mdriley

6 ms·

31.
by mdriley 7y ago
ECC is not a total solution. https://www.vusec.net/projects/eccploit/
32.
TRRespass research reveals rowhammering is alive and well(nakedsecurity.sophos.com)
1 points by mdriley 7y ago|0 comments
33.
TRRespass: Rowhammer against DDR4(vusec.net)
119 points by mdriley 7y ago|52 comments
34.
by mdriley 7y ago
I am. The goal was to create permalinks to specific sections of CPU reference PDFs. https://github.com/mmdriley/cpu.fyi
35.
by mdriley 7y ago
An actual speculation barrier (SB) instruction was added in later releases of ARMv8.0: - https://cpu.fyi/d/047#G6.11222648 - https://cpu.fyi/d/047#E9.CHDHDDBE along with the Consumption of Specula
36.
by mdriley 9y ago
For more on the x86 emulation and tracing tech that powers this, see: "Framework for Instruction-level Tracing and Analysis of Program Executions" (2006) https://www.usenix.org/legacy/events/vee06/fu
37.
by mdriley 12y ago
They're comparable features. In both cases, a simple but hardened filter is placed in front of some part of the kernel attack surface. Vulnerable processes (e.g. renderers) opt in to these protections so that, in the event of compromis
38.
by mdriley 12y ago
This doesn't "bypass all Windows security measures". As of Windows 8, processes can disable win32k syscalls using SetProcessMitigationPolicy with ProcessSystemCallDisablePolicy. https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-u
39.
by mdriley 13y ago
This is a bug in NSS. Here's the corresponding bug I filed against Chromium: https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=349775