xnyhps

21 ms·

61.
On the CCA (in)security of MTProto(eprint.iacr.org)
5 points by xnyhps 11y ago|2 comments
62.
by xnyhps 11y ago
Obviously I'm interpreting "correctly generated" to mean "generated in accordance with the RFC", so no, it does not.
63.
by xnyhps 11y ago
> A correctly generated v4 UUID (S4.4 of the RFC) should be acceptable for use as a secure token, given it has 122 random bits. No it's not, from §4.4: > Set all the other bits to randomly (or pseudo-randomly) chosen values. I
64.
UUIDs generally do not meet security requirements(littlemaninmyhead.wordpress.com)
130 points by xnyhps 11y ago|62 comments
65.
by xnyhps 11y ago
Using UUIDs does not magically solve your problem of using a bad PRNG. RFC 4122 imposes no guarantees on how random the V4 UUIDs really are. You'll still need to verify yourself if the method you use to generate them is good enough for
66.
by xnyhps 11y ago
To be precise, Esqueleto isn't a smaller alternative, it's a layer on top of Persistent that gives you a typed DSL for SQL. It's been pretty nice when I used it, most things that I wanted to do in SQL were easily expressed. E
67.
by xnyhps 11y ago
Strictly speaking that's not forward-secret anymore, as stealing the private key gives some advantage to cracking the session. The practical reason is probably that using DHE with TLS is already many times slower than (plain) RSA. Th
68.
by xnyhps 11y ago
To clarify, I made an error: you generate powers of g (or just any group element whose discrete log you know), not p.
69.
by xnyhps 11y ago
Assuming they are using an index-calculus attack, the output is the discrete logarithms of a set of small primes. (But who knows, they may have much better attacks.) This is how that attack works. You generate a set of small primes called t
70.
by xnyhps 11y ago
The state of the art for SASL is SCRAM-SHA-1. It uses challenge/response authentication and it allows the server and the client to only store salted hashes (using PBKDF2 with a configurable number of rounds). It also uses mutual authen
71.
Scientist says researchers in immigrant-friendly nations can't use his software(news.sciencemag.org)
18 points by xnyhps 11y ago|3 comments
72.
by xnyhps 11y ago
Looks like a boundary between tiles there: https://maps.wikimedia.org/osm-intl/4/2/6.png https://maps.wikimedia.org/osm-intl/4/3/6.png Placing labels on a map is quite a hard p
73.
by xnyhps 11y ago
I was going to post that I was happy to see a new project using hs-plugins, but then I noticed: > h4sh was written during a cold, but sunny weekend in August 2005. hs-plugins looks so cool, but I'm afraid it's bit-rotten and ab
74.
by xnyhps 11y ago
I've had some mild success with https://hackage.haskell.org/package/dynamic-loader (which is basically just a Haskell wrapper around the C-functions in the RTS), but compared to writing normal Haskell, this is pla
75.
by xnyhps 11y ago
I've used a transport for a while, but I've never successfully done a file transfer using one. Voice/video over transports is going to be even harder to do. I think that makes it a dead-end for most people. Trust is also a di
76.
by xnyhps 11y ago
I think there are multiple reasons why multi-protocol mobile clients haven't taken off: 1. More complicated protocols. iMessage and Skype are many times more complicated than AIM/ICQ, MSN or YIM, with lots of layers of custom encr
77.
by xnyhps 11y ago
They have already removed the xmpp_login OAuth permission, they could shut down the XMPP server any day. I am wondering why they would remove the permission so long before shutting down the server, maybe to not break every client at the sam
78.
HipChat Acquires Blue Jimp and Jitsi.org(blog.hipchat.com)
11 points by xnyhps 11y ago|1 comments
79.
Validate the encoding before passing strings to libcurl or glibc(blog.thijsalkema.de)
2 points by xnyhps 12y ago|0 comments
80.
by xnyhps 12y ago
There is another assumption: 4. You download the script successfully. It is trivially easy for a MitM to interrupt the download of the script between two TLS packets, without any CA or server compromises. When you do: curl https:&#x2F
81.
by xnyhps 12y ago
It looks like it uses a single Wikipedia dump from over a year ago. Would be cool if it supported deltas somehow, so the network doesn't split when a new dump is used.
82.
by xnyhps 12y ago
That's the client to server encryption, which Google Talk has. Server to server encryption is missing.
83.
by xnyhps 12y ago
That doesn't protect you from truncation attacks: almost no server out there sends a close_notify before closing the TLS connection, so few tools will throw an error when you receive an incomplete file. It may be hard to exploit, but e
84.
by xnyhps 12y ago
Looks like the software they were using indeed requires a password on the private key: http://www.komodia.com/wiki/index.php/Komodia%27s_Redirector... (Down near the bottom, "sslpsd - To the password of the r
85.
by xnyhps 12y ago
Assuming, from the password, that it uses "SSL Digestor" by Komodia, then yes, it should generate an invalid cert: http://www.komodia.com/wiki/index.php?title=SSL_Digestor#Cer...
86.
by xnyhps 12y ago
They added a password to the private key which they didn't have to, so it's not true that they didn't attempt to obfuscate it at all. In practice that only bought them a couple of hours at most, but why add a password unless
87.
by xnyhps 12y ago
This has nothing to do with e2e encryption, this is only the metadata of your profile, status and when you are online. I thought it was pretty well known by now that WA shares that info of you with everyone who has your phone number. The co
88.
by xnyhps 12y ago
So you have a situation where the client has already authenticated the server using TLS, and now the server wants to authenticate the client too. This solution wants to do that by setting up a new channel, authenticating the server /ag
89.
by xnyhps 12y ago
The static AES key is for local log storage. This is about encrypted communications. They are working together with Open WhisperSystems to bring the e2e-encrypted TextSecure protocol to Whatsapp: https://whispersystems.org/b
90.
by xnyhps 12y ago
It's even counter-productive: If I find a few small flaws that are problematic, but not enough to claim the prize, I'll definitely keep them to myself until the contest ends. Instead of incentivizing people to share vulnerabilitie

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