kfreds

11 ms·

91.
by kfreds 1y ago
Temp file space: Use RAM, or talk to host storage over Virtio. Timezone data etc: You would have to fetch that over the network, or from a metadata API such as the one Firecracker provides to VM guests.
92.
by kfreds 1y ago
> This proposal seems to be taking that approach to the extreme - not even a kernel. To be fair, there is a kernel - the Go runtime. But since there is no privilege separation it classifies as a unikernel. Performance gains should be exp
93.
by kfreds 2y ago
> Fair. This isn't the official Mullvad position, then (which is that the law may apply)? I'm pretty sure our official position is that it doesn't apply, rather than it may apply. Note that the article on our website that
94.
by kfreds 2y ago
I'm writing this on my phone and for whatever reason can't find the passages that you're quoting. Are they in the same article that I linked? In any case, to my knowledge the law in question doesn't apply to us. If the S
95.
by kfreds 2y ago
I'm pretty sure you're talking about this law, in which case it doesn't apply to us. https://mullvad.net/en/help/swedish-covert-surveillance-data... In short, "Mullvad is thus not covered by ei
96.
by kfreds 2y ago
> Ok, but... don't users have to reply [rely] on their provider’s pinky-promise that the two parties won't cooperate with each other and share their separate data, thereby connecting the dots? > Yes. On the other hand, it do
97.
by kfreds 2y ago
> .. Tor .. believing its three hops is the minimum required number of hops to achieve the goal of anonymity. It's more nuanced than that. Tor's design states the following: "A global passive adversary is the most commonly
98.
by kfreds 2y ago
What do you mean by static IPs? Mullvad has never offered static IPs to customers. Please clarify.
99.
by kfreds 2y ago
> how can a device with Soft-CPU implemented on FPGA can be secure? > FPGA configuration (NVCM). The only secret is UDS, 256 random bits that are baked into FPGA configuration stream, and they are protected by FPGA's read-out pro
100.
by kfreds 2y ago
Thank you for mentioning that. Yes. There's also Glasklar Teknik AB and Karlstad Internet Privacy Lab AB. Glasklar does: - Sigsum, a transparency log design - System Transparency, a security architecture for transparent systems - Hosts
101.
by kfreds 2y ago
We're working on it. Our next hardware should have USB HID, FIDO2, and persistent storage. The persistent storage will be per device app. Well, that's the idea anyway. I'm not sure when we'll be done but check our websit
102.
by kfreds 2y ago
> I really want one. I just currently don't know how to write device driver stuff Ease into it. We have fairly good documentation and some getting started material you can read (tillitis.se, dev.tillitis.se, GitHub) to gauge your le
103.
by kfreds 2y ago
Thanks. I don't remember off the top of my head but I believe Sweden has a mandatory refund period of 14 days for online purchases that applies to us. As to why, essentially, one of our cultural tenets is to minimize the amount of cust
104.
by kfreds 2y ago
Don't worry, they haven't.
105.
by kfreds 2y ago
Check out sigsum.org for a simpler design with a stronger threat model. As for building a decentralized append-only log, that would complicate the design and the threat model quite a bit. In particular it would make proofs of inclusion and
106.
by kfreds 2y ago
Yes. My colleagues and I have been working on it (and related concepts) for six years. glasklarteknik.se system-transparency.org sigsum.org tillitis.se This presentation explains the idea and lists similar projects. https://youtu
107.
by kfreds 2y ago
> then post some, instead of obviously biased organisations which make a living of treating it as a problem https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Management_of_attention_defi... Wikipedia is a good start, if you are open
108.
by kfreds 2y ago
> The diagnosis is not a complete surprise but it is hard on him. My understanding of available evidence is that an ADHD diagnosis isn't helpful for everyone. This is partly due to societal stigma and lack of understanding of what A
109.
by kfreds 2y ago
> The only person tackling the verifiable hardware side of things seems to be Bunnie Huang with his work on the Precursor Bunnie's work is inspiring, but he is not alone. As far as verifiable hardware goes, I would argue that Tillit
110.
by kfreds 2y ago
Thank you. I found this comment illuminating. I too am very interested to hear any book recommendations you have on the topic. What are your favorite books on software design, functional programming, and/or computing generally? What ar
111.
by kfreds 2y ago
Well put. This comment makes your criticism of the book much more clear to me at least. I agree with you that the separation of Church and state is a foundational idea of software design and even computing generally. I find it quite beautif
112.
by kfreds 2y ago
The book plainly states that it is a philosophy for software design. Philosophy in this context is closely related to strategy, which is the art of reducing reality to heuristics, so that we might easier figure out how to reach our goals in
113.
by kfreds 2y ago
My understanding is that Apple PCC will not open source the entire server stack. I might be wrong. So far I haven't seen them mention reproducible builds anywhere, but I haven't read much of what they just published. One of the pr
114.
by kfreds 2y ago
No, gigel82 is right. Transparency logging provides discoverability. That does not mean the transparency logged software is auditable in practice. As gigel82 correctly points out, the build hash is not sufficient, nor is the source hash suf
115.
by kfreds 2y ago
You're right that it isn't. I assumed that your "..sheer complexity of modern CPUs.." statement was in response to "Without open silicon, there's no way to detect..". That's what prompted my response.
116.
by kfreds 2y ago
> How can anyone verify that all the code paths append to the log? davidczech has already explained it quite well, but I'll try explaining it a different way. Consider the verification of a signed software update. The verifier, e.g.
117.
by kfreds 2y ago
One approach would be a chip design where a remote attestation request issues a hardware interrupt, and then the hardware hashes the contents of memory, more specifically the memory containing the code.
118.
by kfreds 2y ago
It depends on what you want to do. If all you're trying to do is produce an Ed25519 signature you could use something like the Tillitis TKey. It's a product developed by one of my companies. As I've mentioned elsewhere in thi
119.
by kfreds 2y ago
Hi Mike! Long time no see. > simply asserts that a particular key was generated inside a CPU ... There's currently no good way to prove this step Yes, but there are better and worse ways to do it. Here's how I think about it. I
120.
by kfreds 2y ago
> it feels like a foundation built on quicksand. You depend on so many turtle layers and only one of them has to be adversarial and game over Interesting. Please elaborate. Here's how I see it. Reproducible builds: I think we'l

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