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"We don’t want the state-run telcos in Saudi, Iran, Bahrain, Belarus, China, Egypt, Cuba, USA, etc… to have direct access to the metadata of TextSecure users in
by jlebar 12y ago
"We don’t want the state-run telcos in Saudi, Iran, Bahrain, Belarus, China, Egypt, Cuba, USA, etc… to have direct access to the metadata of TextSecure users in those countries or anywhere else."
I <3 Moxie.
- 616c 12y agoYou will like him more if you read why Saudi is the first one in that list.
- dewey 12y agoIn case anyone else is looking for the story: http://www.thoughtcrime.org/blog/saudi-surveillance/ http://www.thoughtcrime.org/blog/saudi-surveillance/
- mike_hearn 12y agoThe flip side is that identifying all users running TextSecure will get a lot easier, I presume. Previously telcos saw encrypted SMS (sometimes) and connections to GCM. Now they will see connections to TextSecure.
- dredmorbius 12y agoThere are possible ways to mask that, though they'd likely still draw attention. Assuming that any given endpoint was already a surveillance target, the advantage here is that the traffic cannot be used (or is less readily used) to determine contacts -- who's talking to whom.
- harry8 12y agoMore reason to use it and encourage your friends to use it while you still don't really need to.
- orblivion 12y agoI'm curious how GCM is much better? Granted Google isn't a state actor, but it's still a major corp.
- chinathrow 12y agoGoogle surely does not fall into the category of a state actor but has been widely reported as part of PRISM. Go figure.