mskd12

4 ms·

1. 1.▲
   by mskd12 7y ago

   In many scenarios, I'd think that different user-specific secrets can be derived from the single secret stored, perhaps using a PRF. Why wouldn't this be enough? Thanks!
2. 2.▲
   by mskd12 7y ago

   The adversary in your statement seems like a static one. Given enough nodes in the committee (100's), it should be possible to make sure the case you specify never happens. And, I'd think fixing the committee is worse, as it prese
3. 3.▲
   by mskd12 7y ago

   So, in vanilla SSS, committee is fixed and the adversary is allowed to corrupt t-out-of-n nodes over the entire lifetime of the secret . In CHURP, committees are dynamic---changes at every epoch---and the adversary is allowed to corrupt t
4. 4.▲
   by mskd12 7y ago

   Thanks for the comment. We added a disclaimer!
5. 5.▲
   by mskd12 7y ago

   One of the authors of the work here. 1. Thank you for your comments. The project is an early-stage research prototype, and we are soon going to add documentation and tests to the code. 2. In fact, not all functions in the API are fully impl
6. 6.▲
   by mskd12 7y ago

   One of the authors of the work here. This work is an early-stage research prototype. The particular encryption module is currently unused, it is actually part of the pessimistic path of the protocol that is not yet implemented. The code cor