jamesonquinn

3 ms·

1.
by jamesonquinn 8y ago
IRV actually has the opposite problem: "If I vote for my ideal candidate, am I impairing the good candidate's chance of winning?" For instance, if it were Nader/Gore/Bush with 26%/25%/49%, and (hypothetica
2.
by jamesonquinn 8y ago
Arrow's theorem applies only to ordinal voting methods. Approval is not actually subject to Arrow's theorem; it's not even well-defined whether it passes the criteria. However, there are various voting impossibility theorems
3.
by jamesonquinn 8y ago
Sortition (that is, random selection) is a system for roughly-proportional representation; that is, for choosing multiple winners for a legislature so as to represent a population. Approval voting is a way of picking a single winner. They s
4.
by jamesonquinn 8y ago
The "favorite betrayal" criterion is defined mathematically. In your scenario, as long as you approve Ideal, you are not betraying your favorite, even if you also approve Good. The only betrayal would be if you didn't approve
5.
by jamesonquinn 8y ago
The article focuses on approval versus IRV, and the advantages it gives for approval are valid. As you know, there are various other methods (Condorcet, STAR, 3-2-1, etc.) that keep most of approval's advantages, but sacrifice simplici
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by jamesonquinn 8y ago
Unintentional spoilage and intentional tampering are two different things. There's nothing disingenuous about mentioning one of them but not the other. It's true that, depending on the implementation, approval voting can be subjec
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by jamesonquinn 9y ago
As others have noted, proportional representation (PR) is the best solution to gerrymandering. (Not arguing that we shouldn't also support second-best solutions like nonpartisan redistricting and court challenges to the worst gerrymand