3 ms·
Seems like this could be simplified to simply extend standard OTP (with the caveat of requiring a camera on the laptop, probably invalidating one of the use-cas
by e12e 12y ago
Seems like this could be simplified to simply extend standard OTP (with the caveat of requiring a camera on the laptop, probably invalidating one of the use-cases of OTP: logging in to low-security accounts on a kiosk pc):
1: Set up OTP as usual (pc/web-app shows qr code,
scan code with phone. Server and phone now share
a private secret for generating OTP tokens)
2: For login: phone displays QR-code, pc/web-app asks
for image input (with 6-digit code fallback) --
user holds up phone to pc-camera.
I don't really see how Clef offers any benefit, except that you can't use standard OTP with Clef. Am I missing something?
- harshreality 12y agoFunctionally that's what it sounds like they've done with their offline mode. They use "wave" style images instead of qr codes. They also use asymmetric crypto I think, like FIDO, but unlike OTP. It might not be feasible to offer a 6-digit code fallback, though, unless you can map RSA or ECDSA or whatever they're using into a problem with a 20-bit solution space without allowing offline brute forcing. Their offline mode seems like FIDO but with a bidirectional wave image / camera requirement to get around lack of a better data channel (like u2f-hid support that FIDO requires).
- e12e 12y ago> It might not be feasible to offer a 6-digit code fallback, though, unless you can map RSA or ECDSA or whatever they're using into a problem with a 20-bit solution space without allowing offline brute forcing. Probably not. Supporting traditional (T)OTP is more about interop than anything else (the back-end just gets a one-time code to check against a list/counter or against a time-derived token, checking for drift etc. Main point is you can keep your auth-stack as-is, and your shared totp-secret in the same place[t]). You could probably do assymetric crypto fine with qr-codes[1] they pack a lot of data. If an ECDSA signature is ~48 bytes[2] -- that's going to be hard to compact down to a reasonable fallback... maybe. If the idea is to use asymmetric crypto as a backing for OTP, I suppose you'd do something like signing TIME+salt, and transmit the signature and the salt. Unless there is some trick one can do with checking partial asymmetric signatures, I don't see how you could get away with sending less than SIG+salt, or ~50 bytes. That's way too long for typing in, as a usable fall-back. It might actually involve less typing to generate a shared secret -- but that'd completely break the UX -- so it doesn't sound like a sane fall-back to me. [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QR_code http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QR_code [2] http://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/3216/signatures-rsa-compared-to-ecdsa http://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/3216/signatures-rs... [t] http://spod.cx/blog/two-factor-ssh-auth-with-pam_oath-google-authenticator.shtml http://spod.cx/blog/two-factor-ssh-auth-with-pam_oath-google...
- 616c 12y agoI worked with some people testing out such a solution, but I think we all had doubts. http://www.microstrategy.com/us/security http://www.microstrategy.com/us/security