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The Point of the Banach-Tarski Theorem – not just a curiosity
- gus_massa 11y ago> If that's true, then there can be no measure satisfying the requirements even when weakened from countable additivity to finite additivity. I think this is an important/interesting point and should be highlighted more in the article. The "magic trick" is not hidden in the fact that you are using infinitely many pieces. The "magic trick" is that the pieces have very odd shapes.
- ColinWright 11y agoOK, I've made a change to highlight that, and it's processing and uploading now. Let me know what you think.
- reagency 11y agoSpecifically, shapes with infinitely many "sides" in a bounded region. (a ball)
- summerdown2 11y agoI am very much not a mathematician. I took physics at university, but that was 20 years ago. The mathematics here is beyond me. So, I realise I'm probably confusing theoretical mathematics with a practical science. But, still. If this was a real, true result, couldn't someone simply take a sphere of, say, gold, and recut it to be two spheres of gold? Then keep doing it until they're richer than Croesus? Or, to be more serious, what value are results like this if they are obviously false in the real world? Also, if they plainly don't apply to the real world, isn't that a really good sign that the mathematics is actually incorrect? Or, have I completely misunderstood the article?
- gdsimoes 11y agoYou would need to cut the spheres in very strange pieces and since spheres of gold are made of atoms you can't do that in the real world.
- summerdown2 11y agoWhy not, assuming you make the spheres big enough? Let's say not gold, but a moon. I mean, let's do a thought experiment with superhuman tech and a big enough sphere that atoms are small enough to make the slices right. I guess I just don't understand why this doesn't violate conservation of mass.
- ColinWright 11y agoBecause you really, really can't make the slices small enough. And your point about violating the conservation of mass is the whole point of the article. When we try to come up with a mathematical model of what "volume" means there are certain properties we want it to have. One of them is that any arbitrary collection of point - not atoms, but mathematical points - can have a volume associated with it. The Banach-Tarski theorem shows that such a requirement is impossible. You're not alone if you think this is all nonsense - so did Feynman. However, many clever people not only believe that this is relevant, but also useful and insightful. The article is trying to give a sense of why that's the case. I want to write a sister article to this to help people like you come to understand what's going on, but I'm having trouble finding people who are willing to engage with me on it. They usually just find that it offends their sense of reality and reject it all. I think that's a shame, because unless people like me can come to understand what others find so objectionable we can never learn how to help people understand why this is interesting, useful, adn relevant.
- summerdown2 11y agoI think the problem is there's mathematics on one hand and my experience of the real world on the other. I either didn't do any set theory, or I've forgotten it. So it looks just like squiggles on the page to me when I try to understand the maths. So, all I'm left with is trying to relate what the words might mean in real-world terms. And coming up confused. I don't think it's your fault. I just lack the grounding to see both sides of the picture. One thought, though. I'm not trying to reject it because it offends my sense of reality. I'm trying to use my sense of reality (which is the only tool I have) to understand it. For example, if someone came up to me at work and said, "I've just worked out how to cut a sphere up into bits and reassemble it as two spheres the same size," I'd say, "ok, then, show me." If all they could do is make marks on paper I couldn't understand I'd think they'd got the paper wrong, not reality. Which is the dissonance here. I guess, speaking personally, if you want someone like me to understand it you'd need to really, really explain the maths (as if to a simpleton!), or explain what's happening in real-world terms and why it wouldn't work yet is still valid. Does that help?
- Sharlin 11y agoIt is a real, true, result, in a space that is based on different rules than our physical reality. A ball in R^3 is composed of a countably infinite number of zero-dimensional points. It's an abstract concept that doesn't really have much to do with a physical ball that consists of a finite number of atoms. Fundamentally, math is something that describes a large collection of possible worlds. Our universe is just a small subset of all the things that could be, and when using math to understand reality we have to remember that.
- dietrichepp 11y agoI'm pretty sure you mean "uncountably infinite" instead of "countably infinite".
- Sharlin 11y agoYep, thanks!
- reagency 11y agoNot "possible", " imaginable". "Possible" is begging the question.
- CJefferson 11y agoHave you ever heard stories like "Hilbert's Hotel"? Given an infinite hotel (each room labelled with a positive integer), you can empty half your rooms by moving the person in room x to the room 2*x, which gives you all the odd rooms to fill with a new infinity of people, effectively doubling the size of your infinite hotel? This is very similar -- except it works over the real numbers in 3D space. In particular the cuts are "inifinitely fine". Given any point p, and any distance d, there will be a point less than distance d from p which is in a different "slice". Imagine (while this isn't in banack-tarski) making a "slice" which is all numbers of the form 1/x for all integers. Clearly this "slice" could really exist, but mathematics can of course define it and operate on it.
