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Highly secure messaging, email, and Internet services has a long history in military and defense sector with issues well-understood. I mention here [1] the fram
by nickpsecurity 11y ago
Highly secure messaging, email, and Internet services has a long history in military and defense sector with issues well-understood. I mention here [1] the framework I used in high assurance security engineering. The system must be built using strongest engineering techniques with the right requirements. It must run on an endpoint with specialist security engineering techniques resistant to talented hackers. The protocols, parsers, networking stacks, and so on must be carefully implemented to prevent problems. Modern attackers are hitting various firmware, too, so protection is needed from devices. Then, we must be sure the software displayed to us for all this is what's actually running, on non-subverted hardware, and with non-malicious insiders.
The whole thing is beyond tricky to the point that no hosted service is rated to high security in any honest way (eg outside hand-waiving arguments). The only proven model has standalone apps (eg PGP, Nexor Sentinel) acting as proxies between trusted mail/messaging apps and untrusted side. Ideally, user-controlled, vetted code handles secrets with untrusted side (eg Internet host) simply a transport or storage layer that has no influence on endpoint or security past availability. The trusted software must also run on strong endpoints that don't run any other risky software. Given target market, that disqualifies most users of email and messaging software in general.
So, about this one. It seems to not meet many of these requirements and its users don't either. That puts it in Low-Medium assurance category where it might still be helpful against regular black hats, snoops, and attackers without 0-days in what their users have. That will necessarily require decent design & implementation. I commend them on having it pen-tested & open-sourced for review to that effect.
Meanwhile, users wanting to increase resistance to High Strength Attackers should use air gapped, hardened NIX boxes with GPG or Markus Ottela's Tinfoil Chat. Snowden leaks showed using GPG correctly, esp with Tor correctly, gave NSA hell. Markus has also improved TFC many times in response to our critiques to the point that many attack vectors are impossible, risk is lower in others, and endpoint risks are possibly lower than all solutions if right hardware is used. Still work to be done but he's way ahead of the competition.
Note: I second rossjudson that the site, although with beautiful artwork, should be redesigned so it's clear what the app does without a lot of digging. I've seen competing apps where they were clear on the specifics upfront while still not drowning readers in technical detail. The technical detail was a link or so away if I needed it. Right not, it looks too much like a marketing team's work.
[1] https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/01/essay_on_fbi-ma.html#c1102869 https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/01/essay_on_fbi-...
- e12e 11y agoHadn't heard about tinfoil chat before, thanks for the link. He also seem to have an ambitious project for email: https://github.com/maqp/tfe https://github.com/maqp/tfe "When the serial cable used to transmit information between two computers is enforced with an RS-232 data diode to funciton in unidirectional fashion, exfiltration of encryption and signing keys without physical access becomes impossible." Right. Or use a smart-card. I'm not sure it's more sane to trust a typical pc to not have a hw backdoor (eg: intel managment cpu with wlan access -- does need to be enabled in bios. At least that's what Intel says) -- rather than trust a smart-card (idea is to send data to card, get signed/encrypted data back. Keys never leave card). Interesting idea though. Similar ideas for a pair of plugins for pidgin: https://github.com/maqp/tfc-cev https://github.com/maqp/tfc-cev The modules look huge though. Plenty of room for someone to slip in a listening device with burst-capable transmission. I don't think the actual security is much higher than just using a smartcard?
- nickpsecurity 11y agoThe smart-card vendors might be working with any number of people. You can't be sure and subversion is at an all time high. The reason he used our data diode recommendation was you can use arbitrary hardware for the send, receive, and network nodes. Receiver can't leak anything outward even if hit by malware. Sender can't receive attacks from Internet. And network can be toast without ill effect. This can be verified by looking at the wires you modified rather than giving ChipWorks millions to R.E. it. ;) Later we told him OTP wasn't going to get takeup. I described my cascading cipher. That led to his multiple encryption etc version. I told him high assurance crypto NSA uses defeats covert channels with (a) fixed sized transmissions, (b) fixed rate transmissions and (c) not letting errors have a visible effect on that. Goes way back. He changed it to do that. So, he was clever with the design and has been responsive to updates. Those are just a few I remember. He used Python because it's easy to read. He only has so much time for the project. Other stuff I suggested included converting it to a language like C, Ada, or Pascal for control over memory & extra visibility. Also, using the Dresden Nizza architecture (or MILS architecture) on transport and sending stack to further enforce isolation and secure decomposition. More work to be done but it's a nice executable specification of something that can give NSA hell with low end equipment. Far as email, that must be a side project he started as a result of some of us suggesting he port GPG or something to the architecture. I'm not familiar with it. I only endorse main chat architecture with encouragement that implementation keeps improving. :)