4 ms·
I find myself with some cognitive dissonance. This makes perfect sense. But selfishly, I've worked for many corporations that operate an http proxy that they
by wyldfire 12y ago
I find myself with some cognitive dissonance. This makes perfect sense.
But selfishly, I've worked for many corporations that operate an http proxy that they scrutinize and they proxy https which they cannot scrutinize (without detection), so I feel comfortable that they are not. (Yes I periodically review the certificate store for changes).
If the vast majority of sites were https, they might decide to do MITM for those https connections and either instruct everyone to ignore the warning or install their own certs on all of the computers. Indeed I think many corporations may already do this. I would probably not use many websites if they made that change.
- jerf 12y agoThis ship has long since sailed. SSL HTTPS interception for corporate entities is off-the-shelf and readily available.
- jfoutz 12y agoWouldn't the corporation install it's own root certificate in that case? you can MITM without notification. presumably they could tack it on after workstation install. If they're already going through the trouble of monitoring everyone's traffic, a few extra steps don't seem like that big of a hassle. Of course, you're right, some large fraction won't bother with their own root cert, and their users will learn many bad habits.
- wyldfire 12y ago> Wouldn't the corporation install it's own root certificate in that case? Yeah, but I can audit the certificate store (and I have). On some systems, I am granted local administrator privilege. I wouldn't take out any certs that they install, but if I found that they installed and/or used one, I'd probably stop using most public websites (at least the ones that I have a username/password with).
- andrewstuart2 12y agoI don't think there's anything inherently bad about trusted MITM. If the trust exists, then you can have a local caching proxy that can drastically reduce the load on servers, WAN links, etc, and is a major part of Roy Fielding's original description of the REST architecture. [1] IMO, I think the majority of use cases that people care about with HTTPS are about integrity (i.e. authentication) rather than confidentiality. We don't need full-on encrypted requests for those use cases, we just need secure MACs[2] (significant performance difference) as part of the standard so that endpoints can verify it hasn't been tampered with, even if it's been cached somewhere along the way. [1]https://www.ics.uci.edu/~fielding/pubs/dissertation/rest_arch_style.htm#sec_5_2_2 https://www.ics.uci.edu/~fielding/pubs/dissertation/rest_arc... [2]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Message_authentication_code http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Message_authentication_code
- M2Ys4U 12y ago>IMO, I think the majority of use cases that people care about with HTTPS are about integrity (i.e. authentication) rather than confidentiality. I disagree, and so does the IETF: Pervasive Monitoring is an Attack[0]. [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7258 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7258
- spdustin 12y agoBut uncle Joe and grandma Margaret don't care about confidentiality. If they did, they wouldn't crab about that shifty Snowden guy, and they would donate to the EFF. They just don't want their Facebook login stolen, or their banking login sold on some forum, or their family photo gallery erased. Confidentiality, for the unfortunate majority of Americans anyway, just isn't a selling point.
- M2Ys4U 12y ago>They just don't want their Facebook login stolen, or their banking login sold on some forum, or their family photo gallery erased. That is confidentiality, no? If login credentials are transmitted in the clear then anybody listening can impersonate them. That's exactly what FireSheep demonstrates.
- blowski 12y ago> cognitive dissonance Off-topic, but why can't people say "I'm not sure" or "I can see both sides of this argument". It's just an overused geek cliche.
- roel_v 12y agoBecause that's not what 'cognitive dissonance' means.
- Dylan16807 12y agoRight! And what wyldfire is experiencing is not cognitive dissonance. "X is a better policy, but hurts me in Y situation" is not self-contradicting.
- higherpurpose 12y agoScrutinizing traffic like that is dumb anyway because if a hacker gets in he could get control of such a system and "see everything". As a principle, the benefits of encrypting everything always beat the benefits of "monitoring everything" in an enterprise.