charleyablaze

4 ms·

1.
by charleyablaze 3y ago
Extract: There are now less than 13 days until the vote and the cyber security community, civil society and the public are still unable to read the proposed regulation, let alone scrutinize its impacts. In a media Q&A given by the Europ
2.
13 days before the first eIDAS vote, still no public text(last-chance-for-eidas.org)
54 points by charleyablaze 3y ago|18 comments
3.
EU's concealment of secret 'expert list' on CSAM regulation is maladministration(iccl.ie)
397 points by charleyablaze 3y ago|199 comments
4.
by charleyablaze 3y ago
The secret text of Article 45: > I have access to the near-final text of the regulation, which is not yet public, but was leaked to me by a confidential source. ‘qualified certificate for website authentication’ means a certificate for w
5.
What the QWAC? An EV Certificate all over again(scotthelme.co.uk)
165 points by charleyablaze 3y ago|82 comments
6.
by charleyablaze 3y ago
Scott Helme has leaked the secret text of Article 45! (scroll down) https://scotthelme.co.uk/what-the-qwac/
7.
by charleyablaze 3y ago
This prevents governments, ISPs, etc from identifying which websites people are visiting and censoring their connections. Firefox are enabling it by default.
8.
by charleyablaze 3y ago
Previous discussion from Cloudflare's launch: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=37703885
9.
by charleyablaze 4y ago
These are the references that Mozilla listed: "[6] The identical corporate officers were acknowledged in Rachel McPherson’s initial response and confirmed in a company document submitted privately by Rachel to Mozilla. [7] Ian Abramowi
10.
by charleyablaze 4y ago
My read is that Mozilla were much more concerned about the shared ownership and operations with Measurement System, than the presence of the malware. I think we can agree that you can't be doing crimes under one company name and simult
11.
by charleyablaze 4y ago
I agree there was a lot of mud slinging in that thread, but this is the key bit from Mozilla's response, supported by statements which Trustcor haven't disagreed with: > Certificate Authorities have highly trusted roles in the
12.
by charleyablaze 4y ago
Followed up yesterday with: "Certificate Authorities have highly trusted roles in the internet ecosystem and it is unacceptable for a CA to be closely tied, through ownership and operation, to a company engaged in the distribution of m
13.
by charleyablaze 4y ago
> And from Mozilla "I tend to agree at this point that discussing the merits of the claims might be superfluous, because the conduct of the CA's representative is a more urgent issue [...]" This comment was made by Filippo
14.
by charleyablaze 4y ago
I agree there was a lot of mud slinging in that thread, but this is the key bit from Mozilla's response, supported by statements which Trustcor haven't disagreed with: > Certificate Authorities have highly trusted roles in the
15.
by charleyablaze 4y ago
Discussion and response on Mozilla's dev-security-policy list: https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/g/dev-security-polic...
16.
Concerns about Trustcor CA(groups.google.com)
12 points by charleyablaze 4y ago|0 comments