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Linux workstation security checklist
- noja 11y agoNice list, until... install a closed source product that sends backups offsite (SpiderOak). wtf?
- mkj 11y agoThe other backup suggestion's odd too - make a good backup disk passphrase, store it in your password manager. (where's the password manager backed up?)
- kagamine 11y agoI was using Wuala but they are closing it down later this year, starting from now. They recommend switching to Tresorit, Swiss based with end to end encryption and no keys held on the server (lose your password at your peril). Any recommendations for cloud storage that is secure and has a Linux GUI? Tresorit is not open source either as far as I can tell from the website.
- icebraining 11y agoTarsnap now has a GUI: https://github.com/Tarsnap/tarsnap-gui/wiki/Tarsnap https://github.com/Tarsnap/tarsnap-gui/wiki/Tarsnap
- kagamine 11y agoNice, doesn't do Windows though which I am locked into at work, and is aimed solely at backups, not sharing and managing files over multiple computers and OSes which is what I was mainly using Wuala for. But you answered the question, so you get an Internet point.
- Skunkleton 11y agoThe Deja-Dup front end for duplicity is built in to Ubuntu. It does encryption, and knows how to store in all sorts of places, including locally and on multiple cloud providers.
- mricon 11y agoIt's just mentioned in passing, alongside other recommendations.
- wtbob 11y agoAnd, last I checked, SpiderOak's protocol actually has a flaw: they could potentially store a copy of one's initial key. I emailed them about this, but not response. Cyphertite was really interesting, but it sounds like they're going out of business.
- splme 11y agoThat's why SpiderOak moved from browser-based signup to in-app signup, to eliminate this possibility. (The switch was made in April 2015.) discaimer: I work for SpiderOak, but the response is my own.
- wtbob 11y agoThat's really good to know! I'll have to check it out again—other than that one flaw, it looked like a really smart set-up.
- cranium 11y agoIt may be silly to ask[1] but is there a similar list for Mac OS X? [1] Silly because, you know, closed source
- satai 11y agoNSA [1] has pretty good list for major OSs. [1] Yes, pretty ironic, isn't it?
- dfc 11y agoNo, it is not at all ironic that NSA provides STIGs for major operating systems. NSA is responsible for SIGINT and Information Assurance.
- yellowapple 11y agoIf only the NSA knew that :)
- x0 11y agoI mean, if anyone knows about computer security, it'd be them. Nice of them to share.
- jlgaddis 11y agoThere's the DISA STIG for OS X 10.10 [0]. [0]: https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/ncp/repository/checklistDetail?id=562 https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/ncp/repository/checklistDetail...
- noondip 11y agoTake a look at this guide: https://github.com/drduh/OS-X-Yosemite-Security-and-Privacy-Guide https://github.com/drduh/OS-X-Yosemite-Security-and-Privacy-...
- Animats 11y agoFireWire is a vulnerability for Linux only because the kernel maintainers want it to be. There's a register in FireWire controllers which controls the address range for which remote memory accesses are valid. It can be set to 0, which locks out that function. The last time I looked, years ago, it was set to allow access to the first 4GB of memory, because the code pre-dated 64 bit systems. I once proposed setting it to 0. This was rejected because there are kernel debuggers which use it.
- noja 11y agoGot a CVE or lkml link?
- Qantourisc 11y agoThat's a stupid excuse, they should put the flag to flip that bit in the kernel-hacking menu of menuconfig.
- yellowapple 11y agoOr default to that being disabled unless "debug" is passed in the kernel boot parameters.
- Hello71 11y agoLinux has, in fact, supported a configuration option CONFIG_FIREWIRE_OHCI_REMOTE_DMA (default n) since 2.6.26 released 13 July 2008. [0][1] In kernel 3.14, this was changed into a module parameter (default n). [2] I did not further investigate the status of firewire modules before then. I was unable to locate any relevant mailing list posts referencing "firewire" or "DMA" by the author "John Nagle". [3][4] [0] http://cateee.net/lkddb/web-lkddb/FIREWIRE_OHCI_REMOTE_DMA.html http://cateee.net/lkddb/web-lkddb/FIREWIRE_OHCI_REMOTE_DMA.h... [1] http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=080de8c2c57e3199eee837fe8b6d35a43679f8c1 http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.g... [2] http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=8bc588e0e585bc9085df75e84d4d5635f45cf360 http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.g... [3] http://search.gmane.org/?query=firewire&author=John+Nagle http://search.gmane.org/?query=firewire&author=John+Nagle [3] http://search.gmane.org/?query=dma&author=John+Nagle http://search.gmane.org/?query=dma&author=John+Nagle
- 616c 11y agoSecureBoot!? Hahahah, Linux Foundation marks this as critical? I am sorry to laugh, but thank God the LF and others fought tooth and nail for some way to have someone other than Microsoft have the key. But seriously, did anyone else laugh?
