Veserv

16 ms·

241.
by Veserv 11mo ago
Those are non-issues. It only takes a few thousand lines (easily less than 10k even with zero dependencies and no standard library) to implement QUIC. Kernel management of transport protocols has zero actual benefit for latency or throughpu
242.
by Veserv 11mo ago
I am aware. I was making a concrete example pointing at a well known conference where average industry professionals would find the very concept of these systems being secure to be laughable. Somehow we have ended up in this bizarro land wh
243.
by Veserv 11mo ago
At a certain point you do need to test in real road conditions. However, there is absolutely no need to jump straight from testing in lab conditions and “testing” using unmonitored, untrained end users. You use professional trained operator
244.
by Veserv 11mo ago
We do see constant exploitation of government and critical infrastructure systems. The US telecom network is literally actively compromised right now and has been for multiple years [1]. Like wishful thinking, ignorance is also not a valid
245.
by Veserv 11mo ago
That is inanely pedantic. The municipal government of Monowi, Nebraska probably can not buy a RCE in any OS as they only govern a single person. That is also utterly meaningless to argue as it bears no effect on the core thrust of the argum
246.
by Veserv 11mo ago
Yes you did, you said: "all governments using COTS OS for military/intelligence work" and then argued: "If your statement was even remotely true then why is this not used in conflicts to devastating effect?". You ar
247.
by Veserv 11mo ago
You are claiming that every major OS is unhackable by governments. Can you point to literally any specific system that is demonstrably unhackable? Can you find literally anybody who would publicly claim their systems are unhackable by gover
248.
by Veserv 1y ago
I see. The Rust implementation effectively splats out the transitive closure of all your callee stack frames upfront which would enable continuing previously executing async functions.
249.
by Veserv 1y ago
I thought Rust async is a colored stackless coroutine model and thus it would be unsafe to continue execution of previously executing async functions. To explain, generally speaking, stackless coroutine async only need coloring because they
250.
by Veserv 1y ago
Ah yes, Google could make a unhackable phone secure against state actors, they just do not feel like it. Not at all a problem that is viewed as so impossible that the very notion of it is beyond belief to the overwhelming majority of soft
251.
by Veserv 1y ago
L1 caches are usually N-way associative, so that should only become a consistent problem if you access N distinct addresses with the same key (in this case the same offset (with likely 64-byte granularity) relative to a 4K boundary).
252.
by Veserv 1y ago
They are proposing custom hardware on both ends talking a custom hardware network protocol. That is a enormous amount of complexity in comparison to a custom software stack on bog-standard hardware. I would expect advantages to justify that
253.
by Veserv 1y ago
You can use a single core to do 200 Gb/s of bytestream in the presence of loss/recovery/retransmission assuming you adequately size your buffers so you do not need to stall while waiting for retransmit. So ~1 bandwidth-delay
254.
by Veserv 1y ago
All you have said is that RoCE is bad. If it is as you say, then I guess? Not really relevant though. I am saying that a properly designed and implemented software network protocol gets you similar capabilities to the stated capabilities of
255.
by Veserv 1y ago
I am aware of how network protocol stacks work. Getting 200 Gb/s of reliable in-order bytestream per core over a unreliable, out-of-order packet-switched network using standard ethernet is not very hard with proper protocol design. If
256.
by Veserv 1y ago
Is this just a cost efficiency thing? It only takes like 1 core to terminate 200 Gb/s of reliable bytestream using a software protocol with no hardware offload over regular old 1500-byte MTU ethernet. If you want encrypted transport, t
257.
by Veserv 1y ago
Monsanto has already made legally binding declarations that they will never sue for "simply having GMO plants in a field" or "accidentally growing trace amounts of patented crops" which have been affirmatively held as le
258.
by Veserv 1y ago
Newer languages have made packaging and importing dependencys significantly easier, but have done this while increasing coupling and making switching dependencys harder. This results in brittle dependency trees. Using a private package mana
259.
by Veserv 1y ago
Yep. It is now legally called puffery if you commit massive fraud. Truly we live in the best of all possible timelines.
260.
by Veserv 1y ago
The standard you linked literally talks about: "High Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity" and "Remote Access Management" for "High Impact BES Cyber Systems". That explicitly indicates n
261.
by Veserv 1y ago
Ah yes, " likely air-gapped", what a high-confidence statement. Any competently designed air-gap must be precisely auditable and demonstrably, positively air-gapped. The only world where "likely" is a reasonable word is
262.
by Veserv 1y ago
They have them at 2 TB [1] now for just 300$. And SanDisk announced 4 TB last year, but I do not see them for sale just yet. [1] https://shop.sandisk.com/products/memory-cards/microsd-cards...
263.
by Veserv 1y ago
Ah yes, let us just gloss over 6 orders of magnitude when we are discussing cost-effectiveness and feasibility. What is the difference between 100$ and 100,000,000$ of spend really? Basically the same thing.
264.
by Veserv 1y ago
It absolutely matters how large your storage use is. Terabytes of storage is easily manageable on even basic consumer hardware. Terabytes of storage costs just hundreds of dollars if you are not paying the cloud tax. If you got resiliency a
265.
by Veserv 1y ago
Entire terabytes?! My god, I can only barely fit that onto a single SD card the size of my pinky nail. It is quite bizarre that such paltry amounts of data and problems with such tiny scale seem to pose challenging problems when done in the
266.
by Veserv 1y ago
You added a zero. There are ~8760 hours per year, so 8 hours is ~1 in 1000, 99.9%.
267.
by Veserv 1y ago
Needs (2019).
268.
by Veserv 1y ago
Drawn from Karpathy killing a bunch of people by knowingly delivering defective autonomous driving software instead of applying basic engineering ethics and refusing to deploy the dangerous product he was in charge of.
269.
by Veserv 1y ago
No, they claimed: "We have no knowledge " and "we are not aware " which does not mean "the vulnerabilities discovered through exfiltration were not used ". That admits nearly every possible class of outcome
270.
by Veserv 1y ago
You mean the proven false accusations by Tesla promoters?

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