8 ms·

The CA system is so broken. Letting a vendor decide who you should trust to issue intermediate certificates that your software will automatically trust to not i

by 0x0 11y ago

The CA system is so broken. Letting a vendor decide who you should trust to issue intermediate certificates that your software will automatically trust to not issue illegitimate certificates doesn't make the system particularly trustworthy, especially seeing as they are still adding new root CAs for entities with unknown agendas (governmental agencies etc). Maybe the system could be changed to one where domains can only be signed by the DNS registrar, or something. It's pretty crazy that any CA can issue a certificate for any domain. And paying for more validation doesn't help you at all, since it won't keep the "bad guys" from getting an illegitimate one from a cheaper/lazier CA.

hmottestad 11y ago
It still works to hinder that guy who sits at the coffee shop trying to man-in-the-middle attack people connected to hit fake wifi. If you want a system that can hinder a government doing that, or a large organisation, or a corporation. Then look elsewhere. Do you remember to wipe your hard drive when you get your computer back from the repair shop? They could very well have installed a new root CA without you noticing....
- tokenizerrr 11y ago
  I always recommend people to take out the hard drive before sending it in. This has caused some small issues, but most stores don't seem to mind as long as you are very explicit about telling them.
- 0x0 11y ago
  I wipe before AND after, if I have to hand the computer in for repairs. :)
- snowy 11y ago
  I agree it works against most adversary's. Wiping your HDD might not be enough: https://blog.kaspersky.com/equation-hdd-malware/ https://blog.kaspersky.com/equation-hdd-malware/ Theoretically you could hide malware in your GPU, USB, FireWire, webcam, NIC, baseband, Bluetooth, where ever. No matter who you are or how smart you think you are if your adversary is determined and has the required resources they are going to get you.
- anonbanker 11y ago
  SSL: Even in 2015, still more concerned with the local neighborhood boogeyman then Government intrusion.
  - hmottestad 11y ago
    TLS
    - anonbanker 11y ago
      as if it were less guilty of the same crimes.
sigsergv 11y ago
You're absolutely right, and situation is much worse actually. Some time ago another “feature” was introduced — “key pinning”, for some reason it's compared to standard ssh client behaviour (explicit key for given address). But it's nothing similar actually. If MITM have access to any of root certificates installed on your device then he/she could create “valid” certificates that won't raise any warnings in the browser. There is some addon (if I remember correctly) for Firefox that binds specific key to specific domain and raises warning if certificate changes.
- mattkrea 11y ago
  I think you may be referring to Certificate Patrol (https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/certificate-patrol/ https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/certificate-p...)
CyberDildonics 11y ago
I still don't understand why there isn't a public private key for each connection. We seem to accept this broken style of encryption instead of pushing for real encryption.
- jlgaddis 11y ago
  Like session keys and PFS?
ajross 11y ago
> Letting a vendor decide The problem with the root of trust problem is that you have to trust someone. Who is your preference? The government? The registries? ICANN? The hardware vendor? Those are all suspect too, and most have been historically compromised. The only thing I can see that helps is "community" auditing -- things like Chrome's pinning and ... the action that discovered these new certs. So, as much as it sucks, we're sort of doing the right thing already.
- pdkl95 11y ago
  You let the USER decide who to trust, as they are the only person who has enough information to do so. Maybe they trust the community for some things, maybe they trust a government for a different set of use cases, and maybe they trust their nerd friend for other stuff.
  - octo_t 11y ago
    and what should the default be for non-technical users? no trust at all? And asking each time "do you want to trust this root certificate"? (because we know how well that works....)
    - pdkl95 11y ago
      No, we need a system where different types of trust can be selected. (see my other post) A PKI system like we have now is one of them, but we need a system where that is not the only available trust. Yes, it will be necessary to educate people about this topic (and never discussing it with the user will only keep them ignorant). Right now we have a system where users are forced to trust various CA, and if someone decides they want to trust something else, that is difficult or impossible. The problem of WHO to trust for a particular website (that is, every website) is a separate problem which can be solved over time. My point is that we don't even have the tools to let people even being to solve that problem.
    - pessimizer 11y ago
      >and what should the default be for non-technical users? no trust at all? Yes. They should pay a service to keep track of who they should trust. They wouldn't be opened up to any more risk by this than as with the status quo, MS + Apple + Google would end up giving it away for "free" for those don't have a problem with that or don't know better, and the option to get more technical about issues of trust would always be available to them.

