oggy

13 ms·

61.
by oggy 11y ago
In all the examples on the page, the RNN is first trained and then used to generate the text. Is there a way to use RNNs for something interactive? For instance, can one train an RNN to mimic Paul Graham in a discussion, and not only in wri
62.
by oggy 11y ago
But the black magic lies exactly in the handshake. You need to generate the RSA key (or more broadly, an asymmetric key) in order for the handshake to take place. An analogy I like to use are boxes with locks. Imagine that, given a lock des
63.
by oggy 11y ago
Erasing that distinction enables some goodies such as first-class type constructors, which makes it possible to manipulate types of higher kind. This in turn, presumably enables things like Generalized Algebraic Data Types.
64.
by oggy 12y ago
But that was the point, that not all programming languages are created equal. I only have anecdotal and personal experience to back this up, but I believe that a vast majority of people familiar with both Python and C would much prefer the
65.
by oggy 12y ago
So why are you using Python now and not C/C++?
66.
by oggy 12y ago
> Formal specification languages look remarkably like programming > languages; to be usable for significant applications they must meet > the same challenges: defining a coherent type system... Lamport disagreed with this statemen
67.
by oggy 12y ago
Sweet! I am a bit disappointed to see that you don't get your own e-mail subdomain, to which mail is routed using UUCP...
68.
by oggy 12y ago
Are you saying that you, just by the virtue of being a voter in your constituency, can go to the local election office, and demand that you yourself count all the ballots? Anyway mutual distrust is what the proposed e-voting systems rely on
69.
by oggy 12y ago
The premise of whatever it was that you were manually working out was that "all crypto based systems rely on hash collisions to protect voter privacy". Again, pray tell, how does Pret a Voter rely on hash collisions?
70.
by oggy 12y ago
It sounds like one of us doesn't know what they are talking about, and I don't think it's me. How does, say, Pret a Voter rely on hash collisions to protect voter privacy?
71.
by oggy 12y ago
I assume you mean that its transparency can be understood by 10% of the population, not how you use them (Pret a Voter for instance is quite straightforward). Still, that's a fair objection. I can counter it with two points, though. Fi
72.
by oggy 12y ago
> For what it's worth, e-voting isn't verifiable directly, > unless it's done in a way linked to voter identities You're missing out on the last 20 years of crypto research. I'd say we're not there yet, b
73.
by oggy 12y ago
I'll give it a try, briefly. For both, you first need to give a mathematical meaning to your system, i.e. represent the system as some kind of well-defined mathematical object. A typical choice (especially for concurrent/distribut
74.
by oggy 12y ago
Thanks. Is there a way to type something like take 5 . repeat? Or more generally, how do you make use of codata in these languages?
75.
by oggy 12y ago
What are the restrictions on combining primitive recursive and co-recursive functions in total functional programming? Clearly, "repeat" is primitively co-recursive, and "length" is primitively recursive, but "lengt
76.
by oggy 12y ago
If I store a program on Dropbox, I might run it many times. Thousands? Millions to be generous? But if the attacker has to do a brute force search which relies on me executing each different tampered version of the program, that's prob
77.
by oggy 12y ago
My issue with semantics is not that you're generalizing the notion, but rather specializing it. The "tamper" part of use-tamper-use in Evil Maid refers to the entire system, whereas you insist on tampering with only the ciphe
78.
by oggy 12y ago
I concede the point about the possibility of triggering crashes in say the kernel code. This however a) does not depend on repeated access to the encrypted drive, b) is only slightly less likely to occur with a wide-block mode, c) might be
79.
by oggy 12y ago
Thanks for the info. What theorem prover did you use and how do you convert the security rules to a format that the prover understands?
80.
by oggy 12y ago
That looks cool. Could you explain a bit more about how the formal verification part worked? What kind of prover do you use? Are the HSMs the specification, and you want to make sure that the rules behave as specified by the HSMs, or do you
81.
by oggy 12y ago
Thanks for the paper reference. I believe I do understand the constraints under which XTS operates on, and I agree with almost everything you said in the last comment. The only thing I don't agree with is that nobody knows what tamper
82.
by oggy 12y ago
As for security goals: are they not the ones I stated in my post? No, ciphertext integrity is not among them, and yes, there are consequences to this. Yes, it's a trade-off for efficiency. But I really don't see how all of that re
83.
by oggy 12y ago
I don't want XTS? Yes I do, for the purpose it was designed - block device level encryption. The title is misleading, and potentially dangerously so - I could see somebody switching to some CBC-like mode in TrueCrypt "coz tptacek
84.
by oggy 13y ago
The theoretical attack there is that one could selectively garble the (decrypted) parts of your storage, and thus destroy the contents of e.g. your configuration files. E.g. they could corrupt your firewall configuration file and thus leave
85.
by oggy 13y ago
For security, somewhat. The current de-facto standard mode of operation for disk encryption utilities is XTS, which effectively encrypts each block on the disk with a different key, where the blocks are of the same size as the cipher block.
86.
by oggy 13y ago
No, you're right on target. They are using non-optimized data structures, and rely on (Bouncy Castle's) managed code for encryption. From their paper, the throughput is around 10x slower than OpenSSL (but much closer to JSSE). My
87.
by oggy 13y ago
There is a formally verified implementation of TLS in F# (comes from Microsoft Research, if anybody cares): http://www.mitls.org However, there are gotchas. At this point the TLS protocol has gotten pretty complex. Even the act
88.
by oggy 13y ago
I've been wanting to read that for a while. Another candidate is Pierce's "Types and Programming Languages". Has anybody by any chance read both an can compare them?
89.
by oggy 13y ago
Might be worth to note that the YubiKey authors did mess up quite badly at one point in time: http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/Publis/PAPERS/PDF/KS-stm12.pdf
90.
by oggy 13y ago
I'm not sure if it's really the foundations that are the biggest barrier to entry for mathematicians (at least for most fields of math). Admittedly, I don't have experience with dependent-type based systems such as Coq/A

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