11 ms·
It's hard to see how it could be fixed. Fundamentally, what is different about a local key fob, and a relay connected to a remote key fob? It seems fundamentall
by mikeash 12y ago
It's hard to see how it could be fixed. Fundamentally, what is different about a local key fob, and a relay connected to a remote key fob? It seems fundamentally impossible to tell the difference.
The one thing that I could see working in theory would be detecting the roundtrip transmission time with a strict ceiling on it. No matter how good your relay is, it can't relay data faster than the speed of light, so you can enforce the fob being close by only listening to it if it responds fast enough.
The problem with this is that light moves pretty fast, and internal delays within the fob will dominate. If you want to put the range limit at, say, 30ft, that means your response time ceiling is a mere 60ns. Can you build a fob that responds anywhere close to that fast?
Edit: one other possibility is if the fob knows where it is. A GPS receiver on the fob, for example, would allow the fob and the car to securely confirm proximity (absent GPS spoofing). Getting a GPS receiver to run on a wireless fob's battery is left as an exercise for the reader.
- maxerickson 12y agoFrom a previous discussion: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=9383462 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=9383462 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distance-bounding_protocol https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distance-bounding_protocol (I don't pretend to have a clue whether it can be effective or not)
- mikeash 12y agoThanks, nice to know that it has a name.
- Dylan16807 12y agoYou can try to detect the amplified signal, and if you put an accurate timer in the fob you can make it take exactly 5000ns to process and then require a signal back within 5020ns.
- TheLoneWolfling 12y agoDetecting the amplified signal won't work. There are these things known as directional antennas... The timer idea is a good one, although a ns-accurate timer is starting to get a bit much for something to put into a key fob. Especially give it's run off of a watch battery (power requirements) and often exposed to heat / cold (thermal drift).
- Dylan16807 12y agoWell for the example timing I gave you only need 1 part per thousand accuracy, and it's easy to get 10ppm or much better. It only needs to run during communication, anyway.
- anologwintermut 12y agoThe timer could be in the car. Protocol looks like fob pings car, car challenges fob, fob responds.
- TheLoneWolfling 12y agoNope. Dylan's comment requires a timer in both the key fob and in the car. The key fob to delay transmission of the challenge response, the car to check if there isn't too much delay in the challenge / response pair. You really need a timer in the key fob, as the processor in the key fob is often so slow (for battery / cost reasons) that an extra couple clock cycles somewhere would throw off the timing enough to make it fail.
- anologwintermut 12y agoThe usual distance bounding protocols only need a nano-second accurate timer on one device called the verifier. For example https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/sec10/tech/full_papers/Rasmussen.pdf https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/sec10/tech/full_papers/R... Cool trick in that one, the Prover(i.e. the key fob) does the distance measuring part of the challenge response protocol using analog only components. This means its response time is <1 nano second. So you can do it with only the car having a good timer.
- mbrubeck 12y agoTheoretically you could use quantum key distribution, but in practice this usually requires a fiber-optic connection. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_key_distribution https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_key_distribution Edit: Nope, I am wrong, as the comments below point out.
- Sir_Cmpwn 12y agoWould it be possible to establish a secure connection and exchange a secret key?
- sp332 12y agoNo. This could relay the challenge to the key, and the response back to the car. The attacker doesn't have to know any secrets to do that attack.
- prsutherland 12y agoIf you put the car's public key on the fob, the fob can validate that it is talking directly to the car over a secure connection and then the car can validate the fob's secret.
- TheLoneWolfling 12y agoPlease elaborate as to how the fob or car would detect the MITM: 1. You place device A near car and device B near fob. 2. Device A relays all Rf transmissions in the target frequency range(s) to device B, which rebroadcasts, and vice versa. Public-key encryption / authentication only ensures that no-one in the middle is reading or editing your connection. It does not prevent someone from relaying your communication. (And a good thing too, else the entire encrypted web wouldn't work.)
- Sir_Cmpwn 12y agoWhat if the car sent out the signal and the fob received it, then sent an unlock command?
- TheLoneWolfling 12y agoNote the vice versa: In that case device B picks up on the unlock command and relays is back to device A which rebroadcasts the unlock command to the car.
- halviti 12y agoI think this is an easy problem to fix, no? Why not just make the keys responsible for starting the car again? We've traded too much security for convenience and it's time to take a step back. You can still start the car with the push of a button.. only now that button is on the key. Problem solved.
