g_p

100 ms·

841.
by g_p 6y ago
Interestingly, and purely anecdotally (so not designed to replace the study itself), I've been experimenting with the RSSI being reported by the NHSx app through the debug menu. At least based on what I've seen so far on my device
842.
by g_p 6y ago
> > the iOS Bluetooth in sleep workaround method > Why do they need to find a workaround? Can't Apple tell them the best way or push an iOS patch to help? Apple seem to take the view governments should use their decentralised
843.
by g_p 6y ago
This review seems to be of academic code for an epidemiological model, rather than anything to do with the app itself? The 2 apps are in Kotlin and Objective C, rather than C++.
844.
by g_p 6y ago
> I built an exposure notification app that solved the backgrounding issue by simply using the backend to reconstruct the missing Android -> iOS piece: https://medium.com/@dangish/a-solution-to-iphone-backgroundi.
845.
by g_p 6y ago
> Thanks for that I'll have a read. > Is there any discussion about other countries using this NHS app (the repo says MIT license)? > Each country could customise the alert heuristic but it seems like a waste of resources for
846.
by g_p 6y ago
The NHS wanted the ability to model "risk-from" a contact, rather than only "risk-to". In the decentralised approach, infected users upload a list of their own identifiers, these are broadcast, and everyone checks if the
847.
by g_p 6y ago
It takes about 5 minutes to obtain the API keys from the Android app to be able to build it. It was also a pretty well-documented process to get the Android app to build (unlike some Android "open source" projects that seem to be
848.
by g_p 6y ago
There's no obfuscation that I could see on the Android app, which should help with this. Certainly when looking across to the source release, it was a familiar codebase (modulo the fact the reversed version was in pseudo-java, and the
849.
by g_p 6y ago
Yes, this seems to be one of the rather clever aspects of the design - this appears to make it possible to discover iOS devices that are in the proprietary "iOS-only" mode of discovery. It seems that once one of these "overfl
850.
by g_p 6y ago
You're right in your assessment of the risk of trolling etc. There is a model already in place, but it's worth noting that it's got quite an interesting design. In the "Google/Apple" decentralised approach , s
851.
by g_p 6y ago
Perhaps this outage will raise awarenesses more broadly as to the prevalence of "non essential" third party SDKs like these, and the risk that their failure can significantly impact on the wider ecosystem. I can't imagine App
852.
by g_p 7y ago
It looks like you won't have to petition for it. According to https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/NHS-app-security-paper%20V0.1.... , "We intend to open source our codebase once the first release is finalised. The d
853.
by g_p 7y ago
> And I still can't figure out why a freshly wiped unlocked phone w/ a Sprint SIM is running a Verizon provisioning process. Samsung has a rather "interesting" (to say the least) firmware development process (if you c
854.
by g_p 7y ago
It's not a solution for iOS, but Fair Email is an open source Android mail client that fits this description. It can work as a text only client for sending and receiving, and defaults to pretty much everything being safe. Links are hyp
855.
by g_p 7y ago
> Published keys are 16 bytes, one for each day. If moderate numbers of smartphone users are infected in any given week, that's 100s of MBs for all phones to DL. > That seems untenable.* > It's a lot, but untenable? If 30
856.
by g_p 7y ago
I don't think there is any suggestion of using any kind of granular location data, be it GPS or cellular network location. Doing it per region could certainly work, and only reveal maybe 4 bits of information about location. I imagine
857.
by g_p 7y ago
Operators currently have handset location data, based on cell tower triangulation. I imagine many will store this, but this may vary by network. The absolute minimum you need, in order to run a network, is to know the current location of th
858.
by g_p 7y ago
There isn't any IMEI linkage. I think the post you reply to is implying the link between Bluetooth MAC address to IMEI could be established by a state actor. That isn't the case though, due to Bluetooth MAC address randomisation,
859.
by g_p 7y ago
> Also the way cases will be brought seems like it would create perverse incentives on the rulings. > > The International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution, or C.P.R., was willing to allow DoorDash to arbitrate “te
860.
by g_p 7y ago
In cases where the arbitration clause is already in place, and the arbitrations have been filed, that would likely be difficult to do, as a result of the Alsup ruling. Where the arbitrations haven't begun yet, there's certainly so
861.
by g_p 7y ago
> Also, so far I haven't found a truely good SSH client on the iPad. It might be worth checking out Prompt - supports some nice edge cases too, like SSH agent forwarding. > - There is a ton of stuff that could be done on the iPad
862.
by g_p 7y ago
Thanks, that link is a much better overview. It seems the calls will still reach the destination network, and the phone then, but with potential for the operator to signal the likelihood of it being an unwanted or spoofed call. I imagine we
863.
by g_p 7y ago
From my understanding, spoofed calls won’t get onto your carrier’a network under this model, let alone ring your phone. All this assumes that sorting out spoofing resolves the problem, which isn’t guaranteed.
864.
by g_p 7y ago
Sounds like a good first step to solve the problem of how the legacy telecoms systems were designed in a world of trusted peers federating. End result of course being spoofed caller ID spam. Unless I'm missing something though, these m
865.
by g_p 7y ago
When it comes to building the mobile network itself, none of the companies you mention have any footprint in that space. It's really the 3 (Nokia, Ericsson and Huawei) along with some less prominent players (Samsung, ZTE etc). The vast
866.
by g_p 7y ago
This is the key question! Both Europe and the USA took their eye off the ball. Europe's overly strict rules on "state aid" (giving public money to fund private sector work) mean that large, publicly traded telecoms companies
867.
by g_p 7y ago
In addition to the "it's cheaper" point (due to Huawei being a significant recipient of state aid, and European alternatives not being able to receive any state aid), it's worth keeping an eye on some of the wording bein
868.
by g_p 7y ago
Serif also produces free online manuals, in addition to the workbooks: https://affinity.help/photo/en-US.lproj/index.html (Photo) https://affinity.help/designer/en-US.lproj/index.html (D
869.
by g_p 7y ago
Nice initiative! Testing seems key to getting control of spread, so anything that can make it easier to get people tested is key. I wonder if there's enough capacity among the testing facilities to signal when they are out of capacity,
870.
Colleagues Don’t Read Anything You Write. Here Are 8 Ways to Change That(nytimes.com)
2 points by g_p 7y ago|0 comments

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