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alexlarsson
searching PlanetScale…
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11 ms
·
61.
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by
alexlarsson
11y ago
> Turing-complete platforms are universal simulators. There's nothing they can't represent. No existing computer is a universal turing machine. The infinite ram requirement is pretty hard to implement in practice.
62.
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by
alexlarsson
11y ago
I wonder if it does Ajax. Then you could do some kind of weird recursion where it does a request to google for itself.
63.
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Gnome Builder – 3.16.2
(hergert.me)
3 points
by
alexlarsson
12y ago
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0 comments
64.
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Official Gnome SDK runtime builds are out
(blogs.gnome.org)
1 points
by
alexlarsson
12y ago
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0 comments
65.
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by
alexlarsson
12y ago
I don't understand how one can claim to "invent" reallocarray. Glib has had g_realloc_n() since 2010, but its not something being touted as a huge invention. Its a tiny helper. Very useful, but quite obvious.
66.
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by
alexlarsson
12y ago
Its super easy to get out of this container. Just connect to the x socket, then look for a terminal window, the start injecting keyboard input into it.
67.
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by
alexlarsson
12y ago
You didn't give the root command. But the app can easily send keyboard input events to your terminal window injecting that command.
68.
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by
alexlarsson
12y ago
Basically, all the clients that connect to an Xserver has full trust in each other. You can sniff on any event sent to any client, and send fake events (that are not detectable as fake) to any client, as well as read all the contents of any
69.
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by
alexlarsson
12y ago
Not sure what you mean, any user with access to docker can run processes as root, with any part of the host system mounted into the container. Now, that access was not added by you, but its required to be able to run your images. Once you h
70.
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by
alexlarsson
12y ago
This is not sandboxing. Quite the opposite, this gives the apps root access: First of all, X11 is completely unsecure, the "sandboxed" app has full access to every other X11 client. Thus, its very easy to write a simple X app that
71.
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by
alexlarsson
12y ago
The title is a bit hyperbolic, true. There have been various ways to try to contain desktop apps over the years. But I wouldn't call them "apps" really, they may get the sandboxing aspects down, but they don't have the s
72.
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by
alexlarsson
12y ago
Well, the sandboxing stuff is not ready either. We need work on all levels of the stack to make this stuff work.
73.
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by
alexlarsson
12y ago
Raising the latency is what you want in many cases. For instance, the current discussion is about a video player. There is no need for a video player to submit new data every 10ms, because it knows exactly what it will be playing for the
74.
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by
alexlarsson
12y ago
At the moment we grant all of /dev/dri, but long term we want only the render nodes accessible. That gives us no modesetting or DRM master capabilities, only rendering. It is true though that the drivers could very well have leaks
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by
alexlarsson
12y ago
There is no copy. You have a reference to a GPU side buffer, and you want to pass a reference to that buffer to another process, where it will continue to use the GPU to access it.
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by
alexlarsson
12y ago
Sharing a normal memory mapping is not necessarily what is required here though. What you want is to share the same GPU-side memory buffer between two processes. It may not even be mappable to cpu side memory.
77.
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by
alexlarsson
12y ago
Can you not use dma-buf and EXT_image_dma_buf_import?
78.
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by
alexlarsson
12y ago
> The main issue is that the video decoder MUST be in the same process than the video output, for performance reasons (buffer sharing: memcpy is murder) and for hardware decoders. And video output are usually with very high access in the
79.
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by
alexlarsson
12y ago
> Is this true? Can you provide a proof of concept that can attack xscreensaver in this way? I believe this should work: https://github.com/magcius/keylog > What is bad about letting an app talk to alsa if it nee
80.
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by
alexlarsson
12y ago
>> kind of file selector service that runs in the session (outside the sandbox) that grants some kind of access to files the user chose. >This is not enough, as explained above. Well, its hard to say that as this kind of stuff is n
81.
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by
alexlarsson
12y ago
PulseAudio can be very low latency. Here are some docs on how to set this up: http://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/PulseAudio/Document... That said, I don't think a video player needs low latencies.
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by
alexlarsson
12y ago
It all depends on what your goal is. Allowing to run VLC as a bundle with more or less full access is certainly possible. However, that is not really "sandboxed" in any fashion. For instance, once any client has any kind of X11 ac
83.
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by
alexlarsson
12y ago
Both ABIs are shipped in libstdc++, but all other libraries are build with the old ABIs. You can manually use the libstdc++ with the new ABI, but any of your dependencies that use the problematic ABI must then be rebuild (and will be in F23
84.
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by
alexlarsson
12y ago
The login screen is much simpler and controlled than the full session. Its much more likely to work than a full session where you can run any application and do anything. Sounds like a pretty good starting point, much better than introduci
85.
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Builder, an IDE of our Gnome
(indiegogo.com)
14 points
by
alexlarsson
12y ago
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0 comments
86.
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by
alexlarsson
12y ago
Here is an implementation of the logind API for openbsd: https://uglyman.kremlin.cc/gitweb/gitweb.cgi?p=systembsd.git...
87.
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by
alexlarsson
12y ago
True
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by
alexlarsson
12y ago
Or you could use glib which has this exact function (g_realloc_n) since a long time.
89.
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by
alexlarsson
12y ago
Well, even if you assume the app will take too long to render, is it really worthwhile to render the "rest" of the window (pointer, frames, etc). The main reason you're working with a particular window is the content, not the
90.
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Introducing GtkInspector
(blogs.gnome.org)
2 points
by
alexlarsson
12y ago
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0 comments
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