maqp

13 ms·

151.
by maqp 2y ago
>That is not honest presentation of the facts. They have f'd up in the past, and since they still employ the same incompetent nepo-hirings, they will continue to f up in the future. Until they own their mistakes and E2EE everything,
152.
by maqp 2y ago
The content is lies. E.g. https://tsf.telegram.org/manuals/e2ee-simple#are-cloud-chats... Talks about "unique distributed architecture" which I have debunked here https://security.stackexchange.com
153.
by maqp 2y ago
No. I will not stop pointing out the hubris and nepotism in the company. No real changes have been made in who's designing security for Telegram, so their past is their future. Incompetent people doing crap job.
154.
by maqp 2y ago
That would be fine unless Telegram 1) Didn't say it was "Heavily encrypted" on its front page. 2) Didn't claim it was more private than WhatsApp which is always end-to-end encrypted with Signal protocol. 3) Didn't c
155.
by maqp 2y ago
Exactly. I have friends that outright refuse to use secret chats because stickers are so important to them. They literally have said to my face "stickers > human right to privacy".
156.
by maqp 2y ago
>Are you aware the article you link to technically critiques MTProto 1, including links to web archives of the MTProto 1 docs? Yes, but surely you realize a competent cryptographer wouldn't have implemented a backdoor looking design
157.
by maqp 2y ago
>These things do not matter in this conversation The largest UX hit is when launching a client after it's been powered off for a while. Telegram uses a symmetric session key. The client can with SINGLE AES-IGE decryption operation d
158.
by maqp 2y ago
>Come on - you really think that plays a role in how smooth a listview renders? That's not a feature. Stickers is a feature. Calls are a feature. Messages are a feature. Group chats are a feature. Group video calls are a feature. Li
159.
by maqp 2y ago
That was the time before we lived our half of our social lives online in group chats and social media. My calls and texts used to be about me agreeing with my buddies when to hang out. They weren't nearly as private as me keeping in to
160.
by maqp 2y ago
1. It's not end-to-end encrypted by default. 2. No group chat, even a small one between close friends is end-to-end encrypted. 3. Almost all desktop clients support no end-to-end encryption for 1:1 chats, meaning if you use the desktop
161.
by maqp 2y ago
Telegram is a joke in professional cryptography circles https://x.com/matthew_d_green/status/726428912968982529
162.
by maqp 2y ago
https://telegra.ph/Why-you-should-stop-reading-Durovs-blog-p...
163.
by maqp 2y ago
AES-IGE is not best practice. Neither is this https://words.filippo.io/dispatches/telegram-ecdh/ The difference is Moxie isn't an amateur when it comes to cryptographic design. Wikipedia actually lists him as
164.
by maqp 2y ago
Unless you're extremely privileged, privacy does play a role in every feature. There is no user experience if you're imprisoned for speaking your mind and your government intelligence has pwned Telegram servers. Making a smooth ap
165.
by maqp 2y ago
Oh Cwtch is like Cutch, and like the project says, the word rhymes with "butch".
166.
by maqp 2y ago
Ok so you have no idea who's vetting the algorithms at competitions. It's the other participants. That's going to be you among others. You get to break apart all the competing algorithms that claim to be better than yours. An
167.
by maqp 2y ago
>The threat model is excellent, except: “The adversary can’t break standard cryptographic primitives” >Let’s assume they can Let's not. The weak key sizes (<90 bits), broken primitives (SHA-1, MD5, DES), and weak modes of oper
168.
by maqp 2y ago
PGP stopped being the recommendation in 2004 when OTR became a thing with its forward secrecy. I really do not get the charm of repackaging PGP as a messenger, especially when it still has no forward secrecy: https://delta.chat&#
169.
by maqp 2y ago
There's probably not a backdoor in the device. At least I haven't seen any news about that. But. Apple has been an NSA PRISM-partner since 2012: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM#/media/File:Prism_
170.
by maqp 2y ago
None of the given descriptions have been too clear about what it is, though. It appears to not be a drop-in solution for communication like Briar, so why make a comparison here in the first place? Instead, it appears to be physical layer-ag
171.
by maqp 2y ago
Well not quite :) Wrt what upper post said: It used to be the case you could only exchange keys in person, but X25519 was introduced in 2016, and it was bumped to X448 in 2019. You can of course still exchange PSKs as it's currently th
172.
by maqp 2y ago
Briar is really interesting from the PoV of its forum and blog features, that try to use the messaging platform as infrastructure to build private services. There's a lot of discussion about alternatives here so I'm going to drop
173.
by maqp 2y ago
Yup, from what I hear, the problem is Apple doesn't allow process forking which means Tor would have to run inside the same process as the messaging app which is ridiculous.
174.
by maqp 2y ago
Briar runs a Tor Onion Service on your device. I'm unsure how well Tor supports having multiple devices acting as the server. One option could be to have a main program that's always on, to which your messages are received, and ot
175.
by maqp 2y ago
No forward secrecy in 2025. Lokinet is tiny compared to Tor's 9229 nodes https://nusenu.github.io/OrNetStats/w/misc/all.html The last time I checked, a lot of the nodes are just run in Hetzner's dat
176.
by maqp 2y ago
>Is this elitist culture in cryptography. It's elitist in the same way quantum physics, string theory and molecular biology are. A hard science with lot's of moving parts not everyone can manage. >But there is so much extra
177.
by maqp 2y ago
Cryptography isn't like that, it doesn't boil down to 10 simple steps. If you want ten, it's happening at higher level 1. Never invent your own primitives. Only professional cryptographers do that in algorithm competitions li
178.
by maqp 2y ago
>We can leave OpenSSL as it is but it shouldn't be the popular recommendation for developers. OpenSSL isn't a recommendation for developers. For TLS, LibreSSL and BoringSSL are. For other stuff, libsodium is. The only reason I&
179.
by maqp 2y ago
OpenSSL is not misuse resistant, nor is it opinionated. Opinionated means the ciphers available are the best of the bunch. Misuse resistance means the API validates parameters and reduces the footguns. If you're doing a closed ecosyste
180.
by maqp 2y ago
>so I do wonder if it's missing any new state of the art / best practises. https://nostarch.com/serious-cryptography-2nd-edition should have the latest info, it's approachable and goes into pitfalls. http

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