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> Letting a vendor decide The problem with the root of trust problem is that you have to trust someone. Who is your preference? The government? The registri
by ajross 11y ago
> Letting a vendor decide
The problem with the root of trust problem is that you have to trust someone. Who is your preference? The government? The registries? ICANN? The hardware vendor? Those are all suspect too, and most have been historically compromised.
The only thing I can see that helps is "community" auditing -- things like Chrome's pinning and ... the action that discovered these new certs. So, as much as it sucks, we're sort of doing the right thing already.
- pdkl95 11y agoYou let the USER decide who to trust, as they are the only person who has enough information to do so. Maybe they trust the community for some things, maybe they trust a government for a different set of use cases, and maybe they trust their nerd friend for other stuff.
- octo_t 11y agoand what should the default be for non-technical users? no trust at all? And asking each time "do you want to trust this root certificate"? (because we know how well that works....)
- pdkl95 11y agoNo, we need a system where different types of trust can be selected. (see my other post) A PKI system like we have now is one of them, but we need a system where that is not the only available trust. Yes, it will be necessary to educate people about this topic (and never discussing it with the user will only keep them ignorant). Right now we have a system where users are forced to trust various CA, and if someone decides they want to trust something else, that is difficult or impossible. The problem of WHO to trust for a particular website (that is, every website) is a separate problem which can be solved over time. My point is that we don't even have the tools to let people even being to solve that problem.
- pessimizer 11y ago>and what should the default be for non-technical users? no trust at all? Yes. They should pay a service to keep track of who they should trust. They wouldn't be opened up to any more risk by this than as with the status quo, MS + Apple + Google would end up giving it away for "free" for those don't have a problem with that or don't know better, and the option to get more technical about issues of trust would always be available to them.
- Guvante 11y agoYou already have the tools to change who you trust. If you are afraid of automatic updates to your trusted domain list then setup a VM to test the updates or use a script to verify when the list changes.
- mentat 11y agoIf there's anything we've learned from the last 20 years in security it's that the user is the least fit to decide. They are bad at passwords, they are bad at clicking things in email, they just are not security conscious. "Click here to trust my CA", how's that going to end?
- IE6 11y agoAgree - most users of computers do not know anything bout infosec nor do they care.
- userbinator 11y agoIf anything that is an education problem, which is further compounded by the trend of wanting to turn users into completely passive entities who don't know or have to do anything, because then they are more easily controlled and manipulated. The industry does not encourage users to think and learn. The industry wants its software to do the thinking for them. It doesn't want users to think about trust at all. I think that is the scariest part of where things are heading.
- xenadu02 11y agoThat's the great fallacy though. The amount of technical knowledge required to make truly informed security decisions is out of the question for 99% of all computer/mobile users. It isn't about being passive; it's about having lives and jobs and other things to do with their time. A heart surgeon may be a genius but he doesn't have time to keep up with the latest research and teach himself PKI, certificates, crypto, and permission models across all the platforms he uses (and keep up to date on those too!) Users will not waste their time thinkin about trust. The history of our industry is ample evidence that it would be a losing battle. Not to mention a single mistake can be ruinous, requiring absolute perfection 100% of the time (from users and programmers).
- nitrogen 11y agoNot to mention a single mistake can be ruinous, requiring absolute perfection 100% of the time (from users and programmers). One can hope that, eventually, formally mathematically verified open source systems will help solve the issue, at least on the programming side.
- voidz 11y ago> Who is your preference? The government? The registries? ICANN? No, silly: the domain owner! Something that's already possible with DANE: the domain owner gets to decide, as it should be, by publishing information about valid certification into the DNS. Of ALL options this one is the least crappy IMO.
- ajross 11y agoAnd who authenticates the domain owners? Your solution is basically "trust the registries" then. OK, fine. But they've screwed up in the past and they will in the future.
- voidz 11y agohuh? No, for DANE it is required to have DNSSEC in place. Also read the last sentence of my previous statement again.
- realityking 11y agoAnd now you're trusting the registrar, the registry and ICANN. It's always pick a poison. Also, DNSSEC still has some severe issues in practice. I'd be glad if we could get DANE widely deployed for mail servers. Edit: Oh, and if you're not using a validating resolver yourself you're also trusting that you're ISP is using one and not manipulating the responses.
- marcosdumay 11y ago> Oh, and if you're not using a validating resolver yourself you're also trusting that you're ISP is using one and not manipulating the responses. I really don't understand why people keep repeating that complaint. Of course, if you don't check the keys you don't get any security. How is that a problem of the algorithm? And how is that a problem on practice? If you want some real amount of security you check the keys, being them SSL certificates, DNSSEC signatures, or whatever else encryption system people put on place.
- aeijdenberg 11y agoSee also Certificate Transparency (RFC6962) which I haven't seen mentioned in this thread yet - the goals of which are to require all certificates be written to publicly auditable, tamper-proof logs in order to be considered secure by clients. In such a manner certificate mis-issuance will be easy to detect for interested parties. As of earlier this year Chrome is already requiring Signed Certificate Timestamps for new EV certificates in order to display the EV indicator. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962 http://www.certificate-transparency.org/ http://www.certificate-transparency.org/ (disclaimer: I work on this project)
- wtbob 11y agoICANN's the obvious choice since they are in charge of assigned names and numbers. They are controlled by a board, who could use a k-of-n signing scheme to sign off on their decisions, to include delegation, and their successors.