by 0x0 11y ago

hmottestad 11y ago

It still works to hinder that guy who sits at the coffee shop trying to man-in-the-middle attack people connected to hit fake wifi. If you want a system that can hinder a government doing that, or a large organisation, or a corporation. Then look elsewhere. Do you remember to wipe your hard drive when you get your computer back from the repair shop? They could very well have installed a new root CA without you noticing....

tokenizerrr 11y ago
I always recommend people to take out the hard drive before sending it in. This has caused some small issues, but most stores don't seem to mind as long as you are very explicit about telling them.
0x0 11y ago
I wipe before AND after, if I have to hand the computer in for repairs. :)
snowy 11y ago
I agree it works against most adversary's. Wiping your HDD might not be enough: https://blog.kaspersky.com/equation-hdd-malware/ https://blog.kaspersky.com/equation-hdd-malware/ Theoretically you could hide malware in your GPU, USB, FireWire, webcam, NIC, baseband, Bluetooth, where ever. No matter who you are or how smart you think you are if your adversary is determined and has the required resources they are going to get you.
anonbanker 11y ago
SSL: Even in 2015, still more concerned with the local neighborhood boogeyman then Government intrusion.
- hmottestad 11y ago
  TLS
  - anonbanker 11y ago
    as if it were less guilty of the same crimes.

sigsergv 11y ago

You're absolutely right, and situation is much worse actually. Some time ago another “feature” was introduced — “key pinning”, for some reason it's compared to standard ssh client behaviour (explicit key for given address). But it's nothing similar actually. If MITM have access to any of root certificates installed on your device then he/she could create “valid” certificates that won't raise any warnings in the browser. There is some addon (if I remember correctly) for Firefox that binds specific key to specific domain and raises warning if certificate changes.

mattkrea 11y ago
I think you may be referring to Certificate Patrol (https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/certificate-patrol/ https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/certificate-p...)

CyberDildonics 11y ago

I still don't understand why there isn't a public private key for each connection. We seem to accept this broken style of encryption instead of pushing for real encryption.

jlgaddis 11y ago
Like session keys and PFS?

ajross 11y ago

> Letting a vendor decide The problem with the root of trust problem is that you have to trust someone. Who is your preference? The government? The registries? ICANN? The hardware vendor? Those are all suspect too, and most have been historically compromised. The only thing I can see that helps is "community" auditing -- things like Chrome's pinning and ... the action that discovered these new certs. So, as much as it sucks, we're sort of doing the right thing already.

pdkl95 11y ago
You let the USER decide who to trust, as they are the only person who has enough information to do so. Maybe they trust the community for some things, maybe they trust a government for a different set of use cases, and maybe they trust their nerd friend for other stuff.
- octo_t 11y ago
  and what should the default be for non-technical users? no trust at all? And asking each time "do you want to trust this root certificate"? (because we know how well that works....)
  - pdkl95 11y ago
    No, we need a system where different types of trust can be selected. (see my other post) A PKI system like we have now is one of them, but we need a system where that is not the only available trust. Yes, it will be necessary to educate people about this topic (and never discussing it with the user will only keep them ignorant). Right now we have a system where users are forced to trust various CA, and if someone decides they want to trust something else, that is difficult or impossible. The problem of WHO to trust for a particular website (that is, every website) is a separate problem which can be solved over time. My point is that we don't even have the tools to let people even being to solve that problem.
  - pessimizer 11y ago
    >and what should the default be for non-technical users? no trust at all? Yes. They should pay a service to keep track of who they should trust. They wouldn't be opened up to any more risk by this than as with the status quo, MS + Apple + Google would end up giving it away for "free" for those don't have a problem with that or don't know better, and the option to get more technical about issues of trust would always be available to them.