zrm

70 ms·

691.
by zrm 8y ago
TLS could be used in much the same way that a mining truck could be used by a letter courier service. You can, doesn't mean you should. With DNSCurve, when you have a delegation from one authoritative server to another, the parent doma
692.
by zrm 8y ago
> DNSCurve doesn't authenticate the records themselves. A malicious DNS Server can provide simply wrong responses and you cannot notice. There is no way to tell if a provider gave you a bad response. Sure there is. You do the recurs
693.
by zrm 8y ago
If the root was using DNSCurve, a request to the root would be authenticated, and so on all the way down for each domain that uses it. The recursive resolver would have authenticated responses from each authoritative nameserver from the roo
694.
by zrm 8y ago
Not entirely. The promise of DNSCurve is that the authoritative servers can use it too. If they do, it can secure the queries between the recursive resolvers and the authoritative servers as well, and inherently provides secure delegation b
695.
by zrm 8y ago
> DNSSEC == authenticated records. dnscurve, dnscrypt, DoH, and DoT == authenticated and encrypted resolutions. But notice that authenticated resolutions get you authenticated records provided you do them all the way to the root. The roo
696.
by zrm 8y ago
> An other view of the history of Internet network security is largely the history of plain text protocols getting encryption and authentication. Telnet was replaced by ssh, but they're both connection-oriented protocols that create
697.
by zrm 8y ago
For equipment like that which you only use occasionally, they'll often have one at your local hackerspace, along with friendly people who can show you how to use it. Or let you keep yours there where more people can get use out of it a
698.
by zrm 8y ago
That works for the thing expecting the large response, but requires an unusual custom configuration on the server (refuse UDP queries for specific record types but not others), and doesn't really help other clients that may make querie
699.
by zrm 8y ago
One of the problems with DNSSEC is that it causes the size of DNS responses to increase substantially, which becomes a DDoS vector. The response to this is nominally to use response rate limiting, but the more people who use DNSSEC the less
700.
by zrm 8y ago
Because it's encrypted to the app rather than the endpoint's OS or local DNS, so it's more difficult for the system owner to override it or implement a systemic policy. The performance characteristics are also rather unfortun
701.
by zrm 8y ago
> Is there an end to this race? If there is, it'll be a combination of two things. One is you make things simple enough that finding the bugs is more realistic. WireGuard, not OpenSSL. The other is that you make things modular, and
702.
by zrm 8y ago
> That's not correct, for stuff running in the user's scope more often than not a SIGHUP handler is just to gracefully exit the application. I.E. close any open files, finish any writes in process, etc. That's essentially
703.
by zrm 8y ago
The key is to have an open source client and a protocol that protects against a malicious server. One way to do this is to have the new device generate a random passphrase, display it on the screen and require it to be typed into the alread
704.
by zrm 8y ago
Not just that, PNG and gzip use the same compression algorithm: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DEFLATE
705.
by zrm 8y ago
> systemd set the secure default, even if that breaks backward comp, as usually upstreams do, when it comes to security. Breaking compatibility is generally avoided to the utmost. Even security-sensitive things like TLS continue to suppo
706.
by zrm 8y ago
> If you don’t like systemd so much then write something better. Writing something better doesn't get rid of the dependencies other projects now have on pieces of systemd, which pieces then have dependencies on other pieces until yo
707.
by zrm 8y ago
If an application is handling SIGHUP then it presumably intends to continue running. If it used systemd-run instead, it could still get into a bad state at any point thereafter and you have the same problem. Even using a watchdog couldn&#x2
708.
by zrm 8y ago
> Well they should. Otherwise, what’s the point of them? If the distribution is supposed to micromanage everything from upstream then what's the point of upstream? > Of their own volition. And btw, distributions could patch them
709.
by zrm 8y ago
Meaning in this case essentially means context. You have a communications channel, it delivers to you four 32-bit integers, what do they represent? Positional coordinates? One pixel in RGBA? In CMYK? IPv4 port/address 4-tuple with zero
710.
by zrm 8y ago
> Any distro could have flipped the switch and easily reverted to preserve backwards compatibility, but none did. No, many of them did. The problem is that this is not the only such issue, and distribution maintainers don't have u
711.
by zrm 8y ago
> If this behavior was mandated by some other piece of software named FluffyUnicorn and had nothing to do with Lennart, but was still widely adopted just as systemd is, would you be ok with it? If this behavior was mandated by some other
712.
by zrm 8y ago
The problem is that you're breaking compatibility by changing the default. It's one thing to add a feature that can solve a problem. It's something else to break existing programs that don't use it. If you're not go
713.
by zrm 8y ago
> I'd argue that those examples are a higher bar to hurdle than failing to recognize a spear phishing attack, and can be mitigated by solutions like always-on VPN. The theory behind TLS MITM is that it's an extraordinary and da
714.
by zrm 8y ago
> There is always that guy who will click on any link or open the document from what appears to be their co-worker. Which is another reason why DPI is ineffective. The smart malware will identify when its connection is presenting a custo
715.
by zrm 8y ago
> Layered security seems to work best. Also I prefer to heavily monitor/secure two appliances/systems than heavily monitor thousands of end devices It can't be both at once. Either you have multiple layers because both the
716.
by zrm 8y ago
You can't have atomic transactions when one half of the transaction isn't electronic. If I pay someone for a laptop and instead of a laptop I receive a box of rocks, I can claim they didn't send the laptop and they can claim
717.
by zrm 8y ago
This is also why federation is a thing. You can have a single "network" with arbitrarily many "services" and not have smaller services destroyed by Metcalfe's law because they're part of the same network.
718.
by zrm 8y ago
In a multiplayer game where each of the peers is constantly sending the others data, that seems like a surmountable problem.
719.
by zrm 8y ago
It's not that they don't require code execution, it's that there is more code execution happening in things that are supposed to be sandboxed than most people generally anticipate. It's not just VMs. For example, how man
720.
by zrm 8y ago
> The most concrete detail provided is that the attack "disrupted a shared production platform" that apparently made it hard for the printing presses to work - but what does that mean? Disrupted how? What was the shared platfor

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