- crdoconnor 11y agoI didn't laugh but I got a bit suspicious about their true motivations as soon as I saw that.
- mricon 11y agoNot everyone has an evil agenda. And, if you read the guide, it specifically mentions the downsides of SecureBoot and offers alternatives (AntiEvilMaid).
- josteink 11y agoWhy laugh? On proper UEFI implementations you can enroll your own keys. Arch Wiki (as usual) has an article with more details: https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface#Secure_Boot https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Unified_Extensible_Firm... It may not provide 100% security (what does?), but using this still provides much more security than just booting whatever lies on disk without any sort of verification. So yeah. Laughing at this advice is at best uninformed. A nice bonus-effect from using secure boot is that most UEFI implementations secure-boot faster. Why? Because when in "insecure" mode it keeps up a splash-screen saying "Booting insecure" for a few seconds before moving on.
- roghummal 11y ago>On proper UEFI implementations ... You're going to have to qualify that.
- josteink 11y agoIt's no secret that the full UEFI spec is quite complex. Some parts are mandatory while others are optional. It's also no secret that lots of hardware vendors are terrible at implementing software. The usual rule is that the less software they write, the better. The result is that different vendors and OEMs have a different quality UEFI firmware implementations and different feature-set available in them. Some are clearly less proper and less complete than others.
- ivank 11y agoNot the soundest security advice I've read recently: > We recommend that you use the same passphrase for your root password as you use for your LUKS encryption (unless you share your laptop with other trusted people who should be able to unlock the drives, but shouldn't be able to become root). If you are the sole user of the laptop, then having your root password be different from your LUKS password has no meaningful security advantages. Your root password is much easier to steal than your disk encryption password. Trick the user into running a program that does 'alias sudo=evil-sudo' >> ~/.bashrc, or sniff it from an unrelated X11 window, or use a microphone. A microphone is far more likely to pick up your root password than a password typed once at boot. If the root password is sniffed with a microphone, the attacker might not even have root access to your system over the network. If stolen with evil-sudo or via X11, you might realize you've been compromised before all of your data is exfiltrated. Neither scenario should let the attacker then steal your disks and be able to decrypt all of your data. Unless you follow the advice.
- satai 11y agoMaybe prepare a pullrequest for this? ;)
- hnnh 11y ago>Trick the user into running a program that does 'alias sudo=evil-sudo' >> ~/.bashrc That's only going to get you the user's password, not the root password.
- ivank 11y agoGood point. I've toned down my comment because that root password would be getting typed in less often. An attacker might still bring an evil-su in addition to an evil-sudo, though. And even if you're logging into that root user only in an another tty, it seems like an unnecessary risk to share the password with LUKS.
- mricon 11y agoYou actually tend to never use the root password on a modern workstation -- just sudo. The situations where you have to use a root password are usually if something has gone wrong and you have to log in via tty.
- oofabz 11y agoI always install fail2ban so to prevent brute force ssh attacks from getting in. It's popular enough that's it's probably available in your distro's package repositories. http://www.fail2ban.org/ http://www.fail2ban.org/
- m4r71n 11y agoWhy would you have sshd running on your workstation in the first place?
- vacri 11y agoI've ssh'd into colleagues' machines to help them with system problems, and they've ssh'd into mine to retrieve their VPN keys. Not all of my colleagues have ssh access to a common server somewhere. I've also remoted into my workstation from home to do emergency work.
- yellowapple 11y agoIdeally, those colleagues would keep sshd disabled unless they actually do need your remote assistance, at which point they'd "service sshd start" or "systemctl sshd.service start" (or however it's normally done with systemd) or "/etc/init.d/ssh start" or "/etc/rc.d/rc.ssh start" or what have you. Minimization of attack surface is an important part of a comprehensive security strategy, and a remote login system - even one with a phenomenal track record like OpenSSH - contributes pretty heavily to that attack surface.