- mikro2nd 11y agoRudy Rucker explored this thoroughly in his novel "White Light" (which is where I first learned of the Banach-Tarski theorem) whilst having with much fun with infinities.
- skybrian 11y agoIt's finitely many pieces, but not in the way you think. Each supposed piece isn't something you could carve with a knife, even if we defined "carving" as a mathematical operation. It's just a set of points with coordinates that obey a certain rule. In mathematics you can say things like "the set of all points in the sphere with irrational coordinates" and think of that as one "piece" of the sphere but it doesn't correspond to anything in the real world. I'm not a mathematician either, but I think the consequence is just that mathematical points are rather weird and admitting any infinite set of points (however disconnected) as a volume produces weird results. What we think of as a "piece" isn't just an infinite set of points.
- ajuc 11y agoThe result IS true, just like "2i*2i=-4" is true. It just doesn't apply to physical reality, at least not in the most straightforward way (just like you can't have 2i chests with 2i apples in each chest).
- tripzilch 11y agoWhat if you have 2 iPhones?
- legulere 11y agoBanach-Tarski is absurd because matter in reality is made out of particles. If you take this into account in your definitions you can't do absurd stuff like Banach-Tarski. As such it offers an insight into what can happen if your mathematical model fails at representing the reality.
- backprojection 11y agoStrictly speaking, math it self isn't intended to reflect reality. It's just logical system together with some initial axioms. But it does happen to model reality very well, given the right interpretations.
- reagency 11y agoBut uncountable sets do NOT model reality well.
- digama 11y agoOh but they do. When taking measurements in a scientific setting, it usually gives the most accurate and simple model to assume that your measurement is an approximation of a certain real number, and understand more accurate measurements as better estimates of this real number. Using rational numbers or other countable sets in this position usually leads to undesirable biases and or circuity in the model. When you need a "continuum", the real numbers have the best properties for the job.
- SamReidHughes 11y agoLet's say you've got a light-emitting flat surface and want to describe its power output. I recommend modeling it as a set of real coordinates with an intensity value at each point and integrating to compute the total power output. By all means I invite you to come up with a better model, without using uncountable sets, for which there isn't a straightforward analogue, just as good, that uses uncountable sets. Edit: Might as well jump straight to explaining how wave functions work without using uncountable sets, and why that's a better description of reality.
- murbard2 11y agoAccepting or rejecting the axiom of choice as "natural" is a red herring based on the idea that mathematics express external truths about the world. Mathematics describe rules of reasoning which preserve truths about the world. For instance, if I am trying to count my goats, the concept of natural integer allows me to count two groups, sum the results, and still have an accurate understanding of the number of goats I have. As it turns out, the theory of natural integers allows one to define arbitrarily large numbers, even though I cannot possibly have more than, say, 1000 goats. Yet, a theory that deals only with numbers less than 1000 might be more cumbersome to work with. Try to define addition there and see for yourself. The theory of natural numbers is useful because it provides a simple formal way to accurately count the number of goats (and possibly other things). It doesn't matter that it allows us to conceive of an absurd number of goats, like 1,000,000. It does the job, and as long you use it in the real world on real data you won't get absurd results. --- The same goes for the axiom of choice. Whether or not you accept it isn't going to make a practical difference once it comes to measuring the volume of helium needed to fill your balloon. Think of it as upcasting and downcasting. You're dealing with a finite problem which is hard to solve. So you upcast it to a more general theory, solve it, and then downcast it back to the original setting. There are as many ways to upcast as there are ways to pick independent axioms, so pick whichever make the problem easiest to solve, and don't worry about the "truth" of these propositions.
- dietrichepp 11y agoThis "upcasting" and "downcasting" also work with mathematics itself. For example, we can consider adding infinitesimals to the real numbers, allowing us to do calculus without taking limits. Then we can downcast back to the real numbers.
- rndn 11y agoThe problem is that some concepts might not have an "isomorphism" to the real world (as Hofstadter calls it). In fact, finitists believe that the concept of infinity possibly introduces some discrepancy, making the "casting" a lossy transformation.
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- PaulHoule 11y agoI don't believe in the axiom of choice.
- reagency 11y agoYou don't believe it is true? That's silly, there is no good reason to believe it true or false, except in the sense that you think one of Chess or Go is the more fun game of the two. Or you don't believe it is a meaningful to try to choose an answer? That's ZF, the home to the portion of set theory that has anything useful to say about the physical Universe.
- tripzilch 11y agoSo because Go is (objectively) more fun than Chess, that means Banach-Tarski is bollocks!
