pfg

36 ms·

301.
by pfg 9y ago
Both Mozilla[1] and Google[2] are on the record as saying that they don't believe CAs should be the ones to detect and block domains used for phishing and malware. Both are also platinum sponsors of Let's Encrypt. [1]: https:&#x2
302.
by pfg 9y ago
It's unlikely. Google and Mozilla are pushing hard for short-lived certificates, and the CA/B Forum has already passed a ballot that limits certificate lifetimes to 27 months, starting with March 1, 2018. Google wants to see that
303.
by pfg 9y ago
In the process you describe, there is no step where you confirm that you are actually the domain owner. Anyone could obtain a certificate for google.com. Verifying domain ownership is what the challenges are responsible for.
304.
by pfg 9y ago
ACME doesn't require that the client requesting issuance has access to the private key of the certificate. Access to a CSR (which only includes the public key) would be sufficient. Most clients support a mode where they use existing CS
305.
by pfg 9y ago
Just to make sure no one gets the wrong impression: You still have a single point of compromise, as having sufficient access to your machine would allow an attacker to do anything from intercepting your TOTP code to stealing your session or
306.
by pfg 9y ago
It's not really a question of where the hops are located. There'll be a couple of them in Europe and a couple in NA. Each will introduce a bit of latency. The numbers from the article are also round-trip times (that's what yo
307.
by pfg 9y ago
What people typically mean when they say speed of light is the speed in vacuum. For optical fibers, you can reduce that number by about 30%. It's also unlikely that there is a straight line from A to B, and each network hop will introd
308.
by pfg 9y ago
It's definitely not quite an apples-to-apples comparison. The article mentions the old API used to do things like storing the results in a database which "[...] had grown to store a massive slice of the internet", while the n
309.
by pfg 9y ago
It's worth pointing out that AWS allocates CPU shares based on the memory size selected for a function. The CPU performance you'd get with a function running on 256MB would probably be significantly lower than a core of a c4.large
310.
by pfg 9y ago
This is not intended to prohibit wildcard issuance. It just makes clear that identifiers in authorizations (and therefor challenges) are always actual FQDNs. You may still submit CSRs that include wildcard identifiers, and whether they&#x27
311.
by pfg 9y ago
Thanks for your (past and future) work on those clients! In case you haven't seen it yet, Let's Encrypt is working on a testing-only server implementation called pebble[1] that's based on the latest ACME draft. Might come in
312.
by pfg 9y ago
> iPhones can be lost too. emphasis on yet another . One more thing to keep track of. Not everyone likes to have their (door) keys hanging off their notebooks all day. > Yubikey can do U2F and OTP out of the package with no setup req
313.
by pfg 9y ago
The app uses kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly[1]. Quoting the relevant iOS documentation[2]: > After the first unlock, the data remains accessible until the next restart. This is recommended for items that need to be acce
314.
by pfg 9y ago
> Can it do full disk encryption? Works with GPG agent? PIV? PKCS11? OTP? U2F? My understanding is that the only use-case is SSH right now, but that could change, I guess. > Requires battery. Not waterproof. Not crushproof. Those are
315.
by pfg 9y ago
Kryptonite is more like a GPG smartcard (or YubiKey) of sorts (with some security trade-offs for the arguably better UX). The key never leaves your mobile device. Backdoors and bugs are still a possibility of course (when aren't they?)
316.
by pfg 9y ago
I definitely agree with this advice in general, but as it so happens, users who installed HandBrake via homebrew (a package manager for macOS) were affected by this too because the hash for the latest version of HandBrake was changed to the
317.
by pfg 9y ago
60ms sounds like too much. How are you measuring this, and what does your TLS config look like? A quick test with ab (-n 1 -c 1) against a nginx instance shows about 5ms for me, on an Intel E3-1245 V2 @ 3.40GHz. This is with a P-384 key, so
318.
by pfg 9y ago
I'm not sure if "Evil/BadUSB"-style vulnerabilities really apply to HSIC, where the code would know what kind of device to expect. It's possible there are ways to make this work - I'm not aware of any past vuln
319.
by pfg 9y ago
I don't think this is accurate for modern Android or iOS devices. AIUI basebands are connected via HSIC (a chip-to-chip variant of USB) nowadays, which doesn't give the baseband DMA.
320.
by pfg 9y ago
This article leaves out a couple of important things. First, session resumption and TLS False Start reduce the number of round trips required for a TLS handshake to one, both for new and returning clients. TLS 1.3 even allows for zero-RTT h
321.
by pfg 9y ago
Among other things, Chrome (and even Edge) are lightyears ahead when it comes to sandboxing, and were designed with sandboxing in mind. Mozilla is slowly catching up - they've started shipping some sandboxing features since Firefox 50
322.
by pfg 9y ago
You can follow individual accounts on other instances and their posts will show up in your home and federated timeline, but there's no way to, say, "follow" the full local or federated timeline of other instances. I assume th
323.
by pfg 9y ago
There's nothing to stop you from creating a new account at the CA of your choice, asking for a validation token, and putting it wherever it needs to be.
324.
by pfg 9y ago
> And to install a specially formed page on the site, you still need to be able to GET a copy of that page to install in the first place, and how the hell are you going to do that without ALSO stealing their CA login credentials, which I
325.
by pfg 10y ago
I'm all for adding native ACME support to web servers, but I can understand that they'd rather wait till ACME reaches RFC status (which hopefully won't be long now - the draft is in WG Last-Call). Once that's done, I&#x2
326.
Stealing PINs via Mobile Sensors: Actual Risk versus User Perception(arxiv.org)
4 points by pfg 10y ago|0 comments
327.
by pfg 10y ago
That's correct. Browsers offer other mechanisms like HPKP to mitigate attacks through rogue CAs. Active CAA checks by browsers would either be soft-fail like OCSP (i.e. useless in the face of an active adversary who could block the req
328.
by pfg 10y ago
That's right. Ah, the dangers of replying to new comments without re-reading their parent. :-)
329.
by pfg 10y ago
The bank's servers were unlikely to be involved at all. If the compromise happened at the registrar level - as the article indicates - the attackers could use their own DNS and web servers.
330.
by pfg 10y ago
HTTPS with HSTS would be a mitigation for the attack you describe. An attacker would not be able to obtain a valid certificate for the bank's domain, and HSTS would block SSL stripping attacks as well as prevent users from bypassing an

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