andrewdavidwong

5 ms·

1.
Qubes OS 4.3.1 has been released(qubes-os.org)
4 points by andrewdavidwong 4mo ago|0 comments
2.
Qubes OS 4.3.0 has been released(qubes-os.org)
15 points by andrewdavidwong 10mo ago|0 comments
3.
Qubes OS 4.2.4 has been released(qubes-os.org)
3 points by andrewdavidwong 2y ago|1 comments
4.
Qubes OS 4.2.3 has been released(qubes-os.org)
2 points by andrewdavidwong 2y ago|0 comments
5.
Qubes OS 4.2.2 has been released(qubes-os.org)
24 points by andrewdavidwong 2y ago|5 comments
6.
Qubes OS 4.2.1 has been released(qubes-os.org)
58 points by andrewdavidwong 3y ago|11 comments
7.
Qubes OS 4.2.0 has been released(qubes-os.org)
59 points by andrewdavidwong 3y ago|21 comments
8.
Future Directions for SecureDrop(securedrop.org)
1 points by andrewdavidwong 3y ago|0 comments
9.
Qubes OS 4.1.2 has been released(qubes-os.org)
66 points by andrewdavidwong 4y ago|0 comments
10.
New user guide: How to organize your qubes(qubes-os.org)
62 points by andrewdavidwong 4y ago|15 comments
11.
Qubes OS 4.1.1 has been released(qubes-os.org)
6 points by andrewdavidwong 4y ago|0 comments
12.
Automated OS testing on physical laptops(qubes-os.org)
48 points by andrewdavidwong 4y ago|4 comments
13.
Qubes OS 4.1.0 has been released(qubes-os.org)
32 points by andrewdavidwong 5y ago|1 comments
14.
Qubes OS 4.0.1 has been released(qubes-os.org)
5 points by andrewdavidwong 8y ago|0 comments
15.
Introducing the Qubes U2F Proxy(qubes-os.org)
19 points by andrewdavidwong 8y ago|2 comments
16.
The road towards an integrated SecureDrop workstation(securedrop.org)
32 points by andrewdavidwong 8y ago|9 comments
17.
Qubes OS 4.0 has been released(qubes-os.org)
143 points by andrewdavidwong 9y ago|39 comments
18.
Qubes Air: Generalizing the Qubes Architecture(qubes-os.org)
183 points by andrewdavidwong 9y ago|65 comments
19.
Qubes Air: Generalizing the Qubes Architecture(qubes-os.org)
3 points by andrewdavidwong 9y ago|0 comments
20.
Qubes OS Security Bulletin on Meltdown and Spectre(qubes-os.org)
5 points by andrewdavidwong 9y ago|0 comments
21.
MSI support for PCI device pass-through with stub domains(qubes-os.org)
1 points by andrewdavidwong 9y ago|0 comments
22.
Introducing the Qubes Admin API(qubes-os.org)
3 points by andrewdavidwong 9y ago|0 comments
23.
by andrewdavidwong 10y ago
It depends on the entity being hashed, but in the case of software, it's usually a version number. In the case of source code, maybe a git commit hash.
24.
by andrewdavidwong 10y ago
I honestly don't know enough about CT to have an opinion.
25.
by andrewdavidwong 10y ago
> Also, "web of trust" only works for a tiny subset of people. If I'm a "lone wolf" FOSS developer, my key won't be signed by anyone, there won't be any WoT to verify. Downstream packagers just have to
26.
by andrewdavidwong 10y ago
Software Heritage looks excellent, but it sounds like the two projects may have different goals. It sounds like Software Heritage is focused on collecting, preserving, and sharing code (and, as you say, potentially compiled software), where
27.
by andrewdavidwong 10y ago
That's precisely the point. Doug could trivially change some of the hashes before signing them. If he were to do that, he wouldn't be trustworthy, and you, as a security-conscious individual, would want additional witnesses to cor
28.
by andrewdavidwong 10y ago
I don't speak for Joanna, but I interpret that quotation as saying something like: "Users are always fated to trust the 'last mile' vendor because the last mile vendor (e.g., Google Chrome), has control over what the use
29.
by andrewdavidwong 10y ago
> The NSRL dataset has signatures that are typically used to verify both integrity and veracity. > http://www.nsrl.nist.gov/RDS/rds_2.54/split-hash.txt Can you explain this signature scheme? I'm not fam
30.
by andrewdavidwong 10y ago
Fair enough, but this system isn't intended for end users who, as you point out, are unlikely to bother checking the hashes of their downloads. Quoting Joanna Rutkowska: "Also, in case it wasn't clear: the primary audience fo

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