sense for him to spend lots of time reasoning about the web of trust, signing keys, double-checking fingerprints, and creating 12-minute explainer-videos for people he needs to communicate with (for reference: https://vimeo.com/56881481 https://vimeo.com/56881481). Here's the problem: not everyone needs the stringent encryption guarantees that Snowden needed. There is value in crypto systems that are less demanding than PGP, especially if they come with vast increases in usability. iMessage, I think, is what most people need in their everyday life. It's end-to-end encrypted, and although it has a central key-server, it is backed by Apple, which has publicly announced their commitment to user privacy. Yes, a central key-server means that you can't verify the fingerprints Apple gives you, but again, that's not what iMessage's encryption was designed for. If you need that level of certainty, use Signal.
- anon1mous 11y agoWhat a non-sense. We live in the information era, information nowadays is the ultimate power. Democracy depends on the balance of power between the people and the government. If the government has all the data, it has all the power.
- fukusa 11y agoApple is committed to destroy Google, not to protect user privacy.
- jheriko 11y agoi'm not entirely sure this is worthy of a paper... its pretty much a common sense conclusion to reach if you've ever tried to use these things that the UX is usually terrible - even by the standards of a technical user. too many manual efforts need to be made, even after setting up software that is purely designed to make this sort of thing easier. mailvelope is a good example though - i've tried using it, but its not very clear what to do with it, and even once you get to the point of having the button appear in your gmail or whatever you have to then go and do even more things before you can actually send something that is encrypted. optimising this workflow should be trivial... a lot of this stuff can be done for you, e.g. by automatically enabling for common webmail sites, automatically generating some keys for you etc.
- mikeytown2 11y agoIf someone could use your public SSH from say Github and send you a private message that would be great. From my understanding that is not possible. You need to generate and exchange PGP keys before, a major UX issue. Allow SSH public keys to be used and we'll be a lot closer to fixing the secure email issue.
- anon1mous 11y agoBut they can, it's just not PGP.
- nailer 11y agoAlso Facebook (which has an official onion site to help if your internet connection is suspect) has GPG as a standard part of all user profiles. This would be a much more normal person directory than GitHub or MIT ( yes someone on HN suggested MIT as a mainstream PGP directory)
- rakoo 11y agoFriends (https://moose-team.github.io/friends/ https://moose-team.github.io/friends/) allows you to use your SSH keys but it's not email anymore.
- kstrauser 11y agoThat's pretty much what https://keybase.io https://keybase.io does, in a roundabout way. It links your public identity across many social networks to a PGP key, so you could say "let me talk to kstrauser on GitHub" (or on Hacker News!) and it would map that back to my public key.
- thangalin 11y agoHere is a list of steps to send a signed e-mail: http://davidjarvis.ca/dave/tech/privacy.shtml http://davidjarvis.ca/dave/tech/privacy.shtml Once signing is in place, you can send an encrypted e-mail: https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/digitally-signing-and-encrypting-messages https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/digitally-signing-and-e... Here's the response from Robert Hansen on why Enigmail has such a complicated process: > Here's the heart of the problem: "Modifying the wizard to account for average users" works only if you can define an 'average user'. And you can't, the same way that I can't. Please don't misunderstand me, it's not my intent to slight you or your willingness to do a lot of hard work. (Quite the opposite: I really hope you're willing to do it!) But we have to start by looking at the realities, and the reality is the the GnuPG-using community is incredibly fractious and prone to declaring holy wars over the most trivial and irrelevant of details. > If you set key generation to default to 4096-bit keys, a lot of people will roll their eyes and accuse you of subscribing to key length fetishism. If you leave the default at GnuPG's default of 2048-bit keys, a lot of people will scream that you're not providing enough security. > If you default to inline PGP, international users and people who love HTML mail will complain the default doesn't work for them. If you default to PGP/MIME, people who post to mailing lists will scream that your change just broke their communications. (Not a joke, incidentally: there are a lot of mailing lists that strip all attachments as a security measure... which has the side effect of completely breaking PGP/MIME.) > The reason why we ask so many questions in the wizard is not because we're afraid of losing existing users, although that would definitely be a consequence if we were to go with your more simplified way. The reason why we ask so many questions is because we cannot know which option a user will demand to use and will think should be enabled by default. > If we can't come up with a default that will work just fine out-of-the-box for 95% of our userbase, then we're not going to make it a default. We'll ask the user for their preference. And that's the reason why our wizard asks so many questions: we ask questions when there is no clearly correct default. I think he's wrong. Flexible software would have a default wizard for basic users and an advanced wizard for users who care about the difference between 2048- and 4096-bit keys. It's one question at the start of the install process, "Would you like to tweak encryption settings?" -- Yes, No, and "What does tweak mean?" are possible answers. Or install with default settings and guide power users to tweak the parameters post-install. Encrypted e-mail should not require over 90 steps.
- jenscow 11y agoJohnny can't even select, download, use, or configure an email client.
- serpentor 11y ago...not to mention that in most cases, Johnny doesn't even really know what encryption is, let alone believe he's capable of it. Try asking someone to encrypt something, anything before sending it. The looks you'll get range from sideways or merely confused to fearful and panicked, to are you fucking kidding me?
- vxNsr 11y agoAt this point the only way for PGP or really any user-based encryption to get widespread use, gmail, yahoo and microsoft need to adopt it and integrate it into their webmail client, possibly as a semi-mandatory feature that's opt-out instead of opt-in. Anything less will fail as no one is interested in getting a new email address. Anecdotally, I've tried three of four times to learn how to use PGP and integrate it into my workflow and failed each time, so it definitely needs work (at least if they want me on board :))
- omginternets 11y agoI have a budding idea that involved using a blockchain to manage cryptographic credentials, but I'm having trouble finding proper blockchain libraries. Any recommendations? I'd prefer Python or Go, since that's what I'm mostly using these days, but at this point I'll take brainfuck if that's my only choice...
- mirimir 11y agoIt's unrealistic to expect naive subjects to learn how to use GnuPG in an hour. It takes longer than that to learn a new game! People need at least to know what public-key cryptography is before trying to use it. But unfortunately, the Wikipedia entry is rather intimidating.[0] The GnuPG FAQ (at 7.1) is clearer, but not so easy to find.[1] [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy [1] https://www.gnupg.org/faq/gnupg-faq.html https://www.gnupg.org/faq/gnupg-faq.html
- joshbuddy 11y agoYou said "People need at least to know what public-key cryptography is before trying to use it." I think this is untrue. People really just need to know how to work with the technology, not understand what it's actually doing. Trying to explain the underlying principles makes it more confusing and thus, less safe.
- mirimir 11y agoI mean basic stuff. Users need to know that they have both public keys and private keys. That public keys allow other users to encrypt stuff to them. So they need to share them. That private keys allow them to decrypt stuff encrypted to their public keys, and also to sign stuff. So they need to protect them, keep them private. Failure to get those basic facts accounted for much of the craziness and confusion in the cited study.
- gavkearney 11y agoHi guys, Maybe you should try Jumble (www.jumble.io) for email encryption - works with Gmail, iOS and MS Outlook. Jumble manage key pairs for users and encrypt the private key with the users password so they don't have access, this ultimately simplifies the whole process for the end user and frees them from the key management aspect which is the major pain-point with PGP-based solutions. Also, it integrates on top of existing emails clients so no need to change your email address or how you interact with emails. Full disclaimer: I'm a co-founder of Jumble