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“We take security seriously”
- benoliver999 11y agoPeople in the know: how do these breaches keep happening?
- obstinate 11y agoSecurity is very hard, even for the best at their best. And the people who have the information that is most sensitive are not the best, and aren't giving their best. I'm not in the know, but it seems pretty basic. Lemme know if I'm wrong.
- HarryHirsch 11y agoInsufficient liability, one would guess. Cars, airplanes, industrial plant, all these have software in them but the liability is wholly different, should an accident happen due to a software bug.
- hrbrtglm 11y agoI don't think that's a relevant comparison. You can be sure that when cars, airplanes and industrial plant have available access through internet, they will be powned as well and there will be accidents.
- HarryHirsch 11y agoThis argument was implied. If they will own your data when you put your HR database on the internet, maybe you shouldn't put your HR database on the internet to begin with. I can't be the only one who feels that computer security is a field that is insufficiently mature, yet people put confidential data on the internet all the time even though the technology isn't ripe yet to do so safely. Compare this attitude with the extremely conservative approach in rocketry. The technology is positively from the stone age, but everyone agrees that it is well understood. You can't take any other approach when space missions are multi-decade projects and the price tag has nine figures.
- dllthomas 11y agoCareful, though. If I put up a new Tetris clone on GitHub, and you decide to use it to control your power plant... Liability should first rest with the entities deploying the software, since those are the only ones with a picture of what can go wrong in the context where it's being deployed. Those entities should then be demanding warranty/indemnity as appropriate from their suppliers (or possibly third parties, for F/OSS).
- DougN7 11y agoToo prevent it, you have to protect against 100% of all attacks (including new emerging attacks) 100% of the time. The bad guys just have to get lucky once.
- bluecmd 11y agoThe best course of action is to not store the data at all. Use "Sign in with Facebook" et. al and never even get the user password for example. I'm so tired of needing to have a password manager when we have good authentication platforms today.
- juliangregorian 11y agoToo bad we don't have a viable decentralized option, I don't at all relish the idea of Facebook Inc. owning my online identity.
- ryukafalz 11y agoDiaspora. Friendica. Pump.io. If you're more technically inclined, you can self-host one of many: https://indiewebcamp.com/projects https://indiewebcamp.com/projects There isn't just one alternative, and I don't think there really should be - the fact that most of them are interoperable means that not everyone has to be using the same software. We need to standardize on a protocol, not so much an implementation. (But yes, there does need to be a nice-looking implementation if we want the general public to use it.)
- juliangregorian 11y agoMerely having wide adoption of OpenID or Mozilla Persona would be a worthy start. I just don't have much faith in these idealistic open source projects these days; when I google "diaspora oauth" and the first thing I find is abandonware (https://github.com/diaspora/diaspora-client https://github.com/diaspora/diaspora-client), it pretty much confirms my cynicism. "Nice-looking" isn't the only thing we need from identity management.
- Joeri 11y agoPrioritizing other activities over security. Probably in every one of these cases someone on the inside warned that they weren't doing enough about security, and nobody took action because there were no additional people available to work on it. Saying that security is hard is a cop out. It's the cost of doing business. Most places that are hacked should have been doing more about security.
- juliangregorian 11y agoFirst of all, there is no perfect security. Moreover, very few people know how to build a complete soup-to-nuts internet-facing system that has "good-enough" security at every level. The fact that there are few resources available on how to do this is an indictment of our industry. Even if your digital security model is impeccable, I'd wager a large share of these attacks involve a social engineering/disgruntled employee vector as well, which is vastly harder to protect against.
- amelius 11y ago> Moreover, very few people know how to build a complete soup-to-nuts internet-facing system that has "good-enough" security at every level. And even the people who do know, often don't get the time to do it correctly.
- tptacek 11y agoIt is dazzlingly expensive to run a 500+ seat IT organization in a matter that is meaningfully hardened against attackers. Meanwhile, IT budgets are calibrated against the last 20 years of typical IT expenses. That's despite that fact that the last 10 years have drastically increased the risk of IT security attacks, because: * the technology adoption curve of attack techniques has made powerful attacks available to the "early majority" cohort of criminals * computer science has demonstrated flaws in foundational technology that weren't widely known 15 years ago * as online attacks have mainstreamed, an industry value chain has developed to monetize weaknesses So it's business-as-usual in IT, despite the fact that when it comes to security, "usual" has been redefined. Basically no medium/medium-large company in the world is willing to spend the amount of money (and make the usability sacrifices) it would take to reasonably ensure resiliency against attacks. The most secure firms spend anomalous amounts of money simply to elevate themselves to a point where they (a) aren't the easiest targets and (b) have bought enough time to detect and respond to incidents as they occur.
- secfirstmd 11y agoExcellent and very succinct analysis.
- tel 11y agoIf one had an infinite monetary and user acceptability/retraining budget... what would a modern, secure 500+ seat IT infrastructure look like? Even in the broadest of terms.
- JoshTriplett 11y agoYou would also need to ask how much the company is willing to trade off productivity for security. With enough budget, you could have security like that of any three-letter-agency, or even more draconian, but good luck getting work done, or retaining employees. That's not to say that user data should go unprotected; the majority of people in the company should have zero access to that, such that even if their systems were compromised user data would remain safe.
- tptacek 11y ago
- nickpsecurity 11y agoAssuming top-notch everything by industry standards, the systems will still likely get breached by attackers with 0-days in implementations. Brian Snow, a NSA Technical Director, explained the reason very well in his essay We Need Assurance [1]: "The problem is innately difficult because from the beginning (ENIAC, 1944), due to the high cost of components, computers were built to share resources (memory, processors, buses, etc.). If you look for a one-word synopsis of computer design philosophy, it was and is SHARING. In the security realm, the one word synopsis is SEPARATION: keeping the bad guys away from the good guys’ stuff! So today, making a computer secure requires imposing a “separation paradigm” on top of an architecture built to share. That is tough! Even when partially successful, the residual problem is going to be covert channels. We really need to focus on making a secure computer, not on making a computer secure – the point of view changes your beginning assumptions and requirements!" I'll add that the fundamental constructs and operations of a computer are designed a dumb way that will follow the most self-defeating orders. Smarter architectures, like Burroughs B5500 and System/38, existed in the past that had CPU's that enforced fine-grained separation (helps secrecy), protected pointers/stacks/arrays from abuse (stops much code injection), and could spot many problems like interface abuse (80+% of issues) at runtime. The dumb systems were cheaper, faster, & backward-compatible with garbage tools in widespread use. So the market went with them. To this day, most "security professionals" have no clue that there existed hardware & software systems so resistant to compromise that NSA's red teams gave up on even watered-down versions of them. And then bought them for protecting most sensitive stuff while pushing weaker stuff on us for their other mission. ;) Fortunately, there is a tiny, niche part of the security community working on such "high assurance" solutions (eg crash-safe.org) or at least better architectures w/ some higher assurance components (eg genode.org). Our niche is not popular, has few customers, and never will mainstream due to tough tradeoffs it forces. Yet, real security is gaining a bit more traction in academia and some software firms. One day such platforms might get more affordable and widely available so they you can use one without lost sleep due to someone opening an email. :) [1] http://www.acsac.org/2005/papers/Snow.pdf http://www.acsac.org/2005/papers/Snow.pdf
- nailer 11y agoThe Adult Friend Finder attack in particular is awful - the leaked data is incredibly sensitive and could be used to blackmail or manipulate the victims.
- ams6110 11y agoWell that's just part of what you get into when you get involved with extramarital or otherwise clandestine sexual affairs.
- __z 11y agoNot everyone looking for sex online is looking for an affair.
- fuckedapanda 11y agotrue, but AFF is marketed to godless scum
- s_kilk 11y agoVictim Blaming, classy.
- ams6110 11y agoNo, I'm responding to the blackmail concern, and when you do something that if made public would so severely compromise you as to make you vulnerable to blackmail, can you really claim to be blameless?
- ProAm 11y agoTaking security seriously, and knowing what you are doing are often mutually exclusive in business.
- VieElm 11y agoI don't understand the criticism, what are they supposed to say instead? When an attacked company says "we take security seriously" it's probably a statement made by someone in the company who really does care about it and is probably pretty upset about the whole ordeal and wants to fix it. This whole attitude about corporations always being these evil lifeless monoliths who don't care about anything and are just saying whatever they need to stands in contrast with any place I've ever worked. Some of these companies are staffed by people who do care and want to do the right thing and I don't understand what the OP thinks they should say instead.
- ams6110 11y agoMaybe "we are sorry this happened and are working to improve" and leave it that that?
- ProAm 11y ago"Caring" doesn't matter though, only execution does. Everyone cares about obvious things that people should care about, it doesn't matter though if you fail at what you are supposed to do. Only execution matters in business.
- hippo8 11y agoBut the fact is no matter how much money and effort you put in to it, someone determined enough will find a way through. What most people don't realise when it comes to computer security is, the foundation on which our modern systems are built never anticipated this much growth. I think I am happy with companies that care enough to come forward and admit their mistakes. IT security is hard, very very hard.
- nissehulth 11y agoIt's not like someone is saying that the companies have board meetings where they decide to be evil or do stupid things. But they DO decide on budgets that in the end means that there isn't enough time and/or resources to do more than the bare minimum. If there are people that truly do care, they should stand up in the early process and make sure enough budget is allocated.
- jedberg 11y agoSecurity is a business cost like anything else and there are tradeoffs. All of these companies have decided that the risk of losing this data was worth the cost savings of not protecting against the attack. So far they all seem to be right (not even Sony went out of business after their massive breach). So it's perfectly reasonable for them to say they take security seriously and then have these breaches. They take it exactly as seriously as needed to keep their business alive. Having been on that eBay security team mentioned, I can tell you that we did in fact take security seriously. And sometimes what we recommended was done, and sometimes it was decided the cost wasn't worth the risk. But we were always serious about it.
- dsacco 11y agoTo add a point of agreement from another security engineer - this is the best top-level comment on this story. People love to hate companies for their security practices when a breach happens. It's much harder to form a dispassionate, nuanced view from a place of critical thinking.
- jessaustin 11y agoCompanies aren't people; they aren't entitled to basic human dignity and fellowship. When they fuck up and hurt people, and it's clear that their actions are "all in the game", it's time to start hating that game, perhaps enough to get the rules changed.
- vacri 11y agoI remember going to a security conference where one of the speakers said that security flaws and 'fixit' recommendations come so thick and fast, and are so difficult to implement, that even security researchers, who know all the issues and tradeoffs, often don't follow best practices. Security is bloody difficult, even for lauded members of the community. Schneier apologises in his blog when he says he still uses Windows, for example.
- reagency 11y ago
- nickpsecurity 11y agoAnytime I see "We take security seriously" I get double skeptical about their security stance. This is something that's best demonstrated by simply doing it and the results speak for themselves. There's an obvious contrast between organizations with well-managed INFOSEC and those that pretend. Especially when a vulnerability is reported or a breach occurs. Extra-obvious then. Businesses, just practice INFOSEC instead of preaching it. Better that way.
- __david__ 11y agoThough the words are nominally the same, the FBI quote has a distinctly different meaning than all the others—I don't think it's quite fair to lump it in with the rest. The FBI saying "we take threats seriously" means they are willing to throw money at investigations and prosecutions. The other companies don't have that particular power.
- gesman 11y agoHackers takes your security (and your money) seriously too.
- Walkman 11y agoThis is human nature: we usually take actions after the fact.
- jakejake 11y agoIt's not exactly fair because security is a process. Even following all best practices, new attacks happen all the time. Sometimes the security process includes post-attack investigation and mitigation. It's quite easy to point a finger when you have a few servers that you spend all of your time securing and monitoring. It's something else when you have departments of people connected to your network and running services, breaking policies, taking laptops out of the office, etc. Nobody wants to see their data being breached. I applaud companies for publicly sharing their investigation and response.
- lvh 11y agoThis article makes fun of people who get breached. This is less than helpful. > “We take security seriously”, otherwise known as “We didn’t take it seriously enough” This implies that if only the companies that got breached had taken security more seriously, they wouldn't have gotten breached. In a world where databases are valuable (the AFF example cited in the post, for example), software is virtually impossible to get to zero defects, and where zero-day vulnerabilities are traded on the open market, some big fish are going to get popped. The idea that getting breached means you're incompetent is toxic and needs to stop; it just means that you're a sufficiently high-value target. It's very possible (and quite likely) that many of those breached expended extensive efforts in defense. The idea that they would've been fine modulo more security expenditure not just a baseless assumption, it is in many cases patently false (granted, there's plenty where it's true). As a security professional working in customer-facing security, I'm helping exactly the people who are getting breached, therefore I say that having a monetary motive to say that they aren't spending enough efforts and should give me more money ;-) The article also ignores that knowing that you got popped probably already means that you're in one of the higher percentiles of security posture... That's sad, but, again, blaming the victims here helps no-one. (By the way, if you too would like to help people who get breached instead of making fun of them, we're hiring. Contact info in HN profile.)
- programmernews3 11y agoAs far as I know the most successful attacks on companies were based on very simple techniques like phishing or similar easy techniques like SQL-Injection. When we talk about data breaches of companies, it mostly hasn't something to do with high sophisticated attacks using 0-days I guess. I'm not sure, would you agree? Of course companies tell you that there were victims of high sophisticated APT attacks, otherwise they would have to admit, they had been compromised by simple script-kiddy attacks. Of course blaming victims doesn't help anyone. I want to emphasize here, that not only the companies are victims but also the users and customers, who mostly never received compensations after security failures.
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- stephendicato 11y agoIs the issue that there was a lack of technical investment in security or a shortcoming in their ability to communicate with their customers? I'd argue many of the companies mentioned have invested heavily in security. Whether their investment will prevent a compromise from a determined adversary is likely unrelated to their investment. Unfortunately, I suspect many of the mentioned companies had not equally invested in how to properly communicate a compromise with their customers.