- arundelo 11y agoThe author of Irregular Webcomic walks through a Banach-Tarski decomposition and it turns out not to require any really heavy-duty math. You should understand it if you know what rational and irrational numbers are: http://www.irregularwebcomic.net/2339.html http://www.irregularwebcomic.net/2339.html
- pronoiac 11y ago"I have discovered a truly remarkable proof of the Banach-Tarski theorem which this margin is too small to contain - oh wait, this is a webcomic, of course there's room!"
- VLM 11y agoMaybe it helps to circularize the problem a bit? Or at least, if not help, not make it worse? And then mix in some quadratic equations? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-measurable_set#Consistent_definitions_of_measure_and_probability http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-measurable_set#Consistent_d... If B-T is true, then you've got to select 1 of 4 known cheat codes to allow the definition of volume of "normal real world things" at least the way non-math people like to measure volumes. The least icky is the option that demands sets with non-measurable volumes exist, weird as that sounds. Then again, how weird is it really, given that no one freaks out about an infinite number of irrational numbers existing in between all possible fractions. Pi, after all, is no fraction, but its handy to keep around anyway. If you assume B-T is true and in choose-your-own-adventure fashion select that non-measurable sets exist, then, it turns out that having non-measurable sets make B-T "obvious-ish" or at least less obscure sounding, it all kind of works out in a circular manner. Why in the name of Occams Razor would you want a pair of weird ideas instead of dust bin both and stick to grade school geometry? Well the axiom of choice wedges in sideways between B-T and the non-measurable sets above, kind of like two balls wedge into the space one ball takes up above (making kind of a joke or tongue in cheek). Its not just two weirdo ideas that work together but a couple of them. And the axiom of choice is just so useful in so many ways (see its wikipedia page) I'd have to think for a second about chucking out the axiom of choice. I think it would be ickier than keeping it around. Life is so much easier if you keep all three hanging around, and all their hangers on. A really good analogy would be some real world quadratic equations for a land survey (well, made up example) only have one solution in the reals although everyone knows there's two mathematical solutions to any quadratic even if you don't like negative sq roots, and thats OK, and you kinda have to look sideways at the solutions involving negative square roots. Its not that real world geometry problems are full of negative square roots in practice or it means anything in the context of land survey problems, but its kind of a place holder in math. Kind of a "conservation of weirdness" physics theory where they cancel out over a large enough collection of theorems or a collection of weird ideas is in sum less weird than any individual idea. So if you'd like this and that, and its really interesting and handy and seems to work quite well, sometimes you're going to have to not look overly closely at weird point sets that literally do not have a defined volume, at least not as you'd define volumes, and then screwing around with those volumeless objects can result in super weird stuff like two balls for the price of one. Which is OK in the physical world because we don't have abstract spheres that can have anything happen to them, we have vaguely round piles of atoms with really complicated rules about what you can do to that pile of atoms. It all vaguely resembles the manufacture of sausage where you'll probably be happier if you don't look to closely at things that shouldn't exist, yet, its a tasty breakfast sausage if you don't think too hard about where any individual part came from. This is a highly heretical view, we're only supposed to think about math as some beautiful, pure, and virtuous thing, which I'm convinced is sociologically some repressed Victorian views about virgin brides or some nonsense so I don't feel too bad about being a heretic.
- fmela 11y agoIf one solid ball can be partitioned into two solid balls of equal radius, then can't each of THOSE be partitioned into four solid balls of equal radius, and so on ad infinitum?
- reagency 11y agoYes. Except that the ball can't really "be paritioned". That's a mathematical illusion. There is an isomorphism of structures, but there is no computable algorithm that can perform the partition operation.
- black_knight 11y agoI just want to mention that there is a much deeper discussion to be had about the axiom of choice than the apparent impossibility of Banach Tarski, and it has to do with equality. In mathematics is is common to change the equality between sets (form quotient sets). For example, the set of real numbers are infinite sequences of rational numbers (fractions) which approximate the value. But the equality which we place on this set is not the equality of sequences, which is too strict. We put a new equality on these real numbers which identify two of them iff they come arbitrarily close to each other. The axiom of choice (AC) says that if for a ∈ A there is b ∈ B satisfying some requirement, then there is a function A → B selecting these elements. The axiom of choice is only problematic if we require that choice function it produces respects some quotient equality we placed on A and B. The confusion arise because ZF Set Theory cannot express the weaker notion of a function which does not express the quotient equality. Other foundations, such as Martin-Löf Type Theory, can express this difference and you get AC without the paradoxes.
- JoshTriplett 11y agoWhat's the disadvantage of those other foundations that makes them unsuitable for universal use?
