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"IPSec and IPv6 mobility were great ideas that are poorly executed. In reality they should be closely bound -- you cannot securely or reliably implement endpoin
by dsr_ 12y ago
"IPSec and IPv6 mobility were great ideas that are poorly executed. In reality they should be closely bound -- you cannot securely or reliably implement endpoint mobility without authentication."
I have been told -- take this at unsubstantiated rumor level only -- that the NSA opposed the idea that all IPv6 stacks would use opportunistic encryption by default, and exerted influence to make sure that did not happen.
- api 12y agoIt's entirely possible. I have some folks I'm working with right now who are not super-technical. I need to send them some bank account digits. This is surprisingly challenging. I mean all I want to do is to encrypt a set of very important numbers very securely and send them, and there is no really good user-friendly way to do that. I sometimes wonder if that's accidental. At the same time though: IPSec is a mess. It's overly complex, hard to deploy, and generally really annoying to use at the implementation level. I suspect that had as much to do with it as any protocol committee maneuvering. One thing I don't understand about crypto protocol design: why do they end up including every damn algorithm under the sun? I mean, pick a good one at the time of design and use that and include a facility to enable it to be superseded if problems appear. Right now that would be AES+GCM or Salsa/ChaCha+Poly1305. Nothing else is worth using so why would you include it in the spec?