ryan-c

102 ms·

901.
by ryan-c 12y ago
Neat. There is also https://www.nsa.gov/about/cryptologic_heritage/museum/ which I've been to, and recommend people check out if they're ever in the area, though the hours suck.
902.
by ryan-c 12y ago
correct
903.
by ryan-c 12y ago
...is it blindly copying any x509v3 attributes present on the certificate, or just the one that you seem to be carefully not mentioning? Can you email me (one is listed in my HN profile)? I just thought of a pretty horrible exploit. 21993
904.
by ryan-c 12y ago
Since this certificate is unconstrained it can probably be used to sign drivers...
905.
by ryan-c 12y ago
Not sure who huntaub is - there's an hl involved in Namecoin already that I know of but I don't think that huntaub is him. Anyway, there's a somewhat detailed blog post that I helped write about light client design up on the
906.
by ryan-c 12y ago
I don't know of one, but using PAM to add auth methods is actually pretty easy.
907.
by ryan-c 12y ago
Buying anything from that site is probably a bad idea. They fined people for bad reviews and turned them over to collections[1]. 1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palmer_v._Kleargear.com
908.
by ryan-c 12y ago
The default exim config seems to not be vulnerable. I checked the configs on two of my systems, one default, and one heavily customized, neither had the helo verification turned on.
909.
by ryan-c 12y ago
Reading the thread, it does appear that someone broke embargo on this. http://www.frsag.org/pipermail/frsag/2015-January/005727.htm... http://www.frsag.org/pipermail/frsag/2015-Janua
910.
by ryan-c 12y ago
If it affects gethostbyaddr that'd be really bad - there are a lot of applications that automatically look up reverse DNS on a connection. Mail servers in particular generally make it pretty easy to trigger both forward and reverse loo
911.
by ryan-c 12y ago
> The 5th amendment protects US citizens from being forced to reveal their encryption keys. IANAL, but it does not. It protects against self incrimination. They can make you incriminate someone else just fine, and if you try to object
912.
by ryan-c 12y ago
Reminds me of Jacob Applebaum's udev rules for mouse jigglers: https://github.com/ioerror/udev_antiforensics
913.
by ryan-c 12y ago
Part of the point of CipherSaber was that not only is RC4 trivial to implement, but it is feasible to do so entirely from memory . I can't think of any other cipher that comes close to that except for maybe XXTEA (and it's progen
914.
by ryan-c 12y ago
I wonder how a variant of XXTEA (perhaps with more rounds) would fare as a replacement. It's only a little more complicated to implement than RC4, but solves some of the issues. It acts as a wide block cipher which reduces the impact o
915.
by ryan-c 12y ago
I'm pretty sure something similar could be done with shell history logs.
916.
by ryan-c 12y ago
Thanks, that's what I thought it was supposed to mean. There's a number of other ccTLDs as well that have restrictions similar to .eu.
917.
by ryan-c 12y ago
I'm not sure what "no restrictions" is supposed to mean here - I see TLDs that have local presence requirements listed as "no restrictions". For example .eu[1] has "no restrictions" and "Restricted to
918.
by ryan-c 12y ago
For anyone who doesn't get the reference, "Crash Override" was a handle used by the male protagonist in Hackers[1]. 1. http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0113243/
919.
by ryan-c 12y ago
IIRC when I crawled the alexa top million's DNSKEY records none of them used ECC. I did see a few using DSA.
920.
by ryan-c 12y ago
On-the-fly signing (with "white lies") is also required to prevent enumeration of the zone.
921.
by ryan-c 12y ago
Macros can be mapped to specific chords.
922.
by ryan-c 12y ago
The default layout for the twiddler is pretty awful. If anyone wants to try one of these, check out the TabSpace layout. https://github.com/cswetenham/tabspace2.1 http://rhodesmill.org/brandon/proj
923.
by ryan-c 12y ago
Wouldn't much matter. In most cases the cellular location data and the nearby wifi networks are nearly as good.
924.
by ryan-c 12y ago
Enumerating some possibilities, here are things the hotel can do: * Deauth jam nothing * Deauth jam "evil twin" access points only * Deauth jam above plus access points "similar" to the official wifi (have fun trying to
925.
by ryan-c 12y ago
I used to work at a company that provided WiFi service at apartment complexes around 10 years ago. I ended up just assigning every access point a different SSID for each access point to reduce the amount of counterproductive roaming. Some d
926.
by ryan-c 12y ago
I could totally see a hotel not allowing outside food or drink even in a room. I was helping run an event at DEFCON this year and apparently the Rio was fining the conference for people in the conference area having "outside food or dr
927.
by ryan-c 12y ago
Deauth packets are normally sent in the clear even for encrypted networks, though 802.11w is supposed to fix that eventually.
928.
by ryan-c 12y ago
"But the best way for hotels to deal with rogue networks is to inform law enforcement agencies and help them apprehend criminals who are trying to steal information." That's an absurd point to make. One does not even need to
929.
by ryan-c 12y ago
For extra fun, the proxy may only start injecting things once you've been using it for a while - it can appear safe to a cursory check.
930.
by ryan-c 12y ago
Chrome has different SSL validation on each operating system - on Linux it uses it's own NSS instance, on OS X and Windows it uses the OS level certificate validation routines. Not sure how HSTS plays into that.

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