kfreds

13 ms·

121.
by kfreds 2y ago
You're right. It is very hard, if not impossible, to get absolute guarantees. Having said that, FPGAs can make supply chain attacks harder. See my other comments in this thread.
122.
by kfreds 2y ago
> No amount of remote attestation and "transparency logs" and other bombastic statements like this would make up for the fact that they are fully in control of the servers and the software. There is absolutely no way for a cust
123.
by kfreds 2y ago
> How do you know the proprietary part of the FPGA chip performs as expected and does not covertly gather data from the configured gates? We don't, but using an FPGA can make supply chain attacks harder. Let's assume you have a
124.
by kfreds 2y ago
> Apple forgot to disable some cache debugging registers a while back which in effect was similar to something GP described Thank you for bringing that up. Yes, it is an excellent example that proves the existence of silicon vulnerabilit
125.
by kfreds 2y ago
> How would you determine that the hardware being used is identical to the open hardware design? FPGAs can help with this. They allow you to inspect the HDL, synthesize it and configure it onto the FPGA chip yourself. The FPGA chip is st
126.
by kfreds 2y ago
> what does open hardware mean? Great question. Most hardware projects I've seen that market themselves as open source hardware provide the schematic and PCB design, but still use ICs that are proprietary. One of my companies, Tilli
127.
by kfreds 2y ago
> I feel like this is all smoke and mirrors to redirect from the likelihood intentional silicon backdoors that are effectively undetectable. The technologies Apple PCC is using has real benefits and is most certainly not "all smoke
128.
by kfreds 2y ago
I've been working on technology like this for the past six years. The benefits of transparent systems are likely considerable. The combination of reproducible builds, remote attestation and transparency logging allows trivial detection
129.
by kfreds 2y ago
Wow! This is great! I hope you'll consider adding witness cosignatures on your transparency log though. :)
130.
by kfreds 2y ago
> Tor is apparently wide open to the NSA through traffic analysis. Would you be willing to clarify what you mean by that? To start with, are you saying that Tor is wide open to traffic analysis (1) by anyone, (2) by powerful attackers su
131.
by kfreds 2y ago
Wow! This is incredibly exciting. Apple's Private Cloud Compute seems to be conceptually equivalent with System Transparency - an open-source software project my colleagues and I started six years ago. I'm very much looking forwar
132.
by kfreds 2y ago
> I'm just interested in how it all works under the hood. Learn everything there is to learn about the Tillitis TKey. It's the most open-source software and hardware USB security token there is. It is FPGA-based, and contains a
133.
by kfreds 2y ago
Did the ad in fact talk about the VPN by itself, or in conjunction with the Mullvad Browser? In any case we make the most important nuances clear on our landing page, and in other places on our website.
134.
by kfreds 2y ago
Thank you! You are of course referring to System Transparency. I feel obligated to point out that we have yet to fully implement that idea. I've been working on it, and the related projects Sigsum and Tillitis, for the past six years.
135.
by kfreds 2y ago
Thanks! I don't think so unfortunately. It's a great idea though.
136.
by kfreds 2y ago
A VPN is not enough for privacy. But in combination with a privacy-focused browser, you make sure to block third-party cookies and other tracking technologies used by the data collectors. The paragraph above is clearly visible on our landin
137.
by kfreds 2y ago
> feel free to describe to HN how Mulvad protects users against ad networks. A VPN is not enough for privacy. But in combination with a privacy-focused browser, you make sure to block third-party cookies and other tracking technologies u
138.
by kfreds 2y ago
Thanks! :) I should've been more clear. The questions I posed above are rhetorical. I've spent well over half a decade obsessing over them. See my mention of System Transparency, Sigsum and Tillitis elsewhere in this thread.
139.
by kfreds 2y ago
To my knowledge we don't measure it, at least not in the way I think you mean. I can't speak for my marketing colleagues but I would assume they reason about it. It seems like a complex system to me, which means the approach kind
140.
by kfreds 2y ago
> Some of the ads also felt deceptive making it seem like it will prevent all your online tracking, even though we know that’s not the case. I'm sorry to hear that. For what it's worth our marketing colleagues make a big effort
141.
by kfreds 2y ago
Thank you for noticing! System Transparency is taking way longer to figure out, design and build than I expected. On the other hand the project is quite ambitious, and our work on ST has sprouted two additional OSS projects: - https:/
142.
by kfreds 2y ago
> VPNs are pretty far out in the "just trust me bro" realm of handing over all your browsing habits with no ability to check their real behavior. Yes. It is quite an interesting situation, really. It's also a fun challenge
143.
by kfreds 2y ago
It's quite simple really. 1. We launched Mullvad 15 years ago. During those 15 years people's interest and awareness of online security and privacy has grown considerably, as has the consumer VPN market. 2. Our strategy is quite d
144.
by kfreds 2y ago
I'm sorry you feel that way, but I can relate. I initially had mixed feelings about it as well. On the other hand the campaign we did in Stockholm last year worked out quite well. It managed to affect both domestic and EU legislative d
145.
by kfreds 3y ago
> Any insight as to why you think blockchains can't handle this? As you point out yourself the trust assumptions are fundamentally different. As a result a transparency log can produce an inclusion proof and a consistency proof that
146.
by kfreds 3y ago
> The clients can monitor the ledger via consistency proots and it is highly beneficial as that prevents any chances of split being undetected view without requiring to trust other parties in the process. Clients submiting the record to
147.
by kfreds 3y ago
Sort-of. Here's how I think about it. The fundamental value of a transparency log is to provide trivial discoverability. Say an attacker has compromised a code signing key and is using it to sign a malicious software update. Let's
148.
by kfreds 3y ago
> While there's still work to do, the TLS ecosystem is unrivalled in terms of actual security benefit delivered to the most people. Well said!
149.
by kfreds 3y ago
Absolutely. The vast majority of such use cases are way better served by a transparency log than a blockchain. Imagine an embedded system that only accepts firmware updates that are digitally signed and discoverable in a public append-only
150.
by kfreds 3y ago
Transparency logging is a fantastic complement to public-key cryptography. A prioritised list of the most important cryptographic constructions may very well look like this: symmetric ciphers, hash functions, MACs, public-key cryptography,

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