4 ms·

Thanks for the reply. This is not homework. I'm actually trying to find a solution for something at work, and I've never had work on something like this.

e12e 12y ago
In which case, you might want to supply us with a little more detail. Last I looked (it's been a while) CAS seemed the most sane choice for something like this for an intranet-ish thing over http(s!) -- if you can't just use ssh and ssh certs (obviously very different use cases). Does anyone have any insight to what the state of the art is marrying kerberos ideas and nacl? I found this: http://www.slideshare.net/pieterh/zeromq-security http://www.slideshare.net/pieterh/zeromq-security But it is obviously somewhat dated now -- did zeromq+sasl+nacl go anywhere? In what form? I'd hoped that this would "get sorted" and allow saltstack to leverage something a little more standard (which would alleviate my last doubts about salt -- but my fears might be unfounded -- I've just not seen anything that really addresses the early issues they had with security/transport/encryption). Anyone using: https://github.com/zeromq/libcurve https://github.com/zeromq/libcurve in anger? Finally, I can't resist posting this soundtrack that I had serendipitously playing in the background as I read the above slidedeck: "Nothin' - Townes Van Zandt". Seemed oddly appropriate to go along with forward secrecy: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zZcH2OOMV4A https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zZcH2OOMV4A
- mangeletti 12y ago
  I wanted to understand the problem at an abstract level, rather than describing my exact use case, leading people into digressions, debates, etc. Also note, I answered my own question with HMAC being the probable solution (before anyone else mentioned HMAC), and others seemed to verify that this might be the best fit by answering with the same thing shortly thereafter. If I can give permission and I only need to provide permission, the only thing I only need is a way to transmit a message and prove that it wasn't modified while in-transit.
PeterWhittaker 12y ago
I strongly advise you to seek professional assistance with this. Everyone who has ever attempted to implement any kind of security mechanism without significant previous experience has failed, often spectacularly. This is especially true in authentication and access control, sometimes call IDAM (look that up, read, learn). You may do so well as to cover the vast majority of cases. Yet I guarantee you will leave an exploitable edge case that will leave your systems vulnerable. If they are Internet-facing, these vulnerabilities will be exploited, probably without you knowing it. I encourage to read about prevent, detect, respond, and recover, about defence in depth, about Kerberos, about PKI in general, about SSL and TLS and SSH specifically, and about IDAM. Do NOT attempt this on a production server until you know in your heart and gut and mind what was wrong with SSL v1 and v2, what is wrong with v3, and why we are now at TLS 1.2. Do not attempt this until you understand why having keepalives outside the security envelope is a flaw in any security protocol - or until you can argue clearly and cleanly why it may not be important in your case. Once you understand those things, you may start to understand how much you are missing. Learn about SPEKE, e.g., that will help too. I've been a security consultant for a long time, was a development manager and developer before that. Everybody gets their first implementation wrong. Everyone.

e12e 12y ago

In which case, you might want to supply us with a little more detail. Last I looked (it's been a while) CAS seemed the most sane choice for something like this for an intranet-ish thing over http(s!) -- if you can't just use ssh and ssh certs (obviously very different use cases). Does anyone have any insight to what the state of the art is marrying kerberos ideas and nacl? I found this: http://www.slideshare.net/pieterh/zeromq-security http://www.slideshare.net/pieterh/zeromq-security But it is obviously somewhat dated now -- did zeromq+sasl+nacl go anywhere? In what form? I'd hoped that this would "get sorted" and allow saltstack to leverage something a little more standard (which would alleviate my last doubts about salt -- but my fears might be unfounded -- I've just not seen anything that really addresses the early issues they had with security/transport/encryption). Anyone using: https://github.com/zeromq/libcurve https://github.com/zeromq/libcurve in anger? Finally, I can't resist posting this soundtrack that I had serendipitously playing in the background as I read the above slidedeck: "Nothin' - Townes Van Zandt". Seemed oddly appropriate to go along with forward secrecy: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zZcH2OOMV4A https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zZcH2OOMV4A

mangeletti 12y ago
I wanted to understand the problem at an abstract level, rather than describing my exact use case, leading people into digressions, debates, etc. Also note, I answered my own question with HMAC being the probable solution (before anyone else mentioned HMAC), and others seemed to verify that this might be the best fit by answering with the same thing shortly thereafter. If I can give permission and I only need to provide permission, the only thing I only need is a way to transmit a message and prove that it wasn't modified while in-transit.

PeterWhittaker 12y ago

I strongly advise you to seek professional assistance with this. Everyone who has ever attempted to implement any kind of security mechanism without significant previous experience has failed, often spectacularly. This is especially true in authentication and access control, sometimes call IDAM (look that up, read, learn). You may do so well as to cover the vast majority of cases. Yet I guarantee you will leave an exploitable edge case that will leave your systems vulnerable. If they are Internet-facing, these vulnerabilities will be exploited, probably without you knowing it. I encourage to read about prevent, detect, respond, and recover, about defence in depth, about Kerberos, about PKI in general, about SSL and TLS and SSH specifically, and about IDAM. Do NOT attempt this on a production server until you know in your heart and gut and mind what was wrong with SSL v1 and v2, what is wrong with v3, and why we are now at TLS 1.2. Do not attempt this until you understand why having keepalives outside the security envelope is a flaw in any security protocol - or until you can argue clearly and cleanly why it may not be important in your case. Once you understand those things, you may start to understand how much you are missing. Learn about SPEKE, e.g., that will help too. I've been a security consultant for a long time, was a development manager and developer before that. Everybody gets their first implementation wrong. Everyone.