tptacek

32 ms·

931.
by tptacek 4mo ago
No, it's not an absurd claim. Lattice key establishment goes back into the mid-1990s, and was at one point a serious contender for the alternative-to-RSA/FFDH algorithm that ECC became. Modern LWE lattice KEM is approximately at t
932.
by tptacek 4mo ago
The two most important things to understand about this kerfuffle: (1) MLKEM wasn't designed by NSA, but rather by a team of highly-regarded European academic cryptographers, including Bernstein's former collaborator Peter Schwabe;
933.
by tptacek 4mo ago
It's complicated. The federal government pushed for a smaller DES key size, but also fixed the DES s-boxes to resist differential cryptanalysis.
934.
by tptacek 4mo ago
The only jurisdictions where training data is going to matter are in the US, Europe, and China. I think we're just talking past each other. My subtextual point is that none of this is ever going to happen.
935.
by tptacek 4mo ago
There are not in fact 100 nations that will seriously contend for frontier models.
936.
by tptacek 4mo ago
Well, I mean, the alternative is for a US-based process to be put into place, followed (or led) by an EU process. The premise of my comment is that no matter who hosts the process, China isn't going to comply, so it really just comes d
937.
by tptacek 4mo ago
At this point, with this microscopic level of adoption and this track record of instability, and given that we're now 4 major revisions (all premised on the same original service model that TIS came up with in the mid-1990s), it would
938.
by tptacek 4mo ago
It's not that it's less stimulating, it's that pseudoephedrine basically is methamphetamine (the chemistry to reduce it to meth is truck-stop straightforward). But oral phenylephrine doesn't work at all. The case again
939.
by tptacek 4mo ago
I can't help you with any of this, but again: the argument you made about cryptography and jurisdiction, nobody on this thread has taken the other side of.
940.
by tptacek 4mo ago
The mass of the acetominophen isn't really important, it's just vivid writing. The point is that 8g is obtainable for orders of magnitude less when it isn't wrapped in misleading marketing.
941.
by tptacek 4mo ago
Are you sure you posted the right paper? That paper appears to present a clinically insignificant outcome for DXM in children. I think it's perfectly reasonable to contest the research summary this article is providing. All science-bas
942.
by tptacek 4mo ago
I have no idea who you're responding to because nobody on this thread has made that argument.
943.
by tptacek 4mo ago
We're all going to stay fixated on what exactly a "parrot" is, but the paper doesn't rest on the definition of tropical birds: it advances a specific and detailed hypothesis about how language models don't operate w
944.
by tptacek 4mo ago
I am 100% dead serious and I kind of don't understand the rebuttal you're trying to write here.
945.
by tptacek 4mo ago
Go read the mailing lists of the time.
946.
by tptacek 4mo ago
Foreign companies don't have to be subpoenaed. NSA can simply break in and take whatever they want, lawfully. In light of that, the warrant point you're making doesn't make sense: they don't need a warrant to go after
947.
by tptacek 4mo ago
The logic you're using here would be just as valid in a campaign against SHA2. More valid, in fact, because unlike MLKEM, which was designed by European academic cryptographers, the NSA actually designed SHA2.
948.
by tptacek 4mo ago
Why do you think a UN-hosted process would work? Has the UN done similarly intrusive things before and been effective at it? How do you account for Chinese frontier and open weights models, which are just months behind American models and s
949.
by tptacek 4mo ago
No, I'm very clear on what the question was asking, and it is not in fact "NSA" driving this process. This is 100% Daniel Bernstein drama. Bernstein is upset that the NIST contest selected MLKEM (Kyber). He's been runnin
950.
by tptacek 4mo ago
I don't see how this is calibrated. Did they give it to some huge cohort of people we haven't heard about? Or did they just imagine the answers their archetypes, like Aella and Ed Zitron, would have given, and then manually plot a
951.
by tptacek 4mo ago
Hard to beat Richard Lynn's sample of Senegal, which came from 57 children in a malaria hospital.
952.
by tptacek 4mo ago
It's doing that because the protocol was designed for offline signers, which in turn was a result of a folk belief in the 1990s that computers wouldn't be fast enough to do online signing.
953.
by tptacek 4mo ago
You've just provided: (1) Several surveys backed by anonymous online "IQ test" web sites. (2) Richard Lynn, whose numbers are essentially fraudulent. (3) Emil Kirkegaard, the famous Danish white supremacist. The counterargume
954.
by tptacek 4mo ago
Really? "Time and time again", "almost everything"? Make a list!
955.
by tptacek 4mo ago
I think the whole US vs. non-US thing is total crap and there's nothing you can reasonably do with it in any direction, but I always think it's important to point out that US signals intelligence can lawfully compromise foreign
956.
by tptacek 4mo ago
I don't really agree with much of anything you've said in this thread, but the only thing I'm pointing out here is that your argument has shifted and is chugging heartily towards non-falsifiability.
957.
by tptacek 4mo ago
It's not the identity of the agency that makes the argument so slippery!
958.
by tptacek 4mo ago
The word "if" is doing a whole lot of work in that first paragraph. Holding the entire world on its shoulders, so to speak.
959.
by tptacek 4mo ago
Kind of a weird concern to be reading on HN, where the sentiment is overwhelmingly that these kinds of systems should be exempt from warrants and discovery.
960.
by tptacek 4mo ago
Now the argument is shifting. It started out as "a cryptosystem can't be secured from the entity in control of its supply", and now it's "a cryptosystem can't be secured even given its source code because the N

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