todd_austin

3 ms·

1. 1.▲
   by todd_austin 11mo ago

   I created Mojo-V. IMHO, the service provider is the last one that should ever be able to see the keys :-). It's them we want to keep sensitive data away from Keys are injected into the HW with public-key encryption. This requires that
2. 2.▲
   by todd_austin 11mo ago

   I created Mojo-V. There's no back doors, but there's no integrity checking either, so a Mojo-V voting machine could take an encrypted vote and throw it away and add +1 to the attacker's favorite candidate. A computational int
3. 3.▲
   by todd_austin 11mo ago

   I created Mojo-V I agree that side channel and physical attacks are crucial to stop. The predecessor to Mojo-V (Agita Labs TrustForge) was red teamed for three months including differential physical measurement attacks, and the system was n
4. 4.▲
   by todd_austin 11mo ago

   I created Mojo-V Yes exactly, because it is a privacy tech, the key/control channel tunnels through all software into the Mojo-V trusted H/W. In the spec, I've been working on new Appendices comparing Mojo-V to TEEs, FHE, CHE
5. 5.▲
   by todd_austin 11mo ago

   I created Mojo-V. For me, I see Mojo-V more like FHE than a TEE, for three primary reasons: 1) Like FHE, the tech is applied to variables and computation that doesn't touch protected variables is not affected. TEEs protect processes. 2