Y
HN Search
Hacker News Search
new
|
comments
|
top
|
jobs
SERSI-S
searching PlanetScale…
1.
▲
2.
▲
3.
▲
4.
▲
5.
▲
6.
▲
5 ms
·
1.
▲
by
SERSI-S
4mo ago
That’s a good point; I hadn’t thought of it that far. Maybe I’ll think more deeply about what it’s like when family members are far away and the key-sharing feature doesn’t work. At first I thought about a biometric SDK, but in a more sever
2.
▲
by
SERSI-S
4mo ago
Doctors must scan or request the patient’s sharing key (RSA) after the patient has given consent and verify that the treating doctor is indeed a licensed professional. This ensures that sensitive data can only be accessed after the patient
3.
▲
by
SERSI-S
4mo ago
When a patient loses their private key, it’s a very serious mistake, but I’ve thought this through carefully, and yes, your key is split into three or more parts using SSS (Shamir’s Secret Sharing) or another key-sharing method one for your
4.
▲
by
SERSI-S
4mo ago
Key management and authentication are indeed complex issues, just as I had initially suspected, but after reading some older cryptography texts, I realized that we can use a key-sharing method. In an emergency, we can share the key with fam
5.
▲
by
SERSI-S
4mo ago
You’re absolutely right. In my opinion, data like medical records is the most sensitive data in the world. How can you possibly entrust your data to another institution or organization when you don’t know if it could just be taken without y
6.
▲
by
SERSI-S
4mo ago
What I mean is, I envision a scenario in which personal data such as patient data is stored separately and independently from other institutions; that patient data is encrypted and then distributed to the IFPS, while the IFPS ID is stored o
7.
▲
Decentralized Medical Records
3 points
by
SERSI-S
4mo ago
|
10 comments
8.
▲
by
SERSI-S
9mo ago
OP here. I’m still unsure about one assumption and would love pushback: Even if the cryptography is solid, is asking doctors to scan a QR code already too much friction? If you’ve built tools for clinicians, what’s the maximum workflow chan
9.
▲
by
SERSI-S
9mo ago
Agreed. The scary part is that memory requirements quietly define who is allowed to be a prover. If ZK infra assumes 64–128GB RAM by default, decentralization is already lost, regardless of the cryptography. Streaming-first designs feel lik
10.
▲
by
SERSI-S
9mo ago
Interesting work. This seems highly relevant for ZK systems that need to generate large proofs on commodity hardware. Streaming-first proving could be a key enabler for permissionless ZK infrastructure
11.
▲
by
SERSI-S
9mo ago
Author here. A few quick clarifications up front: - No medical data is stored on-chain (hashes only) - This is a prototype to test assumptions, not a compliant system - Hospitals are not expected to run blockchain infrastructure - The desig
12.
▲
Show HN: A self-custody medical records prototype (lessons learned)
(github.com)
4 points
by
SERSI-S
9mo ago
|
2 comments
13.
▲
by
SERSI-S
9mo ago
I’m less worried about deliberate exfiltration and more about the structural opacity of these systems. You’re essentially being asked to trust that data boundaries are respected, without any practical way to independently verify those guara
14.
▲
by
SERSI-S
9mo ago
Thanks — that’s a very clear way of framing it, and the Long Now references are useful. I agree the real challenge over 100-plus year timeframes isn’t storage itself, but continuity of care. Institutions like the Internet Archive handle thi
15.
▲
by
SERSI-S
9mo ago
Fair point. Filecoin answers the question “will this file still be around in 10 years?” through economic incentives. What I’m poking at is the layer above that: “will anyone actually understand this file in 100 years?” Storage alone won’t c
16.
▲
Ask HN: Preserving knowledge long-term without a central authority
1 points
by
SERSI-S
9mo ago
|
4 comments