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So, there's a pattern I'm noticing again and again. Whenever a startup announces a new secure communication product, extremely knowledgeable and respected peopl
by josephg 12y ago
So, there's a pattern I'm noticing again and again. Whenever a startup announces a new secure communication product, extremely knowledgeable and respected people in our community write posts talking about the (awful) mistakes they've made.
In the wake of the Snowden revelations, its incredibly important that we bootstrap a usable new generation of software with security at its core. But I'm worried that lots of people will be afraid to make security a core feature of their product because of the bad press they'll get if they do it a little bit wrong. Frankly the security community does not have a history of making systems that my mum can use. We really need an army of software engineers to work on fixing this problem and I don't think blog posts like this are helping. (Notable exception is Textsecure).
In this case, as I understood the press release:
- The QR code is used to initialize a direct (encrypted) bluetooth / wifi direct connection. Taking a picture of the QR code isn't enough to get the one-time pad.
- Cameras on modern mobile phones should be able to generate more than enough entropy (even if this isn't happening yet).
But there is no discussion of these points so far. Everybody is just piling hate on the product for its failings. We need to be better than that if we want a secure app ecosystem.
- Nursie 12y ago>> The QR code is used to initialize a direct (encrypted) bluetooth / wifi direct connection. Taking a picture of the QR code isn't enough to get the one-time pad. If, as the article says, the QR code gives a symmetric AES key, then yes it could well be enough to get the OTP if you've eavesdropped on the traffic as well. >> But there is no discussion of these points so far. Everybody is just piling hate on the product for its failings. We need to be better than that if we want a secure app ecosystem. What we need to be better at is recognising that "Hey, look at my brand-new awesome crypto-system!" is a huge red flag, and what we should be looking for is "Hey, we're using tried and tested protocol X, which we're pretty confident about". From an app-writer's perspective I can see why they want to announce that they've made this awesome new security system - they want to differentiate themselves, and security is in the public eye right now so seems to be a selling point. Human nature being what it is, new and shiny is eye-catching and good for sales. But we really want pretty much the opposite here.
- maxerickson 12y agoTo be fair, it is much more common that these new softwares add a dash of crypto to spice up their marketing than it is that they carefully approach the problem of creating secure channels. People that want to do the latter should go out of their way to avoid appearing to be the former, not call up Techcrunch to show off their unicorn.
- ncza 12y agoNothing keeps startups from asking crypto experts for consulting and guidance. Nothing keeps them from reading publicly available docs and rants.
- diminoten 12y agoIt ends up being a product of the fact that the smartest crypto folks aren't software developers, and the smartest software developers (or the most innovative -- the guys starting companies or building products) aren't crypto folks. So you have a bunch of what are effectively scientists who aren't all that familiar with how products get made (first build something, release it, then refine it over time through feedback) and you have a bunch of developers who aren't familiar with how security products are managed (you don't release anything until you're willing to put people's lives on your product). What you're left with is an ecosystem of developers releasing code that's not cryptographically sound because they need feedback and a community to help them refine the software, and crypto scientists who scream bloody murder every time they find a bug because, "what if the next Snowden uses your new tool!?!" Everyone's right in this argument, it's just hard to bridge the gap between these two very different schools of thought.
- Nursie 12y agoWith fairly minimal training one can learn to use existing, secure constructions. Hell, there are now protocols designed specifically for this, open source ones at that. In fact everyone who even considers touching anything crypto-related should know one simple thing - do not invent your own schemas!
- diminoten 12y agoIf it's minimal, can you please outline the training required to write secure code? Perhaps you could forward that minimal training to the openssl folks, and maybe you could singlehandedly solve the security crisis currently taking place in software.
- Nursie 12y ago>> If it's minimal, can you please outline the training required to write secure code? Nope, because that's not what I claimed.
- 12y ago
- jarman 12y agoWe need software to protect privacy, not security cargo-cult and bizzare homebrew encryption schemes >... The first step is always optical, and that is an exchange of an AES 256bit key, plus an authentication key, and so those are the keys to encrypt the One-time pad as it’s being transferred ... This software does not use one-time pad. It uses AES-256 with some extra hoops. Authors are either incompetent, thinking that having message-sized chunk of random data somewhere during encryption is 'one-time pad', or dishonest, using 'one-time pad' as empty buzzword. Both are huge red flags against using that software
- cwmma 12y agoI believe the issue involved hype about one type pads being used being a 'game changer'. This is not the case as you can use the qr code along with existing crypto primitives to do the same thing much more securely. E.g. qr code could have a public key and a nonce, send your public key and the nonce (signed by your key) and now both of you have enough information about the other to do diffie-hellmen (create ephemeral keys). In other words they are hyping and trying to sell people something that is at best equally secure to current things and more likely less secure.
- JacobEdelman 12y agoCompanies should be implementing good security not because of the good press it will get them but because of the bad press it won't get them.
- falcolas 12y agoBad press rarely costs as much as good press makes. Plus, even bad press is getting your name out there, another form of marketing which can be spun by the company into revenue.
- JacobEdelman 12y agoIn this case I meant the bad press that results from a security leak.
- falcolas 12y agoSecurity leaks are so common now as to be a non-event for 99.9% of the populace. Even I just go change a password or two and move on with my life.
- 6d0debc071 12y agoWhile I understand that that's primarily a normative statement, you have to have something significant to lose to be worried about the potential losses. It's going to make more sense, initially, for a company to invest in activities that they expected to generate revenue than it is for them to invest in activities that secure the source of that revenue. It would only be once you already had significant liabilities that it would start to make sense to invest in security, and even then only if you expected breaches of security to result in significant loss with respect to the source of that revenue (questionable, if you've achieved significant market leverage then people may not be that worried about breaches to their data. I'm reminded of this sort of thing: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kyle-mccarthy/32-data-breaches-larger-t_b_6427010.html http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kyle-mccarthy/32-data-breaches... .)
- d0ne 12y ago"We really need an army of software engineers to work on fixing this problem" That is what the team at Ionic Security* is doing. With about 50 open engineering positions we are hiring :) My email is adam at our domain. * I'm the founder/CTO
- mikeash 12y agoPeople should be afraid to make security a core feature without actually getting it right. This stuff is literally a matter of life and death in some places, and a product that says it's secure but isn't is much worse than a product that doesn't say it's secure in the first place. Should we avoid criticizing airbag manufacturers for making their products spew shrapnel because we don't want to make them afraid of building safety equipment? The actual problems here are that the claims made by Zendo are 1) pointless and 2) impossible. They're pointless because one-time pads offer zero real-world security benefit over a modern symmetric cipher. They're impossible because there's no way to securely generate and share a one-time pad the way they're saying. For example, you say the QR code is used to initiate a direct, encrypted wireless connection. Encrypted how, exactly? With a symmetric cipher! Either a symmetric cipher is good enough to keep things secret, in which case the one-time pad is pointless, or a symmetric cipher is not good enough to keep things secret, in which case the one-time pad is compromised in flight. If you want to make security a core feature and not get criticized, all you have to do is get your security right. If you want to get your security right, bring in a professional. Any crypto professional worth anything could have pointed out all these problems within five minutes of being given a summary of their design. They either didn't consult with a professional, or they did and ignored the advice. Blog posts like this may not help bring about the security revolution you want, but they sure are helping to prevent a security disaster in the form of a bunch of completely broken programs leaking our info every which way while pretending to be secure.
- MichaelGG 12y agoNo, not at all. At least in the teardowns I've seen here on HN, the companies make big mistakes, market it like they are perfect, and are arrogant regarding fixing things. If companies launched with a real crypto review, this wouldn't happen. On the flip side, most companies wouldn't launch at all because their product is simply inherently insecure. Or, it addresses a mostly useless threat model. For instance, it requires you to trust their server while claiming to be super duper secret. Even Silent Circle, which touts some famous names, talks up their secure PSTN service which is so obviously interceptable it's bizarre to make any security claim at all. The problem with crypto your mum can use is that key management is a pain in the ass. And if users don't verify and maintain their own keys, most systems are useless against strong threats. zRTP is the closest thing to great, because there's a simple in-but-out-of-band key verification system built in. And if you day your mum doesn't need that much security, she just doesn't wanna be in a dragnet or have her ISP read her email, then choosing, say, Gmail, and emailing other users with TLS-enabled SMTP servers gets her pretty damn far (if SMTP actually verified certs). But that's not a very sexy product, is it? (Despite being what many corporations do -- configure explicit SMTP-TLS policies.)
- stouset 12y agoThe fundamental problem is that cryptographers are working on this, but it's hard. Security is always about tradeoffs, and when actual lives are on the line people need to understand what tradeoffs they're making. For instance, a messaging protocol that authenticates its participants can be strongly privacy-preserving for the initiator or recipient, but as far as we know, not both. One side can initiate the connection anonymously, but at some point one or the other must identify themselves before the other. Another issue is that crypto is not, and may never be, at the point where anyone can securely assemble a protocol from raw primitives (e.g., AES or SHA-2) without specialized knowledge. These primitives provide security features that are well-defined mathematically, but that definition may not map well to intuitive real-world security properties. As an example, a one-time pad done correctly is information-theoretically secure. But it's trivial to tamper with, because there's no authentication of the message. AES-CBC has the property of indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext (IND-CPA) and chosen-ciphertext (IND-CCA1) attacks, both of which are considered necessary properties for a block cipher to be secure. For a long time, we though this was good enough. Unfortunately, IND-CCA1 didn't model adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks, where an attacker uses the outcome of previous decryption attempts on chosen ciphertexts to influence his next choice of ciphertext to submit for decryption. Authenticated modes provide indistinguishability under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2), but unauthenticated modes like CBC remain popular (they do still have their use, but you need to understand what the risks and tradeoffs are before using an unauthenticated mode like CBC). We likewise don't know of a good, user-friendly way to authenticate identities without the use of a central authority (à la certificate authorities) or a web of trust (à la GPG). Both suck. With CA-style authentication, if a CA is compromised, you lose many of the security guarantees. This is perhaps good enough for e-commerce, where governments typically have little incentive to steal credit card numbers, but it's potentially catastrophic for communication between political dissidents. A web of trust is perhaps better for this kind of use-case, but nobody knows how to make the process of bootstrapping the web of trust simple, the decision of who to trust is inherently complicated (Alice trusts Bob and Carol, who both sort of know Dave who vouches for Eve implicitly; how should Alice feel about Eve?). You can hide that complication at the cost of decreasing the utility (trust conservatively) or increasing the risk (trust liberally). Or you can expose that complexity and let individuals weigh the risks themselves. The more of these decisions and choices you hide from the user, the more user-friendly you can make your system. But the cost is control over exactly whom and how you trust. Unfortunately, if you build one easy-to-use system for people to securely share cat photos and one hard-to-use system for political dissidents, it's easy to identify the political dissidents. Anyone who solves this problem deserves a fucking Nobel.