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Every day markets shut down at 4pm except for very limited after hours trading. Every weekend down. 10+ days a year, down for market holidays. We're talking
by cma 11y ago
Every day markets shut down at 4pm except for very limited after hours trading. Every weekend down. 10+ days a year, down for market holidays.
We're talking on the order of zero liquidity for 30% of the days (weekends and market holidays) in a given year, and severely limited liquidity outside of market hours.
If liquidity was as important as we like to say, this just wouldn't be the case.
- mlrtime 11y agoGlobally markets are 24/7/365 (+/- 1s). You are speaking of just one particular market.
- cma 11y agoLiquidity of an altogether different basket of securities (or a somewhat overlapping basket) isn't relevant to the point.
- kasey_junk 11y agoI'm not sure I understand your argument. Let me see if I can restate it: "If liquidity was really required at the millisecond level, market participants would not accept markets being down for holidays or weekends." But that is not the point of the millisecond (or sub) resolution. The point is so that the people that provide the liquidity during operational hours can add as much information as they can into their pricing models, thereby requiring them to take on less risk with each bit of liquidity they provide. This less risk gets passed on as savings to the rest of the market participants in the form of smaller spreads. Any increase in that resolution increases the risk to the market makers, who will therefore need to increase the spread to compensate, making trading for everyone more expensive. This would be true if the markets were only open 4 hours a week as well, though trends are towards more 24x5 (at least) trading, not less (and I think that is a good thing).
- cma 11y agoI worked in technical risk management for a large market maker in the US. The latency arms race just drove things towards riskier and riskier practices in our systems. Soft-realtime systems in C++ instead of safer garbage collected runtimes. Parsing market data on FPGAs or Cell processors instead of in code written with emphasis on safety. Distributed trading systems that couldn't afford the latency budget to pass everything through centralized risk management, and therefore not taking into account the entire order book before authorizing a trade. Instead a series of compromises and less optimal failsafes. It also just lead to more expensive practices--communication between threads using spinlocks instead of the normal waking a waiting thread through a system call; basically converting the spreads we could capture into data center waste heat in order to beat out the next guy. Artificially slowing things down a bit would have just reduced costs and increased safety for everyone.
- kasey_junk 11y agoThat is a bit of an orthogonal issue, but I would say that it doesn't show that the speed of HFT is a problem to the broader market. For instance as a market participant I largely do not care about the implementation of any given market makers risk configs. In fact, even with all the nasty bits in HFT, it is loads better than the system it replaced. There is an open question about if it can be made even better. I'd also suggest that your experience (many of which I share) do not necessarily mean that speed is making things riskier, only that your centralized risk management was not as good at lowering the cost of risk as opposed to getting fast. As for the dc energy to spread arbitrage game, that is the result of far reaching policy decisions well outside of HFT and I largely agree that energy is too cheap. I think that any artificial slowing of the market is likely to have really bad unintentional issues. I'd much rather we incentivize the market to fixate on something we care about (ie price) rather than try to subvert the laws of the market. One approach that appeals to me is to remove the sub-penny rule that is artificially propping up spreads.
- cma 11y ago>as a market participant I largely do not care about the implementation of any given market makers risk configs Why? It could severely hurt market liquidity (which everyone claims is so important) if there is a mistake that sparks a panic. > was not as good at lowering the cost of risk as opposed to getting fast Can you reword this a bit? I don't understand what you are saying. > I think that any artificial slowing of the market is likely to have really bad unintentional issues. Can you give some examples? > One approach that appeals to me is to remove the sub-penny rule that is artificially propping up spreads. This would be a decent thing to do, it would take some money out of market making, reducing the returns fueling the latency arms race a bit. Lower returns would also give less justification for some of the risks that are taken today. A transaction tax would help in a similar way, but work more broadly against other high volume, low latency, low value traders. Index-to-underlyings arbitragers (maybe not the best example; sub-penny would decimate (hurr) them as well), etc.