Y
HN Search
Hacker News Search
new
|
comments
|
top
|
jobs
ysnp
searching PlanetScale…
1.
▲
2.
▲
3.
▲
4.
▲
5.
▲
6.
▲
11 ms
·
121.
▲
by
ysnp
1y ago
I haven't read the articles posted (and I don't know how credible piunikaweb and cyberinsider are) but here is the first-ish hand information from GrapheneOS: https://grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/115164133992
122.
▲
by
ysnp
1y ago
Will it be possible to backup messages and media to both Signal's cloud storage and local storage at the same time?
123.
▲
by
ysnp
1y ago
>About the OEM, are you working on having devices ship with GrapheneOS, or devices be GOS compatible (i.e. same as the Pixels)? As far as I'm aware as an outsider, the aim is a device that is compatible with GrapheneOS like the Pixe
124.
▲
by
ysnp
1y ago
Vanadium implements per-site content filtering as a usability feature via Chromium's in-built filtering engine [0]. They currently use EasyList & EasyPrivacy filters which are quite popular and also a prominent default in uBlock Or
125.
▲
by
ysnp
1y ago
It may be permanent and I think this was the official indirect response: "AOSP needs a reference target that is flexible, configurable, and affordable — independent of any particular hardware, including those from Google." [0] Emp
126.
▲
by
ysnp
1y ago
https://words.filippo.io/passkey-encryption/ also seems to be gone?
127.
▲
by
ysnp
1y ago
EDIT: More context from the GrapheneOS team on their public Twitter communications >In the past, the main issue with AOSP was them forking AOSP apps into Google apps and then sometimes abandoning the AOSP apps. This increased over time,
128.
▲
Security and Privacy Issues in WhatsApp's Handshake Mechanism
(arxiv.org)
2 points
by
ysnp
2y ago
|
1 comments
129.
▲
by
ysnp
2y ago
Abstract: WhatsApp, the world’s largest messaging application, uses a version of the Signal protocol to provide end-to-end encryption (E2EE) with strong security guarantees, including Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS). To ensure PFS right from
130.
▲
by
ysnp
2y ago
TL;DR: Have you already written about OR off the top of your head what are some of the hard problems in usable decentralised metadata resistant communication that your project and others tackle and intend to tackle in future? Hi Sarah. My l
131.
▲
Breaking Cryptography in the Wild: Wire (2023)
(research-collection.ethz.ch)
1 points
by
ysnp
2y ago
|
0 comments
132.
▲
by
ysnp
2y ago
Would you say approaches like gvisor or nabla containers provide more/enough evolution on the security front? Or is there something new on the horizon that excites you more as a prospect?
133.
▲
by
ysnp
2y ago
Is there a newsletter/e-zine or something similar that specifically follows research presented at these conferences?
134.
▲
Invisv shutting down two-hop VPN and PGPP services
(invisv.com)
2 points
by
ysnp
2y ago
|
1 comments
135.
▲
by
ysnp
2y ago
INVISV are shutting down their MASQUE proxy service (provided with Fastly) and PGPP service obfuscating identity/location data at MVNO level for mobile data subscribers in mid June. ".. technical issues outside of our control"
136.
▲
Starling Bank (UK) locks out GrapheneOS users due to Custom ROM policy
(github.com)
23 points
by
ysnp
2y ago
|
3 comments
137.
▲
by
ysnp
2y ago
Most of the GrapheneOS information you might be interested in is in a few different places (Reddit, Twitter, Discord) but quite predictably they have become unworkable for searching especially if you don't have an account on those plat
138.
▲
by
ysnp
2y ago
Can't say anything for the impression you get from the style but I can at least say that GrapheneOS argues different things and differently on quite a few of the points made about F-Droid. They have also always been big advocates for o
139.
▲
by
ysnp
3y ago
Thanks for the insight. >As an aside - It's also not obvious it's the best choice for run-time mitigation. What are some of the current contenders/arguments?
140.
▲
by
ysnp
3y ago
Is Snapdragon hardware present in the current/upcoming lineup of Pixel devices such that MTE support is relevant to GrapheneOS?
141.
▲
by
ysnp
3y ago
(not on the team) I believe the project are open to supporting other devices that meet the criteria, or collaborating with hardware partners to that effect. As I understand, the way it works is that the project first has to scope out a hard
142.
▲
by
ysnp
3y ago
If you were a designing an app store that provides apps that are safe for non technical users you would probably want to ensure: excellent curation where human reviewers can have deep knowledge of all of the apps that have been reviewed
143.
▲
by
ysnp
3y ago
Their #1 goal is not to be the most private solution. Their goal is to make day-to-day communications of most people difficult to surveil. Day-to-day/People is why they keep the registration process familiar to other platforms like Wha
144.
▲
by
ysnp
3y ago
> but won't work since most require you to have Google Play services enabled which Graphene sandboxes by default: I might be understanding this wrong, but note that GrapheneOS providing Google Play services as regular sandboxed apps
145.
▲
by
ysnp
3y ago
GrapheneOS leaks less data to Google by default and otherwise than /e/OS and is also a privacy-focused project. I believe places like https://www.kuketz-blog.de/ and https://eylenburg.github.io/and
146.
▲
by
ysnp
4y ago
They have mentioned a few times that it is to reduce spam. See: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Desktop/issues/2383#issu... and in this paywalled article https://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtsc
147.
▲
by
ysnp
4y ago
Didn't moxie explicitly say Signal needed to now keep your contacts list in their servers via PINs/SVR? It is encrypted of course, and they feel they had to do that to enable identifiers not based on phone numbers. Some people dis
148.
▲
by
ysnp
4y ago
Can cellular base stations still track your location via your device's IMEI?
149.
▲
by
ysnp
4y ago
Specifically, what is meant by more updates? According to https://security.samsungmobile.com/workScope.smsb some of their entry J-line from 2018 has two OS upgrades and should be getting (poor) bi-annual security updates. O
150.
▲
by
ysnp
4y ago
Scoped Storage [1] is an important privacy feature introduced recently in Android that sometimes has not been adopted by developers. Storage Scopes puts power in the owner's hands [1] https://developer.android.com/train
More ›