zimmerfrei

9 ms·

31.
by zimmerfrei 3y ago
The real question: how can pip still not allow me to verify a downloaded package with a public key of my choice (PGP key or others, the format is irrelevant)? In most cases, I don't even want to know who the author is, but just be warn
32.
by zimmerfrei 3y ago
Yes, but that will happen also without BootGuard. So what does Bootguard add with respect to physical attacks?
33.
by zimmerfrei 3y ago
However, all UEFI implementations (on PCs at least) allow anybody with physical access to disable Secure Boot, the classic method of just popping the button battery remaining valid to these days. So, isn't this firmware protection with
34.
by zimmerfrei 3y ago
A GCM software implementation can be simple, fast, or secure against side-channel attacks: you can only pick two. OCB (RFC7253) is indeed much simpler and it really deserves more popularity.
35.
Comparing the Top Eight Managed Kubernetes Providers(medium.com)
3 points by zimmerfrei 4y ago|1 comments
36.
PMFault: We were satisfied after successfully destroying two CPUs(arxiv.org)
3 points by zimmerfrei 4y ago|0 comments
37.
Sequoia-PGP, v5 OpenPGP, Authentication, and Debian(youtube.com)
2 points by zimmerfrei 4y ago|0 comments
38.
by zimmerfrei 4y ago
"Small cut" was 30% in my last experience.
39.
Audible feedback on just how much your browsing feeds into Google(github.com)
315 points by zimmerfrei 4y ago|205 comments
40.
by zimmerfrei 4y ago
Probably more related to RHEL compiling openssl in FIPS mode.
41.
by zimmerfrei 4y ago
>> uint8_t gets promoted to a signed int when shifting, which in turn causes undefined behavior for specific input. >> One way of fixing this is casting to the desired type before the shift, thus avoiding surprising conversions.
42.
by zimmerfrei 4y ago
By default, yes. However, as the page you link also mentions, a C extension may also opt to use the "Stable ABI", which does not change across major releases (with some caveats).
43.
Academic Journal Claims It Fingerprints PDFs for 'Ransomware,' Not Surveillance(m.slashdot.org)
2 points by zimmerfrei 5y ago|0 comments
44.
by zimmerfrei 5y ago
SGX seems to have pivoted from DRM use cases (in consumer CPUs) to confidential computing (in server CPUs) [0]. Is that so? Or is the Intel server product line just lagging behind and it will be removed from those too? Will Intel replace it
45.
by zimmerfrei 5y ago
>> Apple doesn't make a thermostat but they, along with many others, are moving to Matter. An interoperable, secure, private, open standard i.e. the very opposite of being cloud orientated. Matter (formerly CHIP)? The protocol wh
46.
by zimmerfrei 5y ago
How many 9s can you get from a single-region multi-AZ deployment not on us-east-1 and which nly uses basic services (EC2, IAM, S3, DynamoDB, etc)? Really only 3?
47.
F-Secure Armory Drive: an encrypted storage solution for the USB armory(github.com)
2 points by zimmerfrei 5y ago|0 comments
48.
by zimmerfrei 5y ago
https://opentitan.org/
49.
by zimmerfrei 5y ago
Can you share a reference showing the support for mesh in 5G (large scale or not)? As in, the equivalent of IEEE 802.11s for WiFi? I can't find anything about that. Or did you actually mean "cellular"? Mesh indicates a deploy
50.
by zimmerfrei 5y ago
You can authenticate to a TPM via HMAC and a shared secret key, so also the two other points can be addressed with code. The catch is that the other elements need to be able to store the secret, and they need to "pair" to the TPM
51.
by zimmerfrei 5y ago
The title is a bit misleading: EdgelessDB was not developed by Microsoft but by a German startup (Edgeless Systems, https://www.edgeless.systems/ and https://github.com/edgelesssys/edgelessdb ). The ann
52.
Project CHIP embraces a timeline and the blockchain(staceyoniot.com)
2 points by zimmerfrei 6y ago|0 comments
53.
Software vendors to disclose breaches to U.S. government under new order: draft(reuters.com)
1 points by zimmerfrei 6y ago|0 comments
54.
MIPS Becomes RISC-V(eejournal.com)
424 points by zimmerfrei 6y ago|214 comments
55.
by zimmerfrei 6y ago
> That's fair, though if some other part of the codebase is ported to Rust anyways sticking to C doesn't save you, unfortunately. This should be turned around. There is no evidence that part for the codebase really need to be p
56.
by zimmerfrei 6y ago
> Is Python actually suitable for cryptographic code, especially if constant-time operations are needed? No, but as seen in the first chunk of rust code added, the amount of logic that needs to be constant-time is a) very, very limited t
57.
by zimmerfrei 6y ago
And why should they re-write the entire world? It's just a wrapper library to openssl and it was marketed heavily to the community (at the beginning) as one where maintainers would follow good practices and not try to write security-se
58.
by zimmerfrei 6y ago
> I feel like this really only makes sense if pyca/cryptography had planned on adding the Rust dependency from the very beginning (or from very early on). Is there any indication that was the case? I am sure this idea surfaced sever
59.
DVD-Drive Based Laser Scanning Microscope(loetlabor-jena.de)
157 points by zimmerfrei 6y ago|7 comments
60.
by zimmerfrei 6y ago
Could you share some examples please? I can't find anything like that.

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