xnyhps

9 ms·

31.
by xnyhps 10y ago
Correct. What might be interesting to add to this: you can't query Certificate Transparency servers by certificate. You can query them by index or by using an SCT hash, but if you want a definitive answer to "when was this certifi
32.
by xnyhps 10y ago
A number of SCTs (basically statements signed by qualifying logs that they saw that certificate at time X) must be delivered to the client during the handshake. Those can be embedded in the certs (by using pre-certificates), included in th
33.
by xnyhps 10y ago
I'd expect HTTP, DNS based or email to {hostmaster,postmaster,etc.}@domain validation to be more common than validation based on WHOIS data. There are probably very few domains for who only the WHOIS based validation is doable.
34.
Comodo Incident Report – OCR(mail-archive.com)
3 points by xnyhps 10y ago|1 comments
35.
by xnyhps 10y ago
"Will step down", according to his own post on https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/... .
36.
by xnyhps 10y ago
The best place to start with this story would be this very well writen document by Mozilla: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1C6BlmbeQfn4a9zydVi2UvjBG... . This is WoSign's first public response after that d
37.
WoSign Incidents Report Update [pdf](wosign.com)
113 points by xnyhps 10y ago|74 comments
38.
by xnyhps 10y ago
> If the certificate is preexisting (presumably issued before 9/19/16) it will be trusted ONLY if the certificate is CT logged. It will know if this is the case by looking for an SCT belonging to that certificate. The SCT will
39.
Apple's response to the WoSign incidents(mail-archive.com)
3 points by xnyhps 10y ago|0 comments
40.
by xnyhps 10y ago
> AKA, SHA-1 may not be secure against a nation state or attacker with a ton of money, but it's secure enough against for almost every site against almost every attacker. Issuing a SHA-1 certificate for one domain doesn't just
41.
by xnyhps 10y ago
They can't backdate their Certificate Transparency log without leaving cryptographic evidence behind. That's how CT is designed to work. Of course, simply being in the log doesn't imply the cert was issued correctly, but the
42.
by xnyhps 10y ago
Or buy yet another CA and continue under their name?
43.
by xnyhps 10y ago
> Google detecting further abuse of notBefore via Certificate Transparency You don't need to rely on Google. All certs issued by WoSign since January 1st, 2015 should be on WoSign's own Certificate Transparency log from which y
44.
by xnyhps 10y ago
Debug code that made it into production is the only thing I can think of, and even that isn't a good explanation.
45.
by xnyhps 10y ago
For me, Manifest.db inside the backup is a sqlite3 database containing a table Properties with two rows, salt and passwordHash, satisfying: passwordHash == SHA256(password || salt)
46.
by xnyhps 10y ago
It's pretty scary that they still haven't fixed the Sparkle RCE vulnerability from a few months back. Attackers with access to their servers could've installed malware for every user, even if they didn't install the upda
47.
Incidents involving the CA WoSign(mail-archive.com)
1 points by xnyhps 10y ago|0 comments
48.
by xnyhps 11y ago
Here's the list of words, by the way. I couldn't find it anywhere in non-hexadecimal form: https://gist.github.com/xnyhps/677f7c1b444f346bef99 (I cleaned it up a bit to remove newlines and tabs, and a couple
49.
by xnyhps 11y ago
Also note that the dictionary is strongly biased towards English. Sure, there is some Russian, Chinese, Arabic (and probably some other scripts in there which I don't recognize), but there seems to be more English words in there than a
50.
by xnyhps 11y ago
Except for displaying your location on Google Maps and using Google's APIs to do reverse geocoding... Their definition of "private" doesn't seem to include "private from Google".
51.
by xnyhps 11y ago
For most research areas I'd agree, "20 years" = "who knows". But for cryptography people using it should keep looking carefully at how long something they encrypted will remain safe. People may be betting a lot on t
52.
by xnyhps 11y ago
Reports indicate it isn't, but they're still including a vulnerable version of Sparkle [1], so I wouldn't trust the auto-update at all [2]. [1] = https://sparkle-project.org/documentation/security/
53.
by xnyhps 11y ago
It's also there for the previous 512 bit prime. Probably just the style preference of the project. Edit: Actually, it looks a lot like the code was originally generated using openssl dhparam -2 -C: https://gist.github.com&#x
54.
by xnyhps 11y ago
Testing for 2 seconds already found the prime factors 271 and 13597. It will probably not be hard. Edit: To add some more information, p / (271 * 13597) is still not prime, however, the library I was using didn't find any new fact
55.
by xnyhps 11y ago
You check the website to find out if they are having server problems and you see they have deprecated the API. Problem solved.
56.
by xnyhps 11y ago
Or just set a date and start rejecting 1% of all requests on that date, 2% the next day, etc. Software that retries immediately will get slower and slower, which will hopefully cause someone to investigate before bandwidth costs become ridi
57.
by xnyhps 11y ago
Would be nice if they documented if they used TLS, and if so, how that was configured. Even if the 28kb per user is a typo and they mean 28kB then that would be impressive with TLS enabled.
58.
by xnyhps 11y ago
I've use that on OS X, worked quite well. Ultimately I don't see much use for it though, maybe if you want to get information about the headers of files before you download them completely or something like that.
59.
by xnyhps 11y ago
True, it needs to be a safe prime, but not all 2048-bit safe primes are equally good. At the very least there are those for which the Special Number Field Sieve applies, though that's likely still infeasible. There might be very rare 2
60.
by xnyhps 11y ago
But it still asks the server to pick the group in which to do DH. This has to be exploitable somehow...

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