- black_knight 11y agoOf course the proponents of these other foundations claim that they are suitable for universal use. But sets came first, and is good enough for most purposes, and mathematicians in general are more concerned with mathematics than foundations. Actually the recent movement of "Homotopy Type Theory" is gaining some traction among non-logicians, giving easier formulations and proofs in category theory and topology. Also in computer science type theory is becoming more usual, since all results are constructive (provides algorithms) and is in fact a programming language in it self.
- tel 11y agoThey're certainly not unsuitable, but they have a tendency to take observation/realization/grasping/proving as an instantaneous process. In most people's regular understanding of logic, however, this is false. There is a process by which new data and new conclusions from that data are drawn and made available to you. So ultimately, if those things matter for either UX of mathematics or for actual mathematical content is a large question, but it's fairly clear that if you need to capture something closer to the actual dynamics of knowledge/learning/understanding then you are sunk when you base your foundations in set theory.
- sjolsen 11y ago>So if we have a bounded set (and I've not given a technical definition of what that means) then we'd like the measure of that to exist Why in the world should this be true? I'd much sooner try to weaken this requirement than the additivity requirement or the axiom of choice. For example, I imagine restricting measures to (unions of countably many disjoint) (path-)connected subspaces of the ambient topology would solve the problem just as handily, without making any compromises on how well the math models our intuitive notion of measure. On that note, I suspect that to really have a meaningful notion of measure, one really needs to have at least a topology, if not an outright metric space. Can anyone more versed in this area comment on this?
- ColinWright 11y agoPeople I talk to about this are often very unhappy about countable additivity, and are often unhappy about infinite in general. I suspect that the reason they think they want a measure to be defined on every set is because they don't know just how weird sets can be, and are relying on their intuition. Everything can be weighed, everything can be dunked in water to test its volume, so why should something not have a "volume"? You clearly have a different intuition born of your background and training. You're talking about > "... unions of countably many disjoint > (path-)connected subspaces of the ambient > topology ..." You already have an unusual intuition. And you're right - it's "obviously" better to restrict the sets we play with rather than limiting ourselves to finite collections, but that "obvious" comes from years, perhaps decades, of playing with these ideas. And with regards having a topology or a metric, consider that perhaps a measure can be coerced into providing a metric ...
- tripzilch 11y ago> Everything can be weighed, everything can be dunked in water to test its volume, so why should something not have a "volume"? But it seems pretty obvious to me that you can't measure the volume of something (accurately) if it has features smaller than a water molecule. Don't know about an equivalent example for weighing things. But it stands to reason that, whatever you (think you) want to measure shouldn't have meaningful features smaller than the accuracy of the thing you're measuring with. That's why we made electron microscopes, because photons were too big.
- cmrx64 11y agoExcellent article, but my first reaction was "Goodness, that's an awfully punny title". It still gives me fuzzies, but I can't tell if it's intentional or not.
- mikhailfranco 11y agoThere is no evidence that the real world has anything to do with a continuum, real numbers, or R^3. When we look closely at things, we always find combinatorial structures of discrete entities (smooth matter -> atoms -> protons -> quarks). For example, electrical charge is discrete, not continuous, and the unit appears to be 1/3 the charge on the electron (as carried by quarks). The balance of evidence is that our universe is spatially compact, with time bounded in the past (Big Bang), so it is possible that there are no infinities at the cosmological scale either. The evidence for the temporal future has recently changed from closed (Big Crunch) to open (infinite expansion). There are various theories about how space and time emerge from discrete quantum mechanical structures. For example, a simple derivation in Loop Quantum Gravity gives a discrete spectrum for area. At the moment, we don't know which theory is correct, but it is likely there is a smallest finite unit of area (and volume). Another reason for rejecting real numbers in physics, is that each value contains an infinite amount of information. The Holographic Principle is interesting because it rejects the notion of an infinite amount of information in a finite space. In fact, it goes a lot further, and says the total information within a 3D volume does not scale as the volume (!), but as the 2D surface area. Essentially there is one bit per Planck Area, so 10^66 bits/m^2. It is easy to imagine, but not to describe or prove, a combination of these theories that implies everything is finite, discrete and combinatorial, without an infinity or a real number in sight.
- ColinWright 11y agoBut that's not really the point. All models are wrong, some models are useful. Using the reals as a model makes the math a lot easier than trying to do everything in discrete structures, especially since we don't actually know the scales that these discrete structures might be at. We don't know what the smallest unit of space is, and it's still not clear that there is one. As a result we use the reals as a model, and it does incredibly well. So in a sense you are helping support the main point of the original article. The fact that the reals are an approximation to what you claim reality might be should be acknowledged, and then we should explore the limits and limitations of that models. The Banach-Tarski theorem does exactly that, showing us at least one place there the model apparently fails, and should certainly be treated with care.