- TheLoneWolfling 12y agoAgreed. Your opinion is an unpopular one, albeit one I share. There are far too many cases where security is getting removed in the name of convenience, and this is no exception.
- URSpider94 12y agoIt's important to look at this in the context of overall auto theft trends. Auto theft has dropped by more than 50% over the past decade, driven mostly by the broad use of smart keys. (http://www.iii.org/issue-update/auto-theft http://www.iii.org/issue-update/auto-theft). The lion's share of the thefts are of older cars (mentioned in the above cite) -- thefts of 2013 vehicles number in the hundreds. Further, a Tesla has a GPS, sophisticated processor, and a 4G WAN. It would be easy enough to have the car report back to the owner if it's being driven without sensing the key, and give the owner the option to route a theft report and live location of the vehicle to police with one click. That's something I wished for in my revenge fantasies when my car was stolen a decade ago. We could do more, sure -- but it's hard to argue that we are making cars less secure, or even that car security should be a major care-about for the buyer.
- greglindahl 12y agoThe main issue with newer cars is people stealing your stuff from your unlocked car. The Tesla app does show the car location on a map; they don't have a "report to police" option, but they aren't that far away from it. BTW the Tesla modem is 3G.
- mikeash 12y agoThe implied context here was "while keeping wireless keyfobs." Yes, the problem becomes substantially easier if you require a direct physical connection, but that's not such an interesting problem. Also, given that modern cars are vastly more difficult to steal, I object to your characterization of "traded too much security for convenience." If the current state is too insecure, then you must think that cars from 20+ years ago are absolutely appalling.
- lsaferite 12y agoIt took a few minutes for the 'relay' portion of what you just wrote to click. So, in theory, if you wanted to steal a REALLY expensive keyless car you could have two devices connected over a mobile data connection that just relays communication with the keyfob. You put one device near the owner of the fob, so in his office, and you keep the other. Then you can just walk off with the car. Yikes.
- TheLoneWolfling 12y agoYep, that's pretty much it. Although sometimes you can even skip the second device and just have the one near the keyfob.
- mbrubeck 12y agoYep - here's a presentation on these relay/repeater attacks by some researchers who actually build some: http://media.hacking-lab.com/scs3/scs3_pdf/SCS3_2011_Capkun.pdf http://media.hacking-lab.com/scs3/scs3_pdf/SCS3_2011_Capkun....
- birdman3131 12y agoI could see several ways. 1. Use a modified form of triangulation. Have multiple transceivers in the car (At the front and back) and make the remote directional aware. Then have the remote and transceivers ask each other if the angles they are seeing are the same. The only way for the thieve to bypass this would be two remote amps set at almost 180 from each other. 2. stick an ultrasonic speaker in the key fob and have the car send it a random sequence to play back. For those worried about battery life use a wireless charging system. Both of these assume that the transmission is encrypted and the thieves are just boosting the signal.
- mikeash 12y agoI don't believe it's possible to do triangulation in anything like a remotely accurate fashion with anything that'll fit in your pocket. I don't see how ultrasound helps matters at all. You just change the nature of what the attacker has to relay.
- tzs 12y agoUltrasound helps because the speed of sound in air is much lower than the speed of radio waves. This makes it massively easier to do distance measurements. Rather than put an ultrasonic speaker in the fob, I'd put a microphone. The car would send an ultrasonic signal, and the fob would send a radio response indicating it heard it. The car could then calculate how far away the fob is.
- mikeash 12y agoUltrasound also makes it massively easier to spoof distance measurements, because there's nothing that requires the attacker to use ultrasound for his own transmissions. The speed of sound in air is about 1ms/foot, so if you're trying to measure proximity within 30ft, you're looking for a 60ms roundtrip delay, or 30ms for one-way. If the attacker has ultrasonic microphones and speakers connected with radio waves, that means he can spoof your fob from up to 9,000km away for roundtrip ultrasound, and 4,500km away for one-way, under ideal conditions. The speed of light imposes difficult constraints in terms of how fast you have to respond, but at least the attacker can't outrun it (as far as anyone knows).
- mikeash 12y agoI can't edit anymore, but expanding on the GPS idea: I just realized that we pretty much all carry around a GPS-enabled "fob" these days. If you switched away from using a dedicated fob and instead authenticated against a person's phone, you could double-check proximity that way. It would only need a quick check before opening the car, so battery life shouldn't be affected too much.