zmanian

19 ms·

211.
by zmanian 11y ago
Out of band verification of key fingerprints is necessary to protect against a malicious server. Users are encouraged to tweet their public keys and verify in person. We don't have any mechanism other than trusting Whisper Systems that
212.
by zmanian 11y ago
Most of the protocols with forward secrecy and non-deniability also require synchronous communication to agree on ephemeral keys. Deniability is almost a nice side effect of the asynchronous design. It doesn't seem like it adds tremend
213.
by zmanian 11y ago
This isn't a great post for explain the simple elegance of Axolotol. There probably needs to be one. My favorite parts comes from combining of Diffie–Hellman operations on both long term and ephemeral keys to integrate identity verific
214.
by zmanian 11y ago
Is a distributed solution fundamentally hostile to deniability and forward secrecy?
215.
A hub and spoke distributed encrypted messaging solution(github.com)
1 points by zmanian 11y ago|1 comments
216.
Drawing Lessons From July’s Jeep Hack(techcrunch.com)
2 points by zmanian 11y ago|0 comments
217.
by zmanian 11y ago
Yes this is the pattern of obsf4 usage. It makes tor traffic look like https traffic to a bridge node.
218.
by zmanian 11y ago
Maybe you'll be okay in the UK? Still avoiding the UK like the plague right now... http://www.businessinsider.com/uk-government-not-going-to-ba...
219.
by zmanian 11y ago
One request Keybase friends... Can we get a forum or mailing list to discuss crypto design decisions, security etc on launch day?
220.
Using SAW and Cryptol to Verify the TweetNACL Primitives in Minilock(galois.com)
2 points by zmanian 11y ago|0 comments
221.
Breakdown of the NSA spying on French leaders(electrospaces.blogspot.com)
89 points by zmanian 11y ago|14 comments
222.
by zmanian 11y ago
Bos manages the internal tooling team at Facebook. It is little surprise that Facebook's internal tooling is acquiring a functional programming flavor.
223.
by zmanian 11y ago
One exciting thing about software distribution with ed25519 signatures is that when Ripple finally releases their threshold signature library for their cryptocurrency we get the ability to create public keys that express software signing po
224.
by zmanian 11y ago
So Bill Binney is often described as a legendary mathematician inside the NSA, have anyone ever had a technical discussion with him about things like ECC?
225.
Does Blockchain Need Bitcoin? A Red Herring(ofnumbers.com)
1 points by zmanian 11y ago|0 comments
226.
by zmanian 11y ago
As a free software proponent, I've spent most of the time promoting Android to my friends. Android(Non-Nexus) is a toxic hellstew of surveillance and security vulnerabilities. I'm currently recommending iPhones or Nexus only to my
227.
by zmanian 11y ago
Unless your policy is that your executives can be arrested, your assets seized and your investors pressured and still you will resist, operating out of a privacy friendly jurisdiction offers no reasonable protections to your users. Now you
228.
by zmanian 11y ago
Switzerland is mostly a privacy snake oil in regards to the coercive powers of various legal authorities. Your executives, investors etc are all subject to US law. Swiss law isn't going to protect users. Switzerland might be a reasonab
229.
by zmanian 11y ago
Great analysis of the state of play on the Patriot Act https://medium.com/@pgeddington/is-the-patriot-act-dead-not-...
230.
by zmanian 11y ago
What are your thoughts on prototype status of NaCL's ed25519 signatures and the updated structure used in libsodium, supercop, ed25519-donna etc....? Should we prefer curve25519 from NaCL but stick with the finalized ed25519 constructi
231.
Elliptic Curves:Finite Fields and Discrete Logarithm(andrea.corbellini.name)
5 points by zmanian 11y ago|0 comments
232.
by zmanian 11y ago
I believe so
233.
In-Q-Tel CISO Dan Greer's Keynote Remarks at the Lang Sec Workshop 2015(spw15.langsec.org)
1 points by zmanian 11y ago|0 comments
234.
ACLU and Tea Party TV ad opposing mass surveillance(youtube.com)
3 points by zmanian 11y ago|0 comments
235.
A Bitcoin miner in every hand(medium.com)
167 points by zmanian 11y ago|118 comments
236.
OpSec for online dating apps(medium.com)
1 points by zmanian 11y ago|0 comments
237.
by zmanian 11y ago
Here is Nadia H's lecture at Stanford from last week. Covers the GCD batch attack and her hypothesis about where the weak RSA keys are coming from. https://mvideos.stanford.edu/graduate#/SeminarDetail/Spring&#
238.
by zmanian 11y ago
Seeing the strength of google migrating all their employees to yubikeys
239.
by zmanian 11y ago
21 is best understood as an attempt by the VC community to break the Chinese Bitcoin mining monopoly. 21 doesn't appear to be working on Lightning Network like layer 2 technologies that would make the Bitcoin micropayments for server b
240.
U.S.A Freedom Act is a mass surveillance bill in sheeps clothing(usafreedom.fail)
48 points by zmanian 11y ago|5 comments

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