3 ms·
Via Turing, we know that the Predictor would be able to decide programs, and since it can't, it can't be a Predictor. The isomorphism between the program which
by samatman 12y ago
Via Turing, we know that the Predictor would be able to decide programs, and since it can't, it can't be a Predictor.
The isomorphism between the program which defeats decidability and the two-box Newcomb problem is left as an exercise.
- connerbrooks 12y agoI think this may be the proof. Start by assuming that the predictor is a decider P for a computational model of a human M in a situation encoded by w. We can then construct a Turing Machine S that decides A_TM. S <M, w> { 1. Run P on w. 2. If P halts, run M on w; if M accepts, accept, if it rejects reject. } Since S decides A_TM we must have made a mistake somewhere in our proof, our only mistake could be that the predictor P is a decider. Therefore the Predictor is not a decider.
- samatman 12y agoFull marks!
- jcoffland 12y agoYou assume that a human cannot be described with something less powerful than a Turing machine. There is no reason to believe that knowing what a human will do in this instance is equal to decidability of computer programs.
- Dylan16807 12y agoI almost objected, but you're right. The human has finite time with which to calculate. The predictor can easily be assumed to have more time. There's no problem calculating if a program will halt in finite time.
- samatman 12y agoI assume nothing of the sort. I merely assume that humans, like computers, are capable of evaluating the truth of something and then deliberately reporting the opposite. That is all that is required.