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>Misunderstanding when models should and should not be applied is one of the core reasons we got into an asset bubble in the mid-2000s. Banks were pricing finan
by lordnacho 12y ago
>Misunderstanding when models should and should not be applied is one of the core reasons we got into an asset bubble in the mid-2000s. Banks were pricing financial products using models whose assumptions did not hold over the long-term. They didn't understand how their models were wrong until it was too late, and it ended up losing them (but ultimately the American taxpayers) a lot of money.
I don't think this is true. Plenty of smart people who worked with various models knew their data wasn't solid and reflected just a few years of a benign market, and plenty of people understood the rather obvious idea of a Black Swan.
The reason they kept at it was systemic: they were paid to sit and cheer the market up, continue to sell product, and generally not question the business model.
The people who made a lot of money off the crash tended to be people who were able to sit out the upswing in some way, without being punished too hard. Hedge fund managers with either new funds or long track records, like Paulson and Andrew Lahde.
The crash was always coming. I remember going to a luncheon at GS where that was the major point. This was in 2006, and they predicted it would start in 2007 and culminate in 2008.
- rhino369 12y agoSome knew, but most didn't appreciate the risk correctly. Of course they knew about the idea of black swan events, but 2008 was not a black swan event. It was caused by a rather mild dip in real estate prices and a rather mild amount of mortgage defaults. The problem was that models assumed some risks were uncorrelated and in 2008 they became highly correlated. A lot of major wall street institutions got destroyed by it.
- lordnacho 12y ago>The problem was that models assumed some risks were uncorrelated and in 2008 they became highly correlated. 2008 was not the first time correlation shot to 1. Sure, it's hard to model, I'll admit that. But to think that nobody had considered this is wrong. I saw a bunch of people who knew the models were wrong, but nobody had the balls to say so while the spreadsheets still worked.
- exelius 12y agoIt was. Their models made the assumption that debt ratings were accurate, and they were substituting leveraged mortgage backed securities with AA ratings for risk-free debt. They also underestimated the effects that a liquidity crunch would have - any asset model backed by volatile assets assumes liquidity, but doesn't tell you what will happen in a period of non-liquidity. Most models assume financial markets are a continuous function, when in reality markets are mostly continuous with periodic step functions. When you hit a period with a step function, the market is either being irrational or correcting prior irrationality. You can't predict these step functions with any accuracy; though many of the big investment banks knew it was coming a year or two in advance. But even if you can predict them, there is no good way to model them. Goldman Sachs, for all its faults, is run by exceptionally competent people. They came out of the downturn stronger than they went in. They understand the models well because they built most of them. But there were plenty of large market players at Lehman, Merrill, Nationwide, etc. who were ignorant of the problems until it was too late. These are the people who just did what the model told them to because it was making them money, and they didn't understand the risk exposure they really had.
- lordnacho 12y ago>Their models made the assumption that debt ratings were accurate, and they were substituting leveraged mortgage backed securities with AA ratings for risk-free debt. They also underestimated the effects that a liquidity crunch would have - any asset model backed by volatile assets assumes liquidity, but doesn't tell you what will happen in a period of non-liquidity. Do you think all these guys with fancy degrees did not think about this? Come on, of course they did. You don't even need to know about any model in particular to understand that models rest on assumptions. It's a high school concept they teach you in any TOK class. The reason GS was able to react is IMO they have a great network. The culture is geared towards finding out what other people are thinking. They're the only firm I've been out to dinner with where the guys cared to hear my opinion, in depth. The same salesguy at another shop reverted back to type. So they found out through their feedback that many, many people did not think the models were correct and acted on it.