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searching PlanetScale…
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66 ms
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661.
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The revolving door between Google and the Department of Defense
(pando.com)
3 points
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rst
13y ago
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0 comments
662.
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rst
13y ago
Not unless RedHat is willing to foot the bill for FIPS certification of a variant, or wait for someone else to do it. The LibreSSL folks have indicated that they won't stand in the way of anyone who wants to do that (in this very note
663.
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rst
13y ago
Some outside observers' current best guess about mitigating this danger is to have the returning boost stage initially aim for water just off-shore, which leaves time to destroy it in the air if it winds up off-course. If things look
664.
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rst
13y ago
Note that the Github blog post briefly summarizes the results of the investigation (acknowledging "errors in judgment" from Preston-Werner and wife but nothing else), but that's basically it --- nothing at all about who the i
665.
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rst
13y ago
They have telemetry until it went into the water --- see tweets quoted immediately below. The last few seconds' worth of that were delayed because the rocket was over the horizon from the launch site, but they got it from chase planes
666.
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rst
13y ago
The main reason he was worried about recovery at that point was that the booster had splashed down into something like 20-foot waves. That's high enough to be real trouble for some of the recovery boats they wanted to have out there (
667.
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rst
13y ago
I was reacting mostly to the apparent exclusion of usernames, passwords, and session cookies (all exposed in net traffic) from the category of "anything sensitive".
668.
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rst
13y ago
Title's correct: there is no heartbleed in Tarsnap, because the only thing that was using OpenSSL was using an old, unbugged version. That said, he goes on to claim that even if he had been using a buggy SSL stack, his stunnel setup &
669.
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rst
13y ago
Corrected. Oops.
670.
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rst
13y ago
More importantly, they're certainly not the only threat presented by HeartBleed. While this guy drags his feet patching (because his certs still won't be really secure), his servers are likely leaking session cookies, usernam
671.
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rst
13y ago
Only sort of. The main technical point of Theo de Raadt's "exploit mitigation countermeasures" post is that even when the infrastructure it's running on is trying to add safety checks, OpenSSL will often neuter them. Th
672.
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A tale of two cities: how SF's tech boom widens the gap between rich and poor
(newstatesman.com)
2 points
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rst
13y ago
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0 comments
673.
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rst
13y ago
TCP heartbeats certainly will let you know if the remote end is entirely dead. They won't let you know if the application process is jammed up --- but TLS hearbeats won't do that for you either! (For example, it's common to
674.
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rst
13y ago
While the core parts of the crypto algorithms are, to some extent, intrinsically messy, that doesn't have much to do with the specific complaints here: inconsistent error return codes, pseudorandom indentation, #ifdef and if(0) stuff
675.
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Comcast reportedly considering Wi-Fi mobile phone service
(theverge.com)
1 points
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rst
13y ago
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0 comments
676.
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rst
13y ago
Some further context: Computers all over the world are competing to extend the block chain by solving a problem involving cryptographic hashes. The reward for solving the problem is that a wallet controlled by the machine that does it can
677.
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rst
13y ago
What are the odds that the NSA didn't already know about it? Even if you don't think they would have deliberately monkeywrenched OpenSSL (as they are widely believed to have done with RSA's BSAFE), they certainly have qualif
678.
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rst
13y ago
C language environments that worked like this have been commercially available in the past: Saber-C in the '90s, and perhaps earlier, was one example. One problem is that the obvious implementation technique is to change the represent
679.
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rst
13y ago
"At 4 a.m. on May 1, 1964...", says Dartmouth, "time-sharing and BASIC were born." Well, BASIC was --- but the CTSS timesharing system had already been in use at MIT since the summer of 1963: http://www.multic
680.
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rst
13y ago
For Android devices, there's also MIT App Inventor, which is a very scratch-like environment for writing mobile apps, available here: http://appinventor.mit.edu In addition to basic I/O and animations, it's able t
681.
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rst
13y ago
Not mentioned: contacts between American aerospace companies and their Russian subcontractors. Which is interesting because rocket engines for the American Atlas V booster are Russian-built. ULA, the American launch consortium that build
682.
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rst
13y ago
There are a whole bunch of items that you'd want to add to a cargo Dragon to make it fit for human travel. IMHO, the two standout items are launch abort handling and docking, but there are a whole bunch of other stuff you'd want
683.
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rst
13y ago
But that's already been possible for a good long while. They wouldn't be the first people to find git-svn to be a better front end to Subversion than the one that comes with Subversion itself :-).
684.
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rst
13y ago
Now definitively an April Fool's joke. Greg Stein's latest, and presumably last, comment on the JIRA ticket that started this furore: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/INFRA-7524?focusedComm... (ET
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rst
13y ago
Seems so. Check the "history" tab in the "activity" panel, under "description": "Pfft! Happy April's fool!" https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/INFRA-7524?page=com.at
686.
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rst
13y ago
The funny thing is that the EDSAC, one of the first functioning computers (perhaps the first, depending on how you define "functioning" and "computer") had a boot loader (the "initial orders") which was capab
687.
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rst
13y ago
There's an extra dimension to what might or might not have been known in 2005: Known to whom ? Given that the standards in question are already widely believed (to put it mildly) to have been deliberately weakened by the NSA, which s
688.
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rst
13y ago
I'm not sure what you're suggesting here. Adding the "specialization" hooks to the post-install script in every single package is genuinely hard --- Debian, for example, has literally thousands of packages, maintained b
689.
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rst
13y ago
Also Mac OSX "prebinding" and (in later releases) dyld cacheing. Though just skipping the cache entirely is certainly the quickest way to get something running --- and quite a few plausible server workloads will pay the penalty m
690.
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rst
13y ago
Specialization at install time is, in a lot of ways, the most reasonable answer. (It completely sidesteps the permissioning issues involved in write permission on a global cache at first execution, for example.) However, hacking an existin
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