- drjesusphd 11y agoIt's irreplacable when one occasionally works from home.
- Skunkleton 11y agoSo that you can ssh to it?
- rythie 11y agoTo allow remote management tools to run. If there's one thing that'll make your systems insecure, it's letting everyone manage their own boxes. SSHd allows you to restrict particular users to IP ranges and of course you can use IP tables and fail2ban too.
- known 11y agoInstall http://wiki.debian.org/iptables http://wiki.debian.org/iptables
- brador 11y agoWhy can't someone simply make a security wizard for Linux. Like I run the program and it gives me options and changes the settings based on my selections. Why must everything be so manual everytime on Linux...
- icebraining 11y agoThey have, it's called Bastille, and it's been around for quite a few years: http://bastille-linux.sourceforge.net/ http://bastille-linux.sourceforge.net/
- brador 11y agoLast update in 2012...is it still workable?
- mtgx 11y agoThis was a nice presentation comparing security in general to how cars were built in the 1960's, when engineers made the car work great - but with little consideration for "user error" or the user experience in general. 50 years later cars are highly protected against dumb things the user might do, and he suggests that's how the security community should look at building stuff, too(while hopefully not taking another 50 years to achieve great security with great user experience as well). http://kernsec.org/files/lss2015/giant-bags-of-mostly-water.pdf http://kernsec.org/files/lss2015/giant-bags-of-mostly-water....
- yellowapple 11y agoTry YaST on openSUSE. Offers precisely what you're looking for (among other things; it's basically the Linux equivalent to Windows' Control Panel). Relevant documentation: http://doc.opensuse.org/documentation/html/openSUSE_121/opensuse-security/cha.security.yast_security.html http://doc.opensuse.org/documentation/html/openSUSE_121/open...
- FireBeyond 11y agoCheck out http://hardening.io http://hardening.io - not quite a wizard, but a good start.
- reacweb 11y agoFor my home computer, sshd is always on. It is configured to disable password authentification. On the firewall, I authorize only two things: ssh port and wakeonlan. If I need to access another port, it is generally enough to open temporarily a ssh tunnel. I think that you lose most of the advantages of a unix computer if you can not access it remotely.
- collyw 11y agoI have Linux on all my home machines, and none are configured to be accessed remotely. There are still plenty of advantages. Far less viruses / malware / crapware. Better performance on under powered machines. Better development environment (for the sort of development I do). No phoning home to MS / Apple (as far as I am aware).
- nadams 11y ago> I have Linux on all my home machines, and none are configured to be accessed remotely. There are still plenty of advantages. Far less viruses / malware / crapware. I don't think the 2 ideas are related. I can't think of a script kiddie that would brute force your SSH to install a virus on it. Join a botnet maybe - but probably not to just install a virus. Also if you use something like SSH keys or OTP - it's pretty much guaranteed that no one but you can access it.
- collyw 11y agoI think I would need to configure my router to port forward ssh before they could do that.(Or am I being dumb assuming that they can't get around that?) Anyway my point was that Linux has plenty of advantage (for me) without being remotey accessed.
- reacweb 11y agoToday, my wife (at home) has called me (at work) because she could not launch chrome anymore. The disk was full. The files /var/log/kern.log and syslog were eating gigabytes. I was able to solve her problem remotely. I have also installed ubuntu on the computer of my old father who lives far. Regularly, I upload pictures (he is my backup for pictuers) and put a shortcut on his desktop.
- nly 11y agoMeh. I have encrypted /, /home and swap. I've disabled Secure Boot, and the TPM, and use legacy boot. I don't really trust my laptop manufacturer to get all this stuff right. I like to keep things simple (which is why I use syslinux instead of GRUB as a bootloader. GRUB2 is ugly as sin to configure) On the FF extension front I'd like to add: Proxy Selector, Self-Destructing Cookies, and RefControl as recommendations.
- darkr 11y ago> Meh. I have encrypted /, /home and swap. I've disabled Secure Boot, and the TPM, and use legacy boot. I don't really trust my laptop manufacturer to get all this stuff right. Without secureboot, how do you know your kernel hasn't been modified to log all your keystrokes (including the passphrase to your encrypted partitions)?
- nly 11y agoIf someone has physical access, they can remove my keyboard and install a hardware keylogger anyway. Updating my kernel image wouldn't be very effective given that it gets updated by Arch more often than it gets booted from.
- mingus68040 11y agoAnd yet, the primary use-case for file system encryption is to protect data at rest, from someone with physical access to the disk. It seems odd to draw the line at physical security so arbitrarily -- that you'd be willing to encrypt your entire root file system and then throw your hands in the air when it comes to securing a tiny boot partition.
- nly 11y agoI mainly encrypt in case of theft, /boot contains nothing valuable. / contains a lot of information about my configuration, and installed packages, as well as the key to /home
- federico3 11y agoShameless plug: a software "checklist" for desktop users - https://github.com/FedericoCeratto/desktop-security-assistant https://github.com/FedericoCeratto/desktop-security-assistan...
- jeffreyrogers 11y agoMaybe if you need this much security just use OpenBSD? :)
- codingvelocity 11y agoCan you enlighten the uninformed what would make OpenBSD more secure by default? It's my firm belief that the only secure system in the world is one that no one can use, biggest security hole you can add is a person...
- linuxkerneldev 11y agoWasn't the Linux Foundation supposed to be just an umbrella org that provided employment to key Linux devs? So that they could be independent from corporate influence and work indepently/freely without corporate interference.
- jldugger 11y agoIMO the Linux Foundation serves three functions: 1. It manages assets: a. Linux intellectual property, like the Linux trademark. b. It secures funding and invests the proceeds to establish fellowships for kernel developers. c. It manages computer hardware for kernel developers. You remember how https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kernel.org#2011_attack https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kernel.org#2011_attack was a thing? It seems reasonable for the people who's job it is to operate computer hardware to publish guidelines on securing their own workstations, and those of kernel devs who randomly have root access on kernel.org.
- vladimir-y 11y agoI'm working on a fully encrypted laptop (LUKS, all partitions except boot/efi) and feel quite secure.
- jmnicolas 11y agoI have a fully airgaped and True-Crypt encrypted computer and don't feel secure at all. I guess it all depends on the attacker you envision and the trust (or lack thereof) you have in your encryption software.
- okasaki 11y agoPaX is not a MAC framework.
- wyclif 11y agoTo all those writing the critical comments: I'd love to read a rebuttal to this written by someone who is a Linux and security professional, and explaining not only what is wrong here but why in addition to best security practises. Thanks.
- pakled_engineer 11y agoEncrypt the root emails instead of sending them cleartext, can easily write a small script to do this and not give away internal security information.
- w8rbt 11y agoI'm surprised that they left out Tomoyo as a MAC option. I thought it had a decent following. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TOMOYO_Linux https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TOMOYO_Linux
- arca_vorago 11y agoThis is an interesting list, and I don't see anything glaringly wrong ( a few personal preference subjects, but..), so here are my handful of extra tips on top: 1. You can encrypt grub in order to prevent single user mode et al boot attacks. It can also make FDE systems recovery a pita though. 2. They already said it, but GRSEC is where it's at. It's really the future of linux security enhancement, and while you can run it in tandem with SElinux et al, I find it's better to run GRSEC and just fine tune it. You will thank yourself for learning it. 3. These days, you need a HIDS, full stop. What good do logs do if you never know what happens or only check your logs once a week/month/year/never? After spending time trying all the main ones out, OSSEC is my HIDS of choice. 4. SSH: while fail2ban, denyh0sts, et al are all workable options along with the listed option tweaks, what I find to work the best in addition are two things. A) Obscure port. We all know security through obscurity isn't, but reducing scripties bogging stuff down and keeping your logs cleaner helps imho. (it's also the difference between a metric ton of log alert emails and only a few). B) Two factor all the things. I am using the Google pam module, "libpam-google-authenticator". I stopped trusting tor but some friends of mine swear by ssh over tor hidden service. 5. The bottom line is that the linux kernel is out of control at >10mil loc, and 0-days/1-days are prevalent. If you have an internet facing system, it's probably going to get compromised, what you really need is the ability to find out as soon as possible when it happens. What this boils down to is you don't want to lose your data, so you need encrypted backups and verifiable checksums/hashes, so that once you've brought up a fresh system, you can restore data asap. Another thing that factors into this is configuration scripts and management stuff. I really like ansible since it works over ssh/powershell. Can really save a lot of time. If you really want security, you also need to start and run minimal. I would say self compiled is the best (use flag changes often prevent sploits that otherwise work) so gentoo/slackware/arch would be the best nix distros for this. Beyond that, BSD is still king of the security world imho, especially OBSD, but please give DragonFlyBSD a look. While it's not touted as a "secure" distro, it has a ton of features that make it sexy as hell and it needs security contribs if you have the time. If I were starting a fresh ISP, I would be using DBSD. For those of us stuck wanting to game and do more fun stuff though, who live in a debian/fedora/ubuntu world, just keeping an eye on logs is really the best you can do. Also keep in mind impact on perf that FDE may have if you are a linux gamer. Those are my main tips/tricks, but I'm sure both the article and I are missing things, so take it all with a grain of salt.
- Thaxll 11y agoSetting SElinux on enforcing mode on a desktop is almost impossible.
- eoranged 11y agoNice checklist, signa11. But there are few moments which I should point: 1. TPM on recent Intel hardware is controlled by Intel Management Engine (http://libreboot.org/faq/#intelme http://libreboot.org/faq/#intelme) which basically acts as a hardware backdoor which cannot be disabled or controlled in most cases. 2. About firewalling: It's good to filter out even ping from Internet (it's almost always fine to keep it enabled for lan segment) to make automatic detection slightly harder (LOW). BTW, installing coreboot instead of manufacturer-provided firmware (if possible) also could be good improvement (PARANOID). 3. As for browser(and skype and all the rest of Internet applications) It's good thing to block and audit strange actions such as attempts to access ssh or pgp/gpg keys. By audit I mean set up quite visible and persistent notification. (MEDIUM) 4. Also, It would be great to add links to NSA Linux Configuration guide (http://www.nsa.gov/ia/mitigation_guidance/security_configuration_guides/operating_systems.shtml#linux2 http://www.nsa.gov/ia/mitigation_guidance/security_configura...) and CIS Security Benchmarks (http://benchmarks.cisecurity.org/downloads/browse/index.cfm?category=benchmarks.os.linux http://benchmarks.cisecurity.org/downloads/browse/index.cfm?...).
- wyldfire 11y ago> 1. TPM on recent Intel hardware is controlled by Intel Management Engine (http://libreboot.org/faq/#intelme http://libreboot.org/faq/#intelme) which basically acts as a hardware backdoor which cannot be disabled or controlled in most cases. Seems kinda like this point is conceded: "plus there is a pretty high degree of certainty that state security agencies have ways to defeat it (probably by design) ..." Other than perhaps misplaced faith, you're no worse off than you would be without TPM?
- eoranged 11y agoSo you mean that having device with unlimited network, memory and TPM data access with encrypted firmware and separate processor should not be considered as a huge risk factor? Due to targeted attack or leak from Intel potential malware can use it to elevate privileges, hide from any type of audit, survive complete system reinstall and even be used to silently infect systems by remote entities. And lack of TPM module allows to steal encryption password by application running with system privileges, which already have all required access anyway.
- sandworm101 11y agoAny security checklist should start with a description both how the machine is to be used and the expected threats models. There are plenty of things in this list that I disagree with, but only because I am looking at different security needs. For instance: I see no mention of Tor or VPNs. So this workstation isn't concerned with APT-style threats, or anyone else with the ability to manipulate network connections at a high level. And my quick read sees no talk of memory encryption or any of the physical measures for countering cold-boot scenarios. This is not a workstation for international (China) travel or for protecting against surveillance. It has some good advice, but is certainly not comprehensive.
- mricon 11y ago> Any security checklist should start with a description both how the machine is to be used and the expected threats models. It states right at the top that the target audience is Linux sysadmins and their workstations. > It has some good advice, but is certainly not comprehensive. "This, by no means, is an exhaustive "workstation hardening" document, but rather an attempt at a set of baseline recommendations to avoid most glaring security errors without introducing too much inconvenience."
- sandworm101 11y agoYa, all of a paragraph. Any security document, even something as basic as an internal policy statement about passwords, should begin with a thorough discussion of the threats that were in the minds of the drafters. Security is heavily a matter of opinion and perspective. The background on which those are based is therefore as important as the individual recommendations.
- syntheticnature 11y agoMake sure you check the regs for China before modifying machines for said travel; a few years back I was supposed to head there (didn't due to a snafu), and encrypted my normal stays-at-work laptop's drive (among other measures), but it turns out that I'm not allowed to bring an encrypted device in without advance permission. Might be able to get away with it, but what happens should it be detected? If I was going to China and really needed to bring a machine, I'd bring a Chromebook with some means to run Linux and the minimum needed to pull critical items... and it would get binned upon return, preferably without being powered up anywhere near any means to connect out (though I'd probably want to ensure it was wiped).
- jqm 11y agoSo.. mostly use SELinux and UEFI? This is NOT the advice I wanted to hear. Maybe I needed to hear it, but both of these things (last I tried them) were a giant messy pain in the rear end. And from what little I understand, both have parties involved in their creation/promotion (MS, NSA) that might don't have stellar open source/privacy pedigrees. Maybe worth another look.... IDK. But for now... I turn both off.
- yellowapple 11y agoThis is heavily dependent on hardware platform (namely, UEFI - and therefore SecureBoot, which is very foolishly being advocated given its limitations - are x86-only). While this might be acceptable for most users, this ignores that non-x86 workstations do still exist. > Has a robust MAC/RBAC implementation (SELinux/AppArmor/Grsecurity) (CRITICAL) This is too specific; there are plenty of operating systems with a much better security track record than even GNU/Linux that don't implement MAC or RBAC (namely, OpenBSD), and it misses the point of MAC/RBAC: privilege separation. Really, the goal here is for any given program to only have the minimum necessary permissions required for it to do its job. You can do this quite effectively by keeping running services/daemons isolated to dedicated users with a minimum permission set (this is, in fact, the core of how Android apps are sandboxed), especially when paired with a proper sandboxing solution. The nice thing about MAC and RBAC is that they have policy implications; when used properly, they can clearly define the level of access some running program should have to a given part of the system. They also tend to go hand-in-hand with fine-grained control over resource access, but it's not correct to conflate access control mechanisms with granularity (you can have a fine-grained DAC-based system or a coarse-grained MAC-based system). > Use full disk encryption (LUKS) with a robust passphrase (CRITICAL) Or (inclusively) a key file (preferably one which is password protected). > Make sure swap is also encrypted (CRITICAL) Or just don't use swap. Even with encryption, if data can be ephemeral, it should be. > Set up a robust root password (can be same as LUKS) (CRITICAL) I very strongly disagree with this. As much as I dislike Ubuntu, it does one thing right: it defaults to disallowing any sort of direct root login (by setting root's password to some randomly-generated garbage during installation, IIRC), requiring all root access to be done with sudo unless the user explicitly sets a root password. I especially very strongly disagree with the suggestion that the disk encryption password should be the same as any other password, let alone the root password that shouldn't exist in the first place (well, more precisely, should exist but should be entirely unknown to anyone or anything, including yourself). > Globally disable firewire and thunderbolt modules (CRITICAL) This, along with the recommendations to not use hardware with such ports, should be marked as (PARANOID). While it's certainly a good idea if you know they won't be necessary, there are plenty of valid use cases for them (particularly on Apple hardware; while Thunderbolt display support is still sketchy on Linux, it's still a very common use case), and such actions meet (PARANOID)'s criteria much closer than they do (CRITICAL)'s. And really, while FireWire and Thunderbolt do have specific security implications (due to them effectively being hotpluggable PCI and PCI-E, respectively), this should hold true for any port on one's machine. Any connector can be a security liability when confronted with a sufficiently-motivated attacker. > Configure the screensaver to auto-lock after a period of inactivity (MODERATE) This needs to be (HIGH), if not (CRITICAL). Why bother with some FireWire jig like what this guide is so afraid of when the machine's already unlocked? > Installing rkhunter and an intrusion detection system (IDS) like aide or tripwire will not be that useful unless you actually understand how they work and take the necessary steps to set them up properly None of the things in this guide will be that useful unless you actually understand how they work and take the necessary steps to set them up properly. None of them. Not MAC. Not RBAC. Not grsecurity and PaX. Not SELinux. Not LUKS. Not passwords. Nothing. This sentence is entirely meaningless. Not to mention that rkhunter should probably be (MEDIUM)... > SSH is configured to use PGP Auth key as ssh private key (MODERATE) What? That's a terrible idea. It's as terrible an idea as using the same password for root and LUKS. If one key is compromised, now the other is, too, because they're the same key. This is really just a waste of effort and time. The normal approach is to just generate two separate keys, and there's no reason to deviate from this; doing so will just make your life harder and less secure.
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- bob1122 11y agoThis is very handy