libroot

4 ms·

1.
by libroot 2mo ago
Again you responded to a position I havent taken. My argument was about who holds procedural power in standards bodies, given that some of the significant participants (NSA & GCHQ) have funded programs with hundreds of millions of $ per
2.
by libroot 2mo ago
What a weird comment. > where you think NSA "proposed" MLKEM or had some hand in its design Never said this and don't think it. Kyber came from an academic team through an open NIST competition, no one is disputing that. T
3.
by libroot 2mo ago
Imo "the optimal choice" is to be extremely skeptical to what comes to NSA proposing anything related to encryption/cryptography. From the first part of this blog series by DJB[1]: > Try to put yourself in the mindset of N
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NSA and IETF, Part 9(blog.cr.yp.to)
51 points by libroot 2mo ago|75 comments
5.
by libroot 2mo ago
This is also relevant if you get the phone back. There could be some nasty hw modifications that could leak data out of the phone in AFU state. Hopefully people in these kinds of situations take this into account. IMO all phones and compute
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Exploiting ML-DSA bugs [pdf](cr.yp.to)
3 points by libroot 4mo ago|1 comments
7.
by libroot 4mo ago
> Posted new paper "Exploiting ML-DSA bugs" and demo scripts: https://cr.yp.to/papers.html#mldsa The current panic to roll out new ML-DSA code in place of ECC signatures will give away tons of keys to attackers
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ExitFlare(exitflare.com)
5 points by libroot 5mo ago|0 comments
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Ears and Eyes – Searchable database of cases of physical surveillance devices(notrace.how)
2 points by libroot 5mo ago|0 comments
10.
by libroot 9mo ago
Yes, the journalists did the redactions. The metadata timestamps in one of the documents show that the versions were created three weeks before the publication. And to be honest, the journalists generally have done a great work on pretty mu
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by libroot 9mo ago
Thank you. The most recent completely new information from the Snowden files is found in Jacob Appelbaum's 2022 thesis[1], in which he revealed information that had not been previously public (not found on any previously published docu
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New information extracted from Snowden PDFs through metadata version analysis(libroot.org)
324 points by libroot 9mo ago|123 comments
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Going Through Snowden Documents, Part 3(libroot.org)
3 points by libroot 9mo ago|0 comments
14.
by libroot 10mo ago
Weird, the certificate should be fine. Here's a link for Web Archive: https://web.archive.org/web/20251211220119/https://libroot.o... We also have Tor onion site: http://librootfuuucybrkp
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Going Through Snowden Documents, Part 1(libroot.org)
246 points by libroot 10mo ago|211 comments
16.
by libroot 1y ago
No, these encrypted VMs are not protected from buggy or malicious on-die components. SEV assumes that the SoC hardware is trusted.[1] And we don't even have to go that deep: both AMD SEV and Intel's equivalent, Intel SGX, have his
17.
by libroot 1y ago
It's hard to take corporate denials at face value. History shows that when it comes to surveillance and government cooperation, big tech companies often say one thing in public while doing another behind closed doors. Before the Snowde
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Cloudflare: The Irresistible Hub for Mass-Surveillance(libroot.org)
9 points by libroot 1y ago|2 comments
19.
by libroot 1y ago
Sure, threat models matter, but that's exactly the point. TEEs are marketed as if they solve the "malicious infrastructure" problem. Cloud providers tell you they can't see your data, and vendors pitch TEEs as some kind
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Trusted Execution Environments? More Like "Trust Us, Bro" Environments(libroot.org)
6 points by libroot 1y ago|3 comments