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bri3d
searching PlanetScale…
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46 ms
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571.
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bri3d
2y ago
> Proximity pairing > Bluetooth? It's not in or around the standard at all. Android/Google has Fast Pair. I guess Apple get to make their own Fast Pair now. > Chromecast exists and is quite open, this is not rocket scienc
572.
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bri3d
2y ago
> The weird missing one is iMessage. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/mex_24...
573.
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bri3d
2y ago
Each feature I listed comes with a clause equal to "Apple shall implement an interoperability solution that provides third parties with access to the same AirPlay feature described in the preceding paragraph as available to Apple, in a
574.
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bri3d
2y ago
On first read, this seems ridiculously onerous to me. They're trying to compel Apple to deliver interoperability for basically every unique Apple feature: * AirPlay * AirDrop * Notifications + Smartwatch integration * Headphone smart h
575.
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bri3d
2y ago
Here are the actual instructions: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_... https://ec.europa.eu/competition/digital_markets_act/cases/2... https:&#
576.
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bri3d
2y ago
> One problem with git is that it's mutable, and real problems have arisen (some quite recently) because of that. What are you referring to? As far as I know, nothing about git is mutable in the hash-chain sense? If I sign the last
577.
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bri3d
2y ago
Well, yes and no. They share the same primitives (hash tree) but those have been around for 40+ years. If you think about Git, it’s already a blockchain without the mining blocks; it’s chained hash trees in the same way. So adding mined blo
578.
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bri3d
2y ago
> Whatever it's verifying is insufficient to stop persistent iOS malware, hence the existence of the MVT toolkit One of these assertions absolutely does not support the other; the newest persistent malware detected on iOS by MVT is
579.
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bri3d
2y ago
Starting in iPadOS and iOS 15, iOS and macOS use a similar Signed System Volume concept and the System volume's integrity is verified.
580.
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bri3d
2y ago
Think like callgrind, but without the overhead. The true x86 equivalent is probably `vtune` For open source there's `perf` + `flamegraph` but that's not interactive, or `KDAB/hotspot` which is probably the closest open-source
581.
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bri3d
2y ago
Daniel Tiger (Mr Rogers spinoff/remake/???) is really quite good as well. They did well at preserving the idea of the original in a very different format.
582.
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bri3d
2y ago
Sure, and this VM solution is the exact path forward for “install stuff in a box” solutions as Android move towards trying to enforce w^x, which is probably why they chose a full Linux VM as their demo app. Emulators and games and apps with
583.
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bri3d
2y ago
There’s being auditABLE and being auditED. Honestly I think the article’s take is smarter for a less experienced or skilled founding team and tptacek’s is better for a more experienced team. Paying auditors to look at screenshots and CSVs i
584.
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bri3d
2y ago
In the Android-y part of Android, yes, they use ART, which is abstracted. But, they also give app authors the NDK. How do you think Android knows whether it's libc or your app making a syscall from native code? It doesn't - you&#x
585.
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bri3d
2y ago
The RTL-SDR was originally intended as a DVB-T receiver, using an app called "BlazeVideo." Anyway, many, many open source implementations exist for this as it's a popular first/early SDR project. All you'll you need
586.
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bri3d
2y ago
I think the concept is similar, a hypervisor-based trusted execution environment which is isolated from both other VMs and the parallel guest/"main" kernel. The Apple environment seems more like a Secure World / TEE, wit
587.
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bri3d
2y ago
No. Way lower level. WINE runs native code and replaces library and system calls. This turns native code into C++ macros and then recompiles those into code. This is like a JIT with C++ as the IR. On the other hand WINE is not an emulator ;
588.
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bri3d
2y ago
It’s a weird in between, IMO. I don’t think it’s fair to say it’s not emulation, because in most places the original architecture’s state is maintained and functions are hooked through macros like PPC_FUNC - the original source code is not
589.
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bri3d
2y ago
Possible, yes, it's just looking at various 3GPP network messages and parsing out a few common anomalies. Accessible, not all the time. This project uses QMDL (Qualcomm debug logging) on a device with an accessible modem debug port and
590.
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bri3d
2y ago
> IIRC even with airplane mode the stingray can capture phone info, IMEI, GPS location, etc. No. Airplane mode turns off the cellular radio's emissions, that's the whole point. A cellular base station emulator isn't going
591.
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bri3d
2y ago
SEV attestation does delegate to the PSP, no? I think it _might_ be reasonable to attest that upgraded microcode is both present and valid using SEV, without the risk of malicious microcode blinding the attestation, but I’m not positive yet
592.
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bri3d
2y ago
Hyundai used both this same NIST AES key _and_ an OpenSSL demo RSA key together in a head unit! (search “greenluigi1” for the writeup). Using CMAC as both the RSA hashing function and the secure boot key verification function is almost the
593.
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bri3d
2y ago
GGML has a Metal (Apple's GPU interface layer) backend, yes, using MPS (Metal Performance Shaders), which are pre-baked shaders provided by Apple in a way similar to cuDNN. This is probably the most popular method for large-scale infer
594.
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bri3d
2y ago
No, the gate length on most 5nm nodes is like 40nm or something. Since around 2008-ish, the “process name” and the size of any feature have rapidly diverged (even if you use some weird pointless metric like the size of a FinFET fin, nothing
595.
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bri3d
2y ago
Tacking on: the devil in a modern baseband is in the firmware. The analog domain stuff is generally handled by increasingly commoditized RF frontends outside of the baseband processor, and then either clean analog IQ or more recently, even
596.
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bri3d
2y ago
No, the data is collected for internal use by product managers. It has little value I'm aware of on the open market and is unlikely to be collected for sale. That's my entire point. Enshittification is Bad, yes, but it's also
597.
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bri3d
2y ago
> that the client spies on you and that data is (part of) your payment. What value do you think this click tracking data has? I'm genuinely curious. To me this seems like Product Manager Telemetry, which is still an insidious and pe
598.
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bri3d
2y ago
Oh, 100%. My point was just: if you're worried that you can't audit your cloud provider's microcode patch level because you aren't using SEV-SNP, you have a threat model where their microcode patch level is not particula
599.
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bri3d
2y ago
It's in the CVE: "AMD SEV-SNP users can verify the fix by confirming TCB values for SNP in their attestation reports." You can read about how this works here: https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/
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bri3d
2y ago
To the very best of my knowledge, yes, it is.
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