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The secret joke of Kant's soul: emotions and moral reasoning [pdf]
- psycr 11y agogwern: care to comment why you've posted this? What in particular is interesting about it?
- eli_gottlieb 11y agoAnd next, gwern, I suppose you'll tell us that things are made of atoms?
- jacobolus 11y agoIn a legal context, Stephen Breyer makes a similar argument about the decisionmaking process of self-professed “originalists” and “textualists” on the Supreme Court. Namely, that they make their decision based on their own preferences and then later come up with a rationalization, claiming that the decision was based on a strict principled interpretation. The rationalization then provides a convenient excuse, letting judges disclaim responsibility for their decisions or their effects, hide their true reasons, and deflect criticism. 2004 lecture: http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/b/Breyer_2006.pdf http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/b/Breyer_20... Book version: http://amzn.com/0307274942 http://amzn.com/0307274942
- ikeboy 11y agohttp://faculty.msb.edu/hasnasj/GTWebSite/MythWeb.htm http://faculty.msb.edu/hasnasj/GTWebSite/MythWeb.htm makes a similar point.
- brownbat 11y agoMuch more at Legal Positivism: http://www.iep.utm.edu/legalpos/ http://www.iep.utm.edu/legalpos/ Note however that it's not the only academic theory of judicial interpretation, and despite its popularity, it still leaves a few gaps as a predictive theory. Sure, it explains why justices tend to vote along ideological lines. Unfortunately, they often don't. Having abandoned any acknowledgment of legislative or judicial constraints, the theory has nothing to fall back on to explain those cases.[1] Justices are most likely operating under multiple constraints in any given opinion. Some of those constraints are dictated by their approach to textual interpretation, just as some are dictated by other ideas about fairness or social norms. [1] Scalia's liberal opinions are a fun read. They have Scalia defending maternity leave, asylum seekers, armed robbers, and members of the communist youth league. Often he's marshalling the same impatient sarcasm against the right as he more famously deploys against the left.
- bonobo3000 11y agoThis is fascinating. The dilemma he poses at the end is something i have thought about a lot - "How far can the empirical debunking of human moral nature go? If science tells me that I love my children more than other children only because they share my genes (Hamilton, 1964), should I feel uneasy about loving them extra? If science tells me that I’m nice to other people only because a disposition to be nice ultimately helped my ancestors spread their genes (Trivers, 1971), should I stop being nice to people? ... It seems that one who is unwilling to act on human tendencies with amoral evolutionary causes is ultimately unwilling to be human. Where does one draw the line between correcting the near-sightedness of human moral nature and obliterating it completely?" The more I overthink and let the "cognitive" part take over, the more the question nags me. The kind of cognitive detachment it takes to ask these questions and digest philosophy is why most people avoid philosophy. Its not healthy to be too detached from your emotions. So it seems like by asking that question, empiricism and rationality have already gone too far.
- steve19 11y ago"... is why most people avoid philosophy" Billions of people discuss and debate morality every week at Churches, Synagogues, Temples, Mosques and Monasteries etc. I don't think its that people don't want to be asked big questions or told how they act is wrong and should be changed. I would argue they avoid it because 20th century philosophers are either boring/abstract, too political or too preachy. For example, postmodernism thought, Feminist philosophy and Green Philosophy all tend towards certain political agendas which it offputting to those who don't agree with the agendas. Modern philosophers also tend to be anti-religion, putting off most of the world's population (being lectured on how the concept of a God has been the source of all the world's problem for millennia is tiresome, as tiresome as you would find a charismatic preacher telling you that you will go to hell for being an Atheist) There are in fact Atheistic movements towards creating moral/church-experiences centered around philosophy, one such example if the London School of Life. http://www.theschooloflife.com/london/ http://www.theschooloflife.com/london/ I think it is very sad Schools of Philosophy, like those of Ancient Greece, no longer exist. Sadly, I don't think they could exist in today's outrage-driven cultural climate where online lynch mobs are on the hunt for someone to say something controversial.
- MarkPNeyer 11y agoso many beliefs people have about morality rest on assumptions: my beliefs must be rational, founded on evidence, or else they are invalid. this insistence is highly destructive. there is certainly a form of validity granted by axiomatic reasoning, but we have rejected things we can't axiomatize and generalize, as if anything uncomputable were not worth thinking of. ========= in this article I explain a common (most likely false) assumption in most moral thinking: http://markpneyer.me/2015/06/25/morality-and-the-subjunctive-ordering-hypothetical-situations/ http://markpneyer.me/2015/06/25/morality-and-the-subjunctive... and this is a series of articles explaining a model of emotion and why it works the way it does: http://markpneyer.me/2014/10/19/a-model-of-emotion/ http://markpneyer.me/2014/10/19/a-model-of-emotion/
- ikeboy 11y agoFrankly, in your article you appear to only argue against deontology, while appearing unaware of any alternatives. Your actual argument is also inconsistent with your uncomputable claim. Specifically, your proposed "taking context into account" is completely computable. Also, if you were right that morality exists but is not computable, why would that change anything?
- MarkPNeyer 11y ago> Also, if you were right that morality exists but is not computable, why would that change anything? because principles as the basis of morality then go away. making moral decisions becomes about looking at each _specific_ situation, and applying as much context as possible - instead of trying to say "well in general, X is bad".
- ikeboy 11y ago>because principles as the basis of morality then go away. I don't see why. Why can't I say "uncomputable function X is the basis for morality", and simultaneously believe that X satisfies principle Y? There's nothing about uncomputable functions that says you can never know a value, and principles are useful even if they aren't always correct anyway. >making moral decisions becomes about looking at each _specific_ situation, and applying as much context as possible - instead of trying to say "well in general, X is bad". Why can't an uncomputable function have a rule that X is bad? It might not be computable in all cases, that doesn 't mean it can't have rules.