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Hadn't heard about tinfoil chat before, thanks for the link. He also seem to have an ambitious project for email: https://github.com/maqp/tfe https://github.co
by e12e 11y ago
Hadn't heard about tinfoil chat before, thanks for the link. He also seem to have an ambitious project for email:
https://github.com/maqp/tfe https://github.com/maqp/tfe
"When the serial cable used to transmit information between two computers is enforced with an RS-232 data diode to funciton in unidirectional fashion, exfiltration of encryption and signing keys without physical access becomes impossible."
Right. Or use a smart-card. I'm not sure it's more sane to trust a typical pc to not have a hw backdoor (eg: intel managment cpu with wlan access -- does need to be enabled in bios. At least that's what Intel says) -- rather than trust a smart-card (idea is to send data to card, get signed/encrypted data back. Keys never leave card).
Interesting idea though.
Similar ideas for a pair of plugins for pidgin:
https://github.com/maqp/tfc-cev https://github.com/maqp/tfc-cev
The modules look huge though. Plenty of room for someone to slip in a listening device with burst-capable transmission. I don't think the actual security is much higher than just using a smartcard?
- nickpsecurity 11y agoThe smart-card vendors might be working with any number of people. You can't be sure and subversion is at an all time high. The reason he used our data diode recommendation was you can use arbitrary hardware for the send, receive, and network nodes. Receiver can't leak anything outward even if hit by malware. Sender can't receive attacks from Internet. And network can be toast without ill effect. This can be verified by looking at the wires you modified rather than giving ChipWorks millions to R.E. it. ;) Later we told him OTP wasn't going to get takeup. I described my cascading cipher. That led to his multiple encryption etc version. I told him high assurance crypto NSA uses defeats covert channels with (a) fixed sized transmissions, (b) fixed rate transmissions and (c) not letting errors have a visible effect on that. Goes way back. He changed it to do that. So, he was clever with the design and has been responsive to updates. Those are just a few I remember. He used Python because it's easy to read. He only has so much time for the project. Other stuff I suggested included converting it to a language like C, Ada, or Pascal for control over memory & extra visibility. Also, using the Dresden Nizza architecture (or MILS architecture) on transport and sending stack to further enforce isolation and secure decomposition. More work to be done but it's a nice executable specification of something that can give NSA hell with low end equipment. Far as email, that must be a side project he started as a result of some of us suggesting he port GPG or something to the architecture. I'm not familiar with it. I only endorse main chat architecture with encouragement that implementation keeps improving. :)
- e12e 11y agoOh, don't get my wrong. I think the project is interesting, and it's obvious open hw is the way to go - especially if the design can be kept both simple and useful. I don't really see anything wrong with having the cable be shorter (ie: an open platform smart card). Lets just say that from a practical standpoint, I'd be much more interested in getting "most" people to use s/mime and/or gpg with keys and encryption on a dedicated device -- no matter if that device is a re-purposed Android without a baseband chip, running some open Linux based OS (full distro or something like Replicant) -- or it is a smart card, or some kind of dedicated open hardware. The cascading idea is interesting, but probably more useful in a more adversarial scenario than most people need. Good for running drugs, or a revolution (or insurgency) though ;-) On a serious note, I do see some real overlap between this military grade approach and "normal" use-cases. Especially for people that find them selves at odds with their government. Be that FBI targeting #occupy in Zuccotti Park, the German intelligence services/NSA spying on elected officials in Germany -- or people opposed to current policies in China, or advocating gay rights in Russia. We live in a time where there's enough oppression to go around :-(
- nickpsecurity 11y agoThe cable is just what he had at his house: a smaller one is better. Not sure why you keep bringing up smartcards as alternative to long cable: two totally different things. Only realistic alternative to his cable w/out extra risk is point-to-point IR transfer: cheap & hard to grab if nearby (unlike Bluetooth/Wifi). It would be nice to get more people on GPG or Linux. It's what I use, too. The problem is their Trusted Computing Base [1] is ridiculously huge. Even amateurs regularly break NIX systems, browsers, and so on. The methods for designing things highly resistant to attack are out of reach for most projects. See my framework [2], for example, to see the gap between high quality coding and truly secure systems. Most developers, even many security "pro's," have no idea about so many of these things. Just ask anyone building one of these "NSA-proof" crypto tools to see their Covert Channel Analysis with breakdown of all residual storage, timing, and resource exhaustion channels. Observe the blank or confused stares. So, Markus was trying to shortcut around that using concepts he learned and we discussed. It had to be provably immune to software attack despite weaknesses in components. GPG on Linux/Android means GPG or Linux/Android must be breached. Although GPG is solid, Linux/Android breaches abound because they're insecure crap. So, that won't work against event a good black hat. He couldn't build a High Assurance Guard [3] by himself so he had to eliminate almost whole TCB. TFC was a clever workaround. TFC and Linux/Android-based clients have no comparison given only one can make a strong security argument under all conditions of software attack and the others just have so many real-world attacks... Apple to oranges, my friend. For cascading, it might be overkill and might not. Note that many real-world algorithms working in isolation had problems. Cryptophone used a AES + Twofish cascade as insurance. The idea is that one algorithm or trick failing won't compromise the system. It applies to regular crypto users as much as anyone else given we use same algorithms. I agree it might not be necessary for majority of people, though. They use Gmail or Facebook over HTTPS for their critical communications. Clearly different privacy needs, there. ;) I agree on the overlap: it's why I push the strong stuff. :) The reason, though, is that all the bad guys aim for the same thing. Plus, the nation-state methods (esp firmware attacks) are starting to be used by non-nation-states. The methods for stopping software attacks by nation-states are same as for anyone else. It's why our systems need to be redone (example [4]) to simply enforce fundamental protections to stop all that shit. And meanwhile, we have to use GPG, TFC, air gaps, and other kludgy solutions to make up for how bad we have it. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_computing_base https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_computing_base [2] http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/01/essay_on_fbi-ma.html#c1102869 http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/01/essay_on_fbi-m... [3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guard_%28information_security%29 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guard_%28information_security%... [4] http://www.crash-safe.org/assets/ieee-hst-2013-paper.pdf http://www.crash-safe.org/assets/ieee-hst-2013-paper.pdf