moxie

40 ms·

241.
by moxie 13y ago
In this case I was mostly referring to the inclusion of certificate pinning (ex: https://github.com/moxie0/AndroidPinning ) in the mobile apps, which would theoretically prevent them from using a UAE or Saudi controlled CA to do the interc
242.
by moxie 13y ago
There were instances of property destruction (but not assaulting residents?) at actions organized as OO, but not at Oscar Grant Park, where the evictions happened. It's not as if the evictions were a situation where police were "responding
243.
by moxie 13y ago
I think "The Illegitimacy of Violence, the Violence of Legitimacy" has the best analysis of what you're implying: http://crimethinc.com/texts/recentfeatures/violence.php
244.
by moxie 13y ago
It wasn't one space that was lost, it was hundreds of spaces all across the US, and hundreds more across the world. What occupiers have to deal with isn't "dogs and firehoses," but an extremely well equipped paramilitary force. Watch this v
245.
by moxie 13y ago
I like that this note about discipline has itself become a distraction. To be true to the note would have meant finishing an idea in progress, rather than browsing to HN and posting.
246.
by moxie 13y ago
iOS development is in the works.
247.
by moxie 13y ago
We're working on open source mobile end-to-end encryption at Open Whisper Systems: http://www.whispersystems.org We'd love it if more interested folks got involved.
248.
by moxie 13y ago
In the 2010 "aurora" attacks, it was Google's "lawful intercept" systems that were targeted by the attackers. Microsoft just recently revealed that it was the same in their case ( http://www.cio.com/article/732122/_Aurora_Cyber_Attackers_W
249.
by moxie 13y ago
I always assumed that the worth of these logos (along with the phrase "military grade encryption" and people who advertise "256bit AES") was that they enabled us to easily identify the projects that we didn't want to trust with our data.
250.
by moxie 13y ago
> I've said it before and I'll say it again: anonymity online and encrypted communications are one of the most important problems we're going to going to face in the coming decades. Hackers should be working on those, not clever ways t
251.
by moxie 13y ago
Yes, iOS versions of both RedPhone and TextSecure are in the works. The former has been under development for a few months now, while the latter started as a project at the "Spring Break Of Code" event that we organized in Maui.
252.
by moxie 13y ago
To be clear, I don't actually think it's worth trying to influence what is or isn't the legal interpretation that we might desire. We can't blame power for establishing systems of control, just as we can't blame a tiger for mauling a zo
253.
by moxie 13y ago
My recollection of the NSA's legal interpretation is that they feel they don't need a warrant to record everyone's traffic; they only need a warrant for a human to subsequently access those recordings. The twist this puts on "having nothing
254.
by moxie 13y ago
Travis Goodspeed and Dan Kaminksy demonstrated this in 2011 by embedding a tribute to the late Len Sassaman in the blockchain: http://pastebin.com/raw.php?i=BUB3dygQ
255.
by moxie 13y ago
Yes! I remember this happening but wasn't able to find any reference to it. I remember that I was already impressed he'd taken someone else's MP3 player, put a GUI in front of it, and sold it to AOL for hundreds of millions of dollars. But
256.
by moxie 13y ago
In San Francisco, I think the most a family of three could get a year (GA + CalFresh) is $10,416. Maintaining GA for any length of time is almost impossible, though, and you need to do eight hours of "workfare" a week to remain qualified (
257.
Privacy is "off the table," says New York City police chief(theverge.com)
6 points by moxie 13y ago|0 comments
258.
by moxie 14y ago
Disappointed that someone hasn't already slipped in: exec requests.get(' http://http://pastebin.com/raw.php?i=fun_harmless_social_con... ).content
259.
by moxie 14y ago
On some level, the fact that compliance regulations exist is an indication that security is not a priority for many of the entities that it applies to. Certainly snake-oil is a problem, but I think this particular area is one where buyers a
260.
by moxie 14y ago
What's interesting is that there is a whole ecosystem of companies like CipherCloud that do the minimum required to provide solutions for those interested in "compliance," not "security." My sense has been that their customers are predomina
261.
by moxie 14y ago
"There were occurrences of Lish passwords in clear text in our database." I think that this is what's most criminal about the whole event. It's probably safe to assume that "there were occurances of Lish passwords in clear text..." is a eu
262.
by moxie 14y ago
That depends on why you're interested in Tor. While my sense is that it was originally designed as an anonymity tool, it seems to have really exploded for use as a censorship circumvention tool. Most of the latter types of users are probab
263.
by moxie 14y ago
A few years ago, I wrote a client (tortunnel) that connects directly to Tor exit nodes and pretends to be a full circuit, allowing you to use Tor exit nodes as one hop proxies. I'm sure that things have changed since then, but I got to kno
264.
by moxie 14y ago
These are all posts written by different people participating in the same week-long event. That seems more forgiving than multiple company employees upvoting a story about the startup they work for to me. Although this particular form of a
265.
by moxie 14y ago
The question is who's liable when the theft occurs. In the CC world, the liable party isn't the card holder or the CC company, but the merchant. Chargebacks make services where money is transferred from one person to another extremely diff
266.
by moxie 14y ago
Any time you're in the position of moving money from one person to another with credit cards, you're in extreme risk. Your service becomes the perfect fraud target, because an attacker can essentially use your service to withdraw cash from
267.
An Android library for easily adding SSL certificate pinning to your app(github.com)
3 points by moxie 14y ago|0 comments
268.
by moxie 14y ago
The SAS section of the ZRTP RFC has all the details: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6189#section-7 But the short answer is that part of the negotiated key material for the call is used to derive two words from the PGP word list, which are
269.
by moxie 14y ago
Thanks! (And thanks for the heads up on the broken link)
270.
by moxie 14y ago
What I really want is for everyone to be using secure communication tools all the time. Not just because it'd obviously be great if everyone were communicating securely day to day, but because in extreme events, people tend to use the tool

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