jude-

19 ms·

151.
by jude- 5y ago
A blockchain's resiliency in part depends on how many full replicas are available -- if at least one replica exists somewhere, the chain can be resuscitated even if all block producers die. In Ethereum 2.0, nodes don't maintain a
152.
by jude- 5y ago
Why is the chain's liveness and resiliency to server failures dependent on where people happen to be keeping their validators? This isn't a problem in Ethereum 1.0.
153.
by jude- 5y ago
Validators != separate physical computers. Also, what happens if the nodes for shard S in epoch N fail to replicate the shard data to the nodes assigned to S in epoch N+1?
154.
by jude- 5y ago
I don't think shards are powered by hashing? I think nodes participating in Ethereum 2.0 are assigned to shards by the beacon chain, and they work to grow the shard's transactions by deciding on transaction ordering and inclusion
155.
by jude- 5y ago
So, what happens when one of the shards goes offline, or forks? What are the cascading consequences for validators of other shards, if any? Asking because I don't think there's a viable strategy for keeping all shard data around
156.
by jude- 5y ago
> Again, the only reason blockchains need consensus is to allow people to interact with each other - consensus is between people. Computers are just tools to make that easier. It's a fundamental contradiction to assume you can use a
157.
by jude- 5y ago
> That is a debatable point. The TCB amounts to a single hash, that the global Ethereum userbase has had at least three months to converge on, with extremely obvious ways of establishing its correctness. If that can't be securely es
158.
by jude- 5y ago
With enough wealth, you can buy violence. Wealth inequality begets power inequality.
159.
by jude- 5y ago
Maybe the only way everyone can have all the power they want (or at least the perception of having it) is to build the Matrix, put the power-hungry people in it, and make it so they only ever interact with AIs.
160.
by jude- 5y ago
Try reading the paper. They address that.
161.
by jude- 5y ago
The author's central argument has been formally proven: https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/919.pdf . PoS protocols cannot offer a client with no a priori knowledge of the history of transactions a way to distinguish
162.
by jude- 5y ago
> What's fascinating about the proof-of-stake vs. proof-of-work debate is that there's sometimes (not always) a tinge of anti-government sort of sentiment. For me, the PoS vs PoW debate is a question of system resiliency. In P
163.
by jude- 5y ago
Making the TCB bigger makes PoS less secure overall. If you pick the wrong validator set when you boot your node up, you're fucked -- your node will never discover the chain history which represents actual user activity [1]. PoS is
164.
by jude- 5y ago
Proof of Space is just Proof of Work by another means. Honestly, I'd rather just have (electric) PoW -- at least the energy source could be green, and any green energy capacity built out for PoW can be repurposed.
165.
by jude- 5y ago
> Both POS and POW depend on some level of subjectivity/trust, even while the latter relies on it less than the former. No one is arguing that you don't have a trusted computing base. What is being argued is, why make the TCB b
166.
by jude- 5y ago
The same people who loudly proclaimed "Code is Law" also wrote The DAO. Therefore, any action the code takes is legitimate.
167.
by jude- 5y ago
> it was possible to bruteforce blocks until you were also the next generator. This sounds exactly like a special case of the game of convincing people that your fork is the true fork. NXT stakers each have their own preferred forks (i.
168.
by jude- 5y ago
In other words, the PoW scores on ETH and ETC after the fork ultimately were predictive of how much one token was valued versus another. You are right that there was uncertainty at first -- and it was reflected in how much PoW each chain g
169.
by jude- 5y ago
You seem certain that the IRS has never considered this possibility before.
170.
by jude- 5y ago
Maybe I'm applying the term "slashing" too broadly. I've historically used it to describe the act of having your tokens taken away for bad behavior (either all at once, or incrementally). Is there a more-specific term
171.
by jude- 5y ago
> By the logic of that article asymmetric cryptography doesn't, because the value equal to what's protected by the key is magically wasted somewhere. Of course, that isn't true, because it's not possible to break asym
172.
by jude- 5y ago
Two ways: * The "stock" (token) is constantly spitting * The "stock" grants the bearer both a continuous dividend as well as a vote on deciding what "work" (transactions) the "company" (chain) takes o
173.
by jude- 5y ago
Honest question: does it matter? As with all things, the purpose of the system is what it does . And right now, for the vast majority of people, the purpose of crypto is to make numbers go up; the original principles only matter to a han
174.
by jude- 5y ago
I call bs. There is not $80 billion USD locked in defi -- the world has not taken $80 billion USD, bought crypto with it, and put the crypto into defi code. Like, where are the receipts? What has happened is defi tokens have appreciated t
175.
by jude- 5y ago
> Satoshi fixed a bug (that reverted it back to the initial rules everyone agreed upon). The Bitcoin chain fork where the bug manifested wasn't reverted. Instead, a chain fork where the bug didn't manifest outgrew the one that
176.
by jude- 5y ago
> "I want to buy coins but the existing hodlers are all colluding to not let me" This isn't the problem. The problem is, "I want to buy enough coins to stake without being diluted but existing hodlers are all collu
177.
by jude- 5y ago
No distributed system is guaranteed to make forward progress if over 1/3 of its voting nodes is faulty, full stop. Once an adaptive adversary controls more than 1/3 of the voting power, they can forever delay the remaining 2&#x2F
178.
by jude- 5y ago
Which is easier to pull off, once you have control of the stolen coins? * Use them to vote for two chain histories, and thereby get the victims slashed? * Launder the stolen coins, buy an ASIC fab, churn out ASICs, plug them into the power
179.
by jude- 5y ago
What on-chain attack surface? The only way to permanently knock a PoW chain offline is to consistently out-mine everyone else. In PoS, once you lose BFT quorum (1/3 of all votes), it's game over.
180.
by jude- 5y ago
Or, maybe we can step back from this whole discussion and consider that maybe, just maybe, tying block-production to coin-ownership in a blockchain with undecidable smart contracts and a less-than-stellar security record is an exercise in t

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