pfg

43 ms·

361.
by pfg 10y ago
You can use the GPG key on the device for SSH authentication through gpg-agent. Here's their documentation[1] for this feature. ECC keys should work, but haven't tried that (I use RSA-4096). [1]: https://developers.yubi
362.
by pfg 10y ago
You can actually store the key you use for SSH authentication on the Yubikey [1]. The main advantage is that the key never leaves the device, so even if your computer is compromised, your key is still safe. Same thing goes for anything else
363.
by pfg 10y ago
The bigger problem for SMS-based 2FA are social engineering attacks on the support personnel of mobile network operators. They typically don't have fancy authentication schemes - it's fairly easy to get them to redirect messages t
364.
by pfg 10y ago
Maybe I'm missing something, but I don't see how these issues are related. One is a compatibility workaround, the other is a vulnerability that exposes server memory to a remote attacker.
365.
by pfg 10y ago
> This figure of 4-10% of connections is meaningless here, either you're intercepted or you're not. The warning would only matter for websites that bother to implement certificate pinning. Most Google properties use key pinning
366.
by pfg 10y ago
The warning fatigue problem is still there - and we're talking about a warning for 4-10% of all connections according to the study. Plus, as you pointed out, this would only help against the average sysadmin; if we assume an advanced s
367.
by pfg 10y ago
Trying to fight a local attacker with root (which is necessary to add a certificate to the trust stores on most platforms) isn't worth the effort. It's easy for the admin to bypass and would cause even more warning fatigue. That&#
368.
Git: private repository theft by mixing repositories(bugs.chromium.org)
2 points by pfg 10y ago|0 comments
369.
by pfg 10y ago
I'm not aware of any large-scale A/B tests for this. That being said, I imagine if Amazon thinks OV is good enough for them, I think it's safe to say it won't affect conversion rates all that much. Perhaps it would eve
370.
by pfg 10y ago
From what I understand, code signing certificates include special OIDs that flag them as usable for things like Authenticode. SSL/TLS certificates don't usually have these OIDs, so they would not be usable for that purpose. I don&
371.
by pfg 10y ago
OCSP and CRLs both work based on specific serial numbers. Serial numbers are not really sequential either (a portion of it has to be random). The closest thing to what you're describing would be the Expect-CT HTTP header[1] which can b
372.
by pfg 10y ago
They seem to own the domain in question, so that could've been validated according to spec. The only thing that's weird in that certificate would be the organizationalUnitName being "Test"; I don't think that would
373.
by pfg 10y ago
> Same with Go. Out of curiosity, what are you referring to? Go has great HTTP/2 support, and is enabled by default since 1.6. It doesn't depend on OpenSSL either, which is a big bonus in my book
374.
by pfg 10y ago
"Too big to fail" would be the usual argument. They're currently the third-largest CA in the industry. Pulling the root completely would desensitize a lot of users to the error interstitials, causing more harm than good. Howe
375.
by pfg 10y ago
Oh, HPKP is definitely something you'll want to think about hard before committing to. Getting a publicly-trusted certificate from any of the myriad of CAs out there, on the other hand, is no rocket science.
376.
Misissued/Suspicious Symantec Certificates(groups.google.com)
2 points by pfg 10y ago|0 comments
377.
by pfg 10y ago
> Not on government systems they aren't (STIG id: v-44789). Also, if we're going all in on https we should go all in on https. I found this description: "By setting this policy to true, the previous behavior is restored an
378.
by pfg 10y ago
HSTS preloading enforces "includeSubDomains" for all domains that are submitted[1]. It's certainly possible to use HSTS without includeSubDomains, but not preloaded HSTS, and since all new executive branch domains will be p
379.
by pfg 10y ago
I mean, sure, there's more things that can go wrong once you add TLS to the stack. At the same time, there are so many other guns to shoot yourself in the foot with, so why is that we should draw the complexity trade-off line between H
380.
by pfg 10y ago
> You might want to re-read my post more carefully, there is not necessarily an attacker per-se in an availability incident (although there certainly could be. Depends on how evil one wants to think.). Well, that was the context of this
381.
by pfg 10y ago
I think what konklone was getting at is that any scenario that allows an attacker to trigger a certificate warning (and effectively taking down the service) would also allow them to take down the service through other means. Do you have a s
382.
by pfg 10y ago
Yep, that's right, thanks. The public key is, of course, calculated based on the private key (these are RSA keys), hence why the brute-forcing still involves the private key, but it's not a hash of that key.
383.
by pfg 10y ago
Hidden service addresses are not just regular domain names resolved via DNS, they're actually a hash of the hidden service's private (edit: public, see below) key. The fancy onion addresses out there (like Facebook's) were ge
384.
by pfg 10y ago
Are we talking about using SMTP via the onion service, or just regular SMTP through an exit node? The onion service comes with its own crypto and would not need TLS on top of it (though you're free to use TLS anyway, like Facebook, if
385.
by pfg 10y ago
FWIW, a GET / (front page) while logged in takes 1-1.5s for me (TTFB). ~3s till load with ads blocked, ~5.5s with ads. Both numbers without caching, but that only seems to shave off about 200ms (most of the time is spent in JS and rend
386.
by pfg 10y ago
Anything from cache poisoning of the CA's DNS server, BGP hijacking or pwning any network hop between the CA and the victim would be sufficient. Domain validation is nothing but a DNS query or a HTTP request.
387.
by pfg 10y ago
The key is generated on device. WhatsApp acts as a kind of key server (if we want to compare it to GPG) where a sender can look up the public (identity) key of the recipient, which is then used to encrypt the message for the recipient. I&#x
388.
by pfg 10y ago
> I know nothing of the signal protocol, but whether the server can tell the message is garbage depends on what the receiver client tells the server. You're forgetting that the server is the one telling the sender what the new key i
389.
by pfg 10y ago
I assume what's meant is that the CA could be MitM'd during the domain ownership verification process, thus issuing a certificate for the attacker, which the attacker can then use to MitM you. Presumably, MitM'ing the CA&#x27
390.
by pfg 10y ago
The blocking would occur when the server changes the identity key of a user. If the server does that with the goal of finding out if the user has enabled safety number change notifications, it could just change the identity